Category Archives: Sexual morality

Consensual Sexual Morality – I

August 12, 2026Moral Neutrality of Sexual Activity, Nihilism, Sexual moralitykielkopf1

(This post is subject to frequent modification since I am using posts on consensual sexual morality to develop a book comparing Consensual and Conjugal Sexual Morality.)

Consensual sexual morality is a reaction to the sexual revolution beginning in the mid-twentieth century. It is progressive; not reactionary. There is no plea for restoration of traditional sexual morality or as I call it Conjugal Sexual Morality. The project is to maintain and even expand the liberation of ways of satisfying sexual desires while providing moral correction for the discontents with the amorality of liberated sexuality. What is so good about the liberation? What is wrong with the amorality? The question about the goodness of sexual liberation is the topic for Consensual Sexual Morality-II. Progression beyond sexual amorality is a topic here.

Intellectual respectability no longer requires amorality. The tyranny of logical positivism has been long defeated. A theory of amorality maintains moral judgments of right or wrong, good or evil are only expressions of preferences; never correct or incorrect. In the mid-twentieth century, there was a “moral theory” revolution. If making moral judgments and supporting these judgments with reasons for thinking them correct is a traditional view, this revolution in moral theory is reactionary. There is a complex and intellectually fascinating history of the effort to restore moral judging as rigorous as reasoning in any area. Here, it suffices, to note that philosophers and other sophisticated writers reflecting on dissatisfactions of the sexual revolution approach the issues with a mindset that they may and ought to analyze attitudes and actions with a view to judging which are right or wrong, good or evil. Popularly, those participating in the sexual revolution or even those suffering from it, may express the amorality view of “Who is to judge?” But the popular sexual amorality is naive.

However, an inconsistency in the popular amorality reveals how moral thinking can engage with liberated sexuality. The popular view is that anything sexual is permissible as long as it is consensual. This judgment about the impermissibility of non-consensual sex is, of course, inconsistent with an alleged amorality. The inconsistency of the popular outlook is uninteresting. The interesting issues are how and why consent is necessary, and perhaps sufficient, for morally permissible sexual activity from the perspective of the new sexual morality? And then, how does the consent requirement lead to a requirement to uncover and satisfy authentic desires?

The moral stance I develop is my own construction of a moral point of view from which I could make the judgments of progressive sexual morality in the articles which expressed moral judgements. The articles in the Palgrave anthology expressing moral judgements are primarily applications of the moral theories of the authors. Indeed, the Palgrave anthology is an anthology of articles on sexual ethics. They do not elaborate on their theoretical stances. We could say that in ethics we apply a moral theory to types of situations while in casusistry we apply moral theory to particular cases. Here it is worth repeating that consensual sexual moralists follow the traditional ways of thinking and speaking morally. They accept general structural rules such as “Do good, avoid evil,” “Treat similar cases the same,” “Each human being has, at some level, equal worth,” Moral judgments are to be supported with reasons. So, I develop a moral stance for consensual sexual morality which, to the best of my ability, avoids logical errors and misuses of moral language. An example of a logically inconsistent use of moral language would be “Necrophila is intrinsically wrong although permissible if she would have given consent to such use of her body before she died.”¹

In sexual activity, it is tempting and extraordinarily easy to treat another person as merely a body to satisfy desires. People can feel degraded and misused after sexual activity or feel shame that they degraded and misued another. The amorality of the sexual revolution revolution promised a “garden of delight” but left us in the same old “vale of tears.” On college and university campuses there were many injustices of too much strictness and too much leniency about consent. Indeed, the Palgrave essays by faculty members are intended to give moral guidance for disputes about consent. The #MeToo reaction made clear how many women in the work-place felt degraded, misused and disrespected. Writers examined the deep dissatisfaction. See Review of Christine Emba’s Re-thinking Sex: A Provocation, The recent release of the Epstein files reveal the need of moral guidance for how rich and famous men who degraded themselves by using young girls. A theme in these lamentations is “I didn’t really consent to this.”

