Monthly Archives: October 2026

Teleological Structure of Conjugal Sexual Morality

A moral outlook’s theory of good characterizes the good we are to promote and how to promote it But ways of promotion of good are constrained by the definite prohibitions from its theory of evil. Both structurally and materially conjugal sexual morality’s theory of good differs greatly from that of consensual sexual morality. Consensual sexual morality’s theory of evil prohibits violation of sexual autonomy and its theory of good promotes sexual satisfaction. However, protection of sexual autonomy is independent of sexual satisfaction. Autonomy is independent of what sexuality is for. Conjugal sexual morality’s theory of evil is to avoid that which interferes with what sexuality is for – sexuality’s telos. Thus, the evil of conjugal sexual morality is not independent of the good of conjugal sexual morality. Hence, consensual sexual morality can be called a “rights theory of sexual morality” while consensual sexual morality can be called a “teleological theory of sexual morality.” Consensual’ s sexual good is uncovered by asking what sexual desire is for. The answer is sexual satisfaction. Sexual satisfaction is naturally and immediately seen as desirable. Conjugal’ s sexual good is uncovered by asking what are sexual satisfactions for.

The answer of marriage and family is not immediately seen as describing a good. I am a participant in a program for promoting Catholic male morality TMIY (That Man Is You). The challenges of marriage are clearly brought out. It must be admitted that finding sexual satisfactions under the constraints of attaining them only in conditions which are not contrary to what they are for may lead to a diminishing of sexual satisfactions, In one of the sessions on marriage there was a quotation from St. John Paul II: “Spouses are the permanent reminder to the Church of what happened on the cross.” The burdens of marriage are clearly brought out in Bishop Erik Varden in his October 15, 20261 blog post on a Vatican meeting on marriage held ten years after publication of Pope Francis’ Apostolic Letter on marriage Laetitiae Amor.

“The spouses are themselves the agents of the sacrament. They nonetheless make it in church, before the cross. To say yes to the question, ‘Will you love and honour each other all the days of your life and accept with love the children God may send?’, is to consent to a share in the cross. Any spousal and parental love involves suffering. It will pierce the heart. It will require one’s life to be poured out that others may live. 

To embrace this reality knowingly from the start, consenting to a share in Christ’s life-giving cross, will give spouses strength to carry their burdens, making even heavy things seem light. The horizontal relationship between husband and wife, parents and children, will be sustained by a sure, dependable vertical axis. “

Marriage and children certainly can be appreciated as a basic good upon reflection. Nonetheless, the good of conjugal sexual morality is definitely an acquired taste. It’s an adult good.

Is it really an adult good? Rather, is it not an adolescent good? Is it not rather a fantasy for young people who would like their story to be one of meeting, going through the trials and tribulations of courtship before falling completely in love resulting in a life-long marriage in which they live happily ever after? The reply is that we need not be and are not ignorant of the challenges of a lifelong monogamous marriage. The good of marriage is a good of struggle – a good of coping with hardship. The good of conjugal sexual morality is not a good of happiness. Happiness is a static condition. Marriage is a good of struggling. In light of this type of goodness, the basic line of defense for conjugal sexual morality will be that whatever sexual activity weakens us for this struggling is immoral.

Another post on conjugal sexual morality’s good is needed to clarify what I have here tentatively called “a good of struggling.” Other titles are “quest goods” or “task goods”

  1. Laetitiae Amor – Coram Fratribus

Consensual Sexual Morality Would Condemn Cornell Seven “Orgy”

At this time, October 2026, there is much discussion of a September 2024 sexual orgy in the Chi Phi Cornell fraternity house. Since seven young men engaged in various sexual acts with a coed called Jane Doe, the incident is called the Cornell Seven In the New York Times, October 8, 2926, Christine Emba wrote “reliance on consent as the ultimate arbiter of acceptability has left us unable to recognize and critique bad behavior outside of its narrow definition of criminal sex. ” She went on to write “That gap between “legal” and “decent” is where moral criticism does its work, but a lack of a moral language strips us of the nuance needed to empathize with victims and to come up with a social, not just a juridical, response. Without that vocabulary, it’s difficult to express what we want our shared sexual culture to look like. ”

However, writers who hold what I call “consensual sexual morality” have lifted the notion of consent above its legal context. The bar for morally acceptable consent is high. All of the students involved were intoxicated with alchohol and ketamine. Even if they were predisposed to sexual activity involving more than two people, at the time they were unable to provide genuine consent. See *for an argument that typical college parties prevent conditions for genuine consent. Thus all of the sexual activity described for the Cornell Seven orgy was immoral. The parties involved acted immorally from the prespective of consensual sexual morality. Morality includes more than fundamental rules. There are rules about not providing support for immoral activities and not stopping them. So, consensual sexual morality can morally castigated responsible officials for not preventing these kinds of activities from occurring. Also by-standers can be morally criticized for not trying to intervene.

