Consensual Sexual Morality – II

A moral outlook has two parts: A theory of right, and and a theory of good. The bipartite division is based on the first principal of natural morality: Do good, avoid evil! The theory of right specifies what we have a right to do. These rights are what we may do without doing evil. So, in effect, the theory of right part tells us what we ought not do. These “Thou shalt not” are protective. For instance, in consensual sexual morality, sexual dignity is to be protected. Consensual Sexual Morality – I presents the theory of right for consensual sexual morality. The first principle of natural morality is not only protective, it is also calls for promotion of what is good. Promotion of what is good is the theory of good for a moral outlook.

It is worth noting that the first principle of natural law can be read in two ways depending upon whether the protection part is taken as more important than the promotion part. If a condition, such as dignity, which is not by itself a good, as needing protection at all costs, then promotion of positive goods are constrained by prohibitions against infringing upon that protected condition. These are rights moral outlooks. On the contrary if the only, or primary, protection needed is hinderance of the good, then we have a beneficent or teleological moral outlook for acts are judged by how well they promote that for which they are good. The consensual sexual morality theory I am constructing is a rights theory.

Why does the moral outlook of consensual sex have a theory of rights as more fundamental than its theory of good? Sexual practice is obviously in pursuit of some good in the sense of something highly desired for its own sake. People avidly engage in courting, bonding and mating. Unfortunately, sexual practices provide many affronts to human dignity; especially using others as merely bodies for some satisfaction. The affronts to human dignity require moral thought to protect human dignity. So, when we come to moralize sexual practice we must first protect human dignity. Once the constraints on pursuit of the good are in place, attention can refocus on the good to consider how it may be promoted.

What is the good of sexual activity from the perspective of consensual sexual morality? The sexual activity of the human animal, as for other animals, consists of the reproductive activities of courting, mating and bonding. I use “mating” to refer to the various uses of the genitalia for arousal and pleasure; not only to coitus. Mating is an episode beginning with some arousal actions, a climax and some post climatic states. Why do we do these things? No doubt a function of our sexual activity is reproduction of our species. Instincts are a foundation for sexual practices. Most likely we have evolved, or been created, to find the activities desirable for their own sake. However, in humans sexual activities are also intentional. A crucial assumption I put at the foundations of consensual sexual morality holds: It is in what people intend where we find what is the good of a practice in the sense of what is the purpose of a practice. If we study the human species as zoologists, human sexuality is for reproduction and bonding – has the function of reproduction and forming a foundational element of social grouping. When we examine the human condition with a view to discovering or inventing, our place in reality and purpose of our lives, we, from the perspective of consensual sexual moralists, hold that the pleasure of mating episodes is the purpose of human sexuality. For only self-conscious rational beings set purposes.

When writing of consensual sexual morality, accuracy requires a more comprehensive term for the genitalia manipulation phase of sexuality than “mating episode.” The term “mating” suggests an activity whose function is reproduction. Consensual sexual moralists find good in the pleasure of masturbation and same-sex genital manipulation. So, I offer “erotic episode” as a more comprehensive term. Colloquially, “making love” and “having sex” are terms for what I here call erotic episodes. When writing of erotic episodes, accuracy also requires a moral general term than “genitalia manipulation” since while people have sex, more body parts than genitalia may be manipulated. Indeed, material objects such as sex toys and pornography may be involved in the episode. I am writing about sexual morality; not about sex itself. So, I do not want to describe details. I label all those actions used for arousal and pleasure in an erotic episode “erotic actions”. Many, if not most, erotic actions are clearly identified as sexual. However, there are many other actions, not readily identifiable as having anything to do with sexuality, which for various reasons some people use in erotic episodes for sexual arousal and pleasure such as whipping, choking and even killing. These non-sexual actions are morally forbiden even if not forbidden by sexual morality. Consensual sexual moralists have more morality than sexual morality. So, even if an erotic episode in which all parties consented to all erotic actions, there could be moral condemnation of strangling a woman even if she consented. The strangling would not be condemned as a sexual wrong but as the wrong of strangling someone.

In the following I assume that if people engage in a practice for its own sake, they intend to do so.

We cannot assume that people engage in the varieties of courting, mating and bonding with the intention of reproduction. For one, humans needed to learn that the natural function of coitus is conception and birth. Secondly, at least in recent history, there are intentions to avoid conception. What in this triad of courting, mating and bonding is most likely to be desired for its own sake? Courting is for the sake of finding a mating partner. Bonding is for the sake of supporting results of the mating. This leaves the erotic episodes to be desired for their own sake.

Do people pursue erotic episodes for their own sake? The “in general answer” is: People pursue erotic episodes simply because they are highly desired. In general truths are not necessary truths. But they hold for the vast majority of situations And a special explanation has to be given to support a claim that the “in general” claim is rejected for a special case.. So, it is a fact that erotic episodes are desired for their own sake. Critical thinkers may note that being desired does not mean being good. So, consensual sexual moralists add to their rights principles about protecting sexual dignity a value principle that the pleasure of erotic episodes is a basic human good. Consensual sexual morality is sex positive! Individuals experience sexual pleasure, but the judgment that this pleasure is good is a judgment that we have an obligation to increase the experiences of it both numerically and qualitatively. But obligations to promote good are obligations to do so when we can actually accomplish something without doing more harm than good. For instance, an increase in what is good might be accomplish by providing opportunities for people with physical disabilities to enjoy erotic episodes

Erotic episodes have participants and can be evaluated on the basis of the sexual pleasure of the participants. But the evaluation does not call for specific action for it is not ordered and there is no clear way of adding pleasures. But most of all, rights protection is more important that sexual pleasure promotion. An erotic episode with a USA billionaire and an eight-year old girl in Southeast Asia may be very good because of the intense pleasure of the adult. But its goodness does nothing to remove the fact that it is categorically forbidden as a degradation of the girl’s sexual dignity, and indeed the dignity of all girls.

It may be that pornography enhances sexual pleasure for male viewers who masturbate and even for male/female couples who view it together. But promoting pornography might have undesirable consequences for society. Here is a situation where we might do more harm than good by promoting what we think we do by promoting sexual pleasure.

A summary of the relations of right, good and erotic actions in erotic episodes is helpful. Here I use “coerced” rather than “non-consensual” although some non-onsensual acts are not strictly speaking coerced. I use “coerced” to emphasize the negativity of the types of non-consensual actions to which I allude. An erotic action is right (morally permissible by sexual morality ) if and only if no participant is coerced to perform or allow it. An erotic episode is right (morally permissible by sexual morality) if and only if the none of the erotic actions are coerced. The pleasures of participants are good whether in the actions or in the whole episode; but pleasures do not justify.

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Consensual Sexual Morality – II

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