How can we frame the problem of degradation so that moral thought can be used to address it? The concept of respect links moral thought to psychological problems of degradation. The degradation is based on failing to respect how our bodies are to be used in sexual activity. What is it to respect how our bodies are used in sexual activity? Consensual sexual moralists are not Kantians. But as I read their concerns, most hold that each human being is an end-in-itself and it is morally wrong to treat any human being only as a means to an end. Following this principle is respecting human dignity. How do we respect human dignity in sexual activity? In other words, how do we respect the sexual dignity of each and every person with whom we have sexual activity? As a sexual end-in-itself, each person is the ultimate authority on how his or her body is to be used. However, this authority is valid only if the consent truly comes from the person himself or herself. In other words, the consent is valid only if it is autonomous or as I prefer to say: only if there is full consent of the will. Another term used for authorative consent is authentic consent – that which the person genuinely wants. In regard to never using anyone as a means only, the principle tells us never to engage in sexual activity regardless of the full consent of the parties.

This categorical imperative does not require denying oneself any sexual activity; only doing it with total disregard for consent is forbidden. I coin the term “aspirational imperative” because human sexuality provides little time or incentive before sexual activity to carefully consider the character of the consent.

In a more complete presentation of Consensual Sexual Morality, there are several topics which need to be developed about this principle that a sexual activity is morally correct if and only if what is done is done with the full consent of all parties involved. The goodness of such a morally correct sexual activity is the topic of the next post: Consensual Sexual Morality-II.

First, I have stated the principle as an “if and ony if” principle. I add the “if” by assuming that the Kantian sounding principle is the only moral norm specified for sexual activity. To say that it is specified for sexual activity is not simply to say respect human dignity in sexual activity. It says respect human sexual dignity. Consensual sexual morality avoids two errors about sexual morality. One error is to think sexual activity is too trivial to be of moral concern. But if sexual morality is based on respecting human dignity, it is far from trivial. A second error is to demonize sexuality as too powerful to be constrained by moral thinking. But if sexual morality is ultimately respecting human dignity, there is hope that moral thought can guide it. For sexuality is not some external force but part of our nature.

Second, Consensual sexual morality focuses primarily on the courting dimension of sexuality. Sexual activity occurs along three dimensions: courting, mating (use of genitalia) and bonding. Consensual sexual morality focuses primarily on courting as partner selection. It seems that consensual sexual morality refards all mating (use of genitalia) as morally neutral. No Palgrave writers examine use of genitalia with an aim to uncover their proper use. Bonding as in romantic love or marriage gets some attention which gives results contrary to conjugal sexual morality. What guidelines does consensusal sexual morality have for bonding. Interesting areas are whether romantic love compromises consent, when romantic love should be suppressed and when pursuit of consent becomes “stalking” or harrassment.

Third, Consensual sexual morality is not utilitarian. Sometimes in moral theory, we are asked to look at acts with a tripartite framework. There is the object or what is to be done, the intentions and motives of the actors, and the consequences of what is to be done. According to this framework, the consensual sexual morality I am constructing regards only the motives and intentions of the actors. What is done and its likely consequences are morally irrelevant or morally neutral².

Fourth, consensual sexual ethics is primarily a virtue or character morality. The goal is to become the kind of person who strives to engage in only morally correct sexual activities – those with full consent of all participants.There need be no claim that sexual activity will be more enjoyable for those who strive to engage in only morally correct sexual activities. They can answer that trying to be that way is the right thing to do. This how my defense of Conjugal Sexual Morality as an antidote to nihilism is undercut. Consensual sexual moralists can also give meaning to their lives by stoically adhering to the duty of being morally correct sexual partners.

Fifth, Consensual sexual morality is not hedonistic. It does hold that pleasure is the goal of sexuality. However, the pursuit of pleasure is contrained by seeking the pleasure in the proper way.

Sixth, Living in accordance with consensual sexual morality is not easy. The difficulties do not come from prohibitions of sexual activity. The difficulties come from anxiety that one’s own sexual activity and that of others are morally problematic. It is very difficult to determine that one’s own sexual consent is full, genuine or authentic; let alone that of another. Hence, there is anxiety that most sexual activity is morally problematic.³But apart from clear cases of forcible rape there are indefinitely many circmstances which case doubt on whether or not the consent was genuine, real, authentic. One author claimed that excessively loud music at college The solace is that one can be striving to become a morally proper sexual agent while being willing to admit that no sexual activity ever reaches the level of morally correct.

