Monthly Archives: July 2025

Jesus Would Not Have Reasoned as a Consequentialist

This essay supplements my essay on Jesus’ sexual morality. In that essay, I argued that Jesus would never have masturbated because he was a moral genius. I elaborate on notion of moral genius and emphasize that the reasoning of a moral genius, especially in his early years when he would be a moral prodigy, is not that of a utilitarian or more broadly: a consequentialist.

His genius was possessing from a very early age perfect applied moral reasoning of a type frequently called natural law moral reasoning. Applied moral reasoning is primarily knowing how to do good and avoid evil. It is knowing, on a particular occasion how to organize the facts characterizing the situation and the values relevant to the situation into an intention to do good and avoid evil. The genius, as brought out below, invariably has the will to carry out his intention.

For instance, consider how I argue that a moral genius would resist a temptation to replicate the sensation of an unintended orgasm? He would recognize that he could aim at getting a pleasure and that since he had a desire for that pleasure it would be good. He would also recognize that he could manipulate himself to attain that pleasure. And, perhaps less clearly, he would recognize that such manipulations could be done whenever he wished. He was also at a stage of life when he knew of the role of male orgasms in reproduction. This knowledge of “the facts of life” brought with it recognition that lifelong monagamous bonding of a male and female for reproduction and mutual care was a basic human good. A basic human good is one which ought never be intenitonally set aside. Along with the recognition of the basic goodness of marriage, there would be the recognition that the pleasure of an orgasm is one of the features which make for marriage’s basic goodness. With this meagar but crucial information, the moral genius knows how to form an intention not to masturbate because an intention to masturbate would beintending what is evil – not good. The intention to masturbate would intend that the basic good of marriage could be set aside for only a portion of it. That would be intending evil since a basic good ought never be set aside for only a fragment of it.

More elaboration my be needed to persuaded everyone that the unarticulated reasoning of the alleged genius is correct. Here I want to give a reminder of the limited about of factual information – knowledge that – required. If the reasoning of the moral prodigy were to be based on an evaluation of the consequences of masturbating, an immense amount of factual information about the future would have to be innate to the child. Assuming an ability to organize a small amount of facts and values is more probable.

But making a correct moral decision requires more than forming a correct intention

A perfect applied practical reason is a reason for which to know the good is to do the good. Here I put myself on the side of those, such as St. Paul in Rm 7:19, who recognize weakness of the will. A weak will may not choose the good it intends. A perfect applied practical reason is a reason for which to intend the good is to choose the good. A moral genius is one with a perfect applied moral reason.

For a moral genius to intend the good is to choose the good. However, this choice may not be easy. A moral genius can be tempted and overcoming the temptation may be painful. However, the moral genius always has the will to endure the pain of setting aside the lesser good for the more fundamental good.