I conjecture that faculty and professors developed consensual sexual morality to have moral language adequate to condemn behaviour such as that of the Cornell Seven plus one.

My fear is that the language of consensual sexual morality has become our shared moral language; or, at least, the moral language of the opinion forming elite. As a result we cannot morally condemn that type of group sexual activity even if all of the participants were mature, sober and of sound mind.

*James Rocha, College Party Hook Ups: Consent, Apps, and Double Standards

Conjugal Sexual Morality -Theory of Evil

What are the basic evil and good of conjugal sexual morality? I answer by asking myself this question. The answer may be found scattered through out various authors over the centuries. I been influenced by other writers. But now I have to answer why I think conjugal sexual morality is the reasonable morality by which to live. And I force myself to answer in the framework I have specified: Theory of evil, theory of good. If others have answered along these lines better than me, they deserve credit. But I will engage in no scholarship. Here I sketch out conjugal sexual morality’s basic definite duties to avoid sexual evil.

Sexual evil is satisfaction of a sexual desire which is a satisfaction contrary to that for which sexual satisfactions exist.

The basic principle for perfect duties holds: Do not seek sexual evil! Which means for sexual morality: Do not seek sexual satisfactions contrary to that for which sexual satisfactions exist

Note that sexual evil is not undesirable. Instead, it is explicit that sexual evil might be highly desirable for evil is satisfaction of a desire

What are sexual satisfactions for? Sexual satisfactions are for procreation, bonding of a man and woman in a lifelong monagamous union and temporary easing of sexual desires.

Note that the question was not “What are sexual desires for?” The question was “What are satisfactions of sexual desires for.

With this specification of what sexual satisfaction is for, we can sketch a stereotypical conjugal sexual morality.

Condemnation of masturbation and homosexuality are immediate consequences. Adultery is contrary to monagamous bonding. Similarily, fornication is contrary to permanent bonding. Cohabitation is also contrary to permanent bonding. For cohabitation is for temporary bonding. Cohabitation is practice in a non-binding relation which is contrary to strengthening a permanent bond, Use of chemical or physical contraceptive techniques is contrary to reproduction. However, marital coitus only when conception is highly improbable is arguably permissible for nothing is done in attainment of the satisfaction which renders it contrary to conception.

This sexual morality need not be puritanical or prudish, As I see it, sexual actions in an erotic episode of a married couple – a conjugal episode- are permissible as long as the episode ends in coitus open to conception. In this connection see, Sexual Morality & Conjugal Episodes. See alsoErotic Episodes and Erotic Actions.

Rather than write more about what the outlook condemns and permits, it is more important to characterise the assumptions about reality of this moral outlook. For the justification of the assumptions about reality are crucial for defense of the sexual morality built upon them. I brought out these assumptions in a fable about a society finally developing The Intercourse Theory of Conception. Here I lay them out as principles. They need to be justified in subsequent posts.

Satisfaction of human desires are for the sake of human goods.

Humans can and do attain satisfactions of a desire which are in conformity to that for which the satisfaction is for. These are orderly satisfactions.

Humans can and do attain satisfactions of a desire which is contrary to what that satisfaction is for. These are disorderly satisfactions.

The outlook is based on a dread of disorderly satisfactions even if such satisfactions are by themselves desirable.

Disorder satisfactions are evil

Note how there can be intrinsically disordered satisfactions. The satisfaction of an orgasm in masturbation is intrinsically disordered because there is no way it can be ordered to procreation or masturbation. However, the satisfaction in coitus is disordered in fornication but ordered in marital coitus. So, the satisfaction in fornication is not intrinsically disordered.

A case needs to be made that disorderly satisfactions are undesirable. This will be an appeal to our moral aspirations.

A case needs to be made that satisfaction have a purpose. this will be a metaphysical case.