Seventh, Basing sexual morality on respect for human dignity leads to rules of sexual morality being principles of human justice as well as promoting sexual activity as a matter of justice. If all genuine sexual desires are legitimate, the prohibiting exercise of some is an afront to the sexual dignity of those who have such desires. Hence, all activities hindering expressions of homosexual desires are violation of human dignity. For consensual sexual morality condemnation of homosexuality as intrinsically disordered is itself intrinsically disorder. If sexual satisfaction is regarded as a good, then there will be concern about a just distribution of this good. Polices that allow certain sorts of people few if any outlets for sexual satisfaction are disrespectful of the sexual dignity of those people.

Since consensual sexual morality is based on respect for human dignity, consensual sexual morality is not relativistic.

Eighth, Is being an authentic choice, choice with full consent of the will or autonomous choice is always a choice for what is right? It is a mark of being fully responsible for the choice. so, seeking to work with others on projects with which you seek their autonomous choice is only showing them respect. It is not seeking for an affirmation that what is to be done is in accordance with morality. However, what if we are asking for genuine consent or authentic consent?

Ninth, What are the sanctions forrules of consensual sexual morality? What happens when there is reckless disregard for consent? I think it would be difficult to make a factual case that people would be happier if they mst followed the guidelines of consensual sexual morality. I think that any moral theory is ultimately going to need a metaphysical theory to point out that there are sanctions for violating moral rules. Challenges to any such metaphysical theory about providers of sanctions is what really threatens being a realist about morality.

Tenth, What constraints does authenticity place on the sexuality one can choose? This is closely connected to the eighth point above

Can one have an authentic desire for sexual activity with another regardless of the authentic desires of the other? I think a plausible case can be made for holding that a person who desires to use another solely as an object for satisfaction of his desires does not care about authenticity. One can’t authetically not care about authenticity.

If I desire to use another regardless of their desires I desire to ignore human dignity. If I desire to ignore human dignity, then I ignore human dignity in myself. If I ignore human dignity in myself, then I ignore my authority to determine my authentic desires. If I ignore my authority to determine my authentic desires, then I do not determine my authentic desires. So, if I desire to use another regardless of their desires, I do not determine my authentic desires.

Can a person authentically desire that he be used only as an object for satisfying another’s desires?

If I desire to be used by another regardless of my desires, then I ignore human dignity in myself. If I ignore human dignity in myself, then I ignore my authority to determine my authentic desires. If I ignore my authority to determine my authentic desires, then I do not determine my authentic desires. So, if I desire to be used by another regardless of my desires, I do not determine my authentic desires.

To repeat, consider a brief argument that an authentic sexual desire is never for a sexual act which disregards the authentic consent of all concerned. An agent searching himself or herself for an authentic desire is searching for a desire which respects his or her sexual dignity. So, he or she has a concern for respecting human dignity. Hence, this agent will act as is or her sexual desire only acts respecting sexual dignity of all involve.

Here is another way to for trying to characterize the sexual morality of the progressive writers in this Handbook. One framework for organizing a sexual morality for humans is to regard it as for human reproductive. In this framework, we can divide sexuality into three main types of activity: courting, mating (genital activity) and bonding. In this framework, the purpose of sexuality is the pairing of a man and a woman to provide mutual support of each other in the bringing forth and caring for their children. The morality of acts in courting Mate selection, mating and bonding is weighed by considering how well they promote supportive monagous unity and children. A new sexual morality can be developed by changing the purpose of sexuality. How can the purpose of sexuality be changed? The theory that it is the means of reproducing the human species is well-established. Also, in theory, there is the prospect of reproduction without sexuality. So, the features of sexuality: courting, mating and bonding are not essentially linked with reproduction. so, their purpose could be for some other good. What might this other good be? Is it to be discovered or invented? Despite frustrations, there is a battery of physical, interpersonal and emotional delights in the courting, mating and bonding that have evolved in the human species to maintain our species. That battery of delights is desired. Being universally (almost) desired makes this battery of delights a candidate for being a basic human good. A revolution in sexual morality is to assume -better: to suddenly recognize- the battery of sexual delights is a basic human good. Taking the battery of sexual delights as a basic human good is compatible with a variety of other moral theories. You would expect that the greatest differences in morals would be between those who take sexual delights as the purpose of sexuality and those who take reproduction as the purpose of sexuality. However, since sexuality does function for reproduction there will still be courting, mating and bonding in the battery of sexual delights – only differently for the new telos of sexuality. Since sexuality is a basic good we are obliged to promote it in ourselves and in others, especially those with whom we have sexual relations. Hence, carrying out the command to promote what people desire sexually, we are morally obliged to find out what we and our partners really desire sexually.. Thus the imperative for authenticity. If we seek sexual delights with another person regardless of what they really desire, we use them as a means for our own delights. If we use them as a means only for our own delights, we are not acting on the imperative to promote sexual delights since we ignore attainment of delights in the other person.

Conjugal outlook: Sexuality is for reproduction. . Reproduction is the good for determining sexual morality. Here facts give the standard for sexual morality.

Relativistic outlook: There is no purpose for sexuality. Good order in the community is standard for its regulation. This is amorality of sexuality

Consensual outlook: Sexuality is for satisfaction of sexual desires. this requires that each individual uncover his own desires and seek to satisfy them with someone else who has uncovered his true desires.

The desire satisfaction has been chosen by people autonomously but not arbitraryrily afer all there are the desires.

Each person has their own sexuality. This is not to say that each person has a unique sexuality. Two or more people may have the same sexuality. The claim is that each person has a sexuality which is their own It is a pattern of desires that if they knew the truth about themselves and could express that truth, they would say that is what they are sexually. A type of sexuality is a component of personal identity. But sexuality is necessary for a personal identity. An asexual person can have an inauthentic sexual identity if he simply lives without sexual desires while never bring it to consciousness to accept asexuality as his way of being sexual. However, ethnicity can be a component of personal identity but it need not be. For instance, I choose to ignore ethnicity as characterizing myself.s But I know men whose being Irish is a component of their identity.

People have privileged access to what they believe, hope for and desire. This means that the ultimate authority on what a person believes and desires is the person. When a person authoritatively(autonomously) judges what he believes, hopes for and desires, what he so judges is his authentic beliefs, hopes and desires.

Social forces can lead people to have a sexuality which is not their real or authentic sexuality. There is no claim that an authentic sexuality has to be the individual’s invention. The basic sexualities are given to a person although variants can be invented. The authenticity or autonomy comes from accepting a sexuality as one’s own. There is a “That’s for me” accepting of a sexuality.

The sexuality of a person can change and the new sexuality is authentic as long as it is autonomously accepted.

There is no normal sexuality. Sexualities are morally neutral. No sexuality is intrinsically disordered.

Sex-positivity extends the moral neutrality of the physical dimension of sexual acts. Not only sexual acts morally neutral they are part of a natural good viz. sexual pleasure. Attainment of sexual pleasure is to be promoted and its attainment is not to be directly frustrated.

Sexual autonomy is to recognize and accept one’s authentic sexuality.

Dignity is measured by what a person is is free to do.

All people are free to choose their identity. So, there is a basic sense of dignity in which all people have equal dignity. This is the freedom to choose their authentic identity as their identity. This is human dignity. When we focus on sexuality we can talk of human sexual dignity or simply sexual dignity. Sexual dignity is each person’s freedom to choose their authentic sexuality as their identifying sexuality.

. Respect for human sexual dignity requires accepting any authentic sexuality as legitimate for no person is illegitimate. No person is born bad.

The basic moral principle for sexuality runs: Promote the expression of the authentic sexuality of yourself and others and never directly hinder the expression of authentic sexuality of yourself or others.

This sexual morality is feasible only if there are reliable methods of contraception and abortion is readily available.

This sexuality is feasible only if divorce is readily available. For a couple should not be bound to one another if their authentic sexuality indicates they be in other types of relation.

The emphasis on authenticity prioritizes parents pursuing their authentic selves over their children.

A basic moral principle is: Respect human dignity. Accept all people as good when they are accepting in accordance with what they really are.

If a person truly desires to perform a sexual act that sexual act is prima facie permissible

If human sexuality does not require that it ought to be used in certain ways, then no sexual act is intrinsically disordered.

If no sexual act is intrinsically disordered, then all sexual acts are prima facie permissible.

If all sexual acts are prima facie permissible, then if some sexual acts are impermissible they are wrong because of the mentality of actors, the circumstances in which the act is performed or the consequences of the act.

But respect for the dignity of each and every human forbids treating another person only as material to be used.person is an end in itself. This means that there is never a need to justify willing what is good in itself for another. You may need to justify that what you do is in fact a good for the other. But the fact that you intend it for the good of the other needs no justification.

But it is most helpful to set aside doing it for the good of the other to consider doing it regardless of the good of the other.

In other words, if love is willing the good of the other, loving needs no justification. . How can consent overcome using another as merely a means to satisfy desires? I write from the perspective of a heterosexual male.The consent must be perfect and mutual. Her consent is her willingness to give me her body to use for my good, which is satisfaction of my sexual desire. My consent is my willingness to give her my body to use for her good, which is satisfaction of her sexual desire. In this perfect situation neither of us are treated as a means only. Although I am a means in so far as my body is used, I am treated as an end in itself because she gives her body to me as an end itself. Similarly, she is a means in so far as her body is used by me, she is treated as an end in itself because I give my body to her as an end in itself. In this union which is created each is treated as an end-in-itself. The intention to form this union in which the dignity of each is maintained because each is treated as an end-in-itself, need not be conscious. What is in the thoughts and emotions are many and various. With their bodies they accomplish what is intended.

NOTE Can we say: Their bodies express the intention? Not always. The body in sexual activity is always saying we come together to form a unit for procreation to form one for life. On traditional sexual morality, in the best sexual activity the intention expressed by the body is that of the best sexuality, viz. uniting to form life. In progressive sexual morality the intention of the participants is out of sync with what their bodies express. They intend the joint pleasure; not a union open to life for life-long.

It is a human creation. It is autonomous in the sense that humans make it independently of anything else. Autonomy requires recognizing that all consent. Each person has the dignity of consenting.

Note: Since human sexuality requires consent, traditional sexual morality posits unifying as a goal of sexuality. the unity goal of human sexuality cannot be attained without consent.

moral sexual activity?

parties cast doubt on whether or not there can be authentic consent.

Focusing on consent leads us to consider the courtship dimension of sexual morality. They focus on the morality of partner selection but there are discussion of bonding under the headings of cohabitation and gay marriage which seems to be unquestionably accepted. What about mating – the physical contacts or lack thereof? As far as I can tell, there is no moral evaluation of sex acts. It is assumed that all of them are morally neutral

Traditional outlook: Sexuality is for reproduction. . Reproduction is the good for determining sexual morality. Here facts give the standard for sexual morality.

Relativistic outlook: There is no purpose for sexuality. Good order in the community is standard for its regulation. This is amorality of sexuality

Authenticity outlook: Sexuality is for satisfaction of sexual desires. this requires that each individual uncover his own desires and seek to satisfy them with someone else who has uncovered his true desires.

The desire satisfaction has been chosen by people autonomously but not arbitraryrily afer all there are the desires.

to make this moral – not egotistical there needs to be consent. the consent requirement is respecting human dignity.

The sexuality of a person can change and the new sexuality is authentic as long as it is autonomously accepted.

There is no normal sexuality. Sexualities are morally neutral. No sexuality is intrinsically disordered.

I will not claim that those who hold this theory of sexual authenticity do not hold moral principles. I will only posit that no principle can consistently contradict justifying an act in pursuit of sexual authenticity

Sexual autonomy is to recognize and accept one’s authentic sexuality.

Dignity is measured by what a person is is free to do.

. Respect for human sexual dignity requires accepting any authentic sexuality as legitimate for no person is illegitimate. No person is born bad.

This sexual morality is feasible only if there are reliable methods of contraception and abortion is readily available.

This sexuality is feasible only if divorce is readily available. For a couple should not be bound to one another if their authentic sexuality indicates they be in other types of relation.

The emphasis on authenticity prioritizes parents pursuing their authentic selves over their children.

This sexual morality is a virtue ethic. The goal is to be authentic. Sexual imorality is falling short of sexual activity in accoradance with sexual authenticity.

The sexual morality of authenticity is primarily a morality for courting, The other dimensions for sexual morality are mating and bonding. Since all physical acts are morally neutral, authenticity morality has no morality for mating,

PROBLEM TO BE WORKED OUT. What constraints does authenticity place on the sexuality one can choose?

Can a person authentically desire that he be used only as an object for satisfying another’s desires?

A basic moral principle is: Respect human dignity. Accept all people as good when they are accepting in accordance with what they really are.

If a person truly desires to perform a sexual act that sexual act is prima facie permissible

If human sexuality does not require that it ought to be used in certain ways, then no sexual act is intrinsically disordered.

If no sexual act is intrinsically disordered, then all sexual acts are prima facie permissible.

I use this bizzare example because one writer considers necrophilia and wrote “it canot be argued that advanced consent is insufficient to render later sex with the corpse impermissible” (David Bentar,Homosexuality, Beastiality and Necrophilia, Ch13 Because to me necrophilia is intrinsically wrong besides being abbhorent to imagine, I thought he made the inconsistent statement. However, he does not hold that necrophilia is intrinsically wrong. This single quotation shows the importance of consent in consensual sexual morality.
One writer is explicitly a untilitarian; not what I call a consensual sexual moralist.. He argues that the sexual practices of those participating in the sexual revolution are immoral on the utilitarian grounds that they lead to the bad consequence of sexu

I use this bizzare example because one writer considers necrophilia and wrote “it canot be argued that advanced consent is insufficient to render later sex with the corpse impermissible” (David Bentar,Homosexuality, Beastiality and Necrophilia, Ch13 Because to me necrophilia is intrinsically wrong besides being abbhorent to imagine, I thought he made the inconsistent statement. However, he does not hold that necrophilia is intrinsically wrong. This single quotation shows the importance of consent in consensual sexual morality.
One writer is explicitly a untilitarian; not what I call a consensual sexual moralist.. He argues that the sexual practices of those participating in the sexual revolution are immoral on the utilitarian grounds that they lead to the bad consequence of sexually trasmitted disease and unwanted pregnancies. Coitus should be used only when the intention is conception. Otherwise, everyone should masturbate as much as possible and , if desired, use of sex-toys and pornography. See

Re-thinking Sexual Nihilism

July 21, 2026Book promotion, Nihilism, Sexual moralitykielkopf1

Is the title of my Blog Site outdated? In 2014 I published a book defending traditional sexual morality.¹ I contended that there was a widely accepted view that no sexual act by itself was morally impermissible. I called this moral neutrality of sexual acts “sexual nihilism.” The commonly used term is “sexual amorality”. I went on to make a case that sexual amorality (sexual nihilism) led to total amorality (nihilism) that nothing matter because in principle nothing was right or wrong. Traditional sexual morality was proposed as an antidote for drifting into nihilism.

I started this Blog Site to continue this line of thought. Recently I read an anthology which requires serious reconsideration of my defense of traditional sexual morality^.2 Most of the writers for this anthology made moral judgments about sexual behavior. The moral judgments were contrary to those of traditional sexual morality. For instance, all assume that masturbation and homosexuality are morally permissible. Their sincerely held moral judgments undercuts a major line of thought in my book. I assumed too uncritically that those who dismissed traditional sexual morality would ultimately make no moral judgments about sexuality.

To respond, I plan a triad of posts. The goal of this triad is to characterize and evaluate a moral theory supporting the moral judgments of these writers. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this is a moral outlook. It is not moral relativism. For these writers, since it is wrong to suppress homosexuality in the USA, Ugandans are morally wrong in trying to suppress homosexuality. I will label this progressive sexual morality Consensual Sexual Morality. In the first post of the triad, I speculate about the origin of this new sexual morality in relation to traditional sexual morality, the crucial role of consent and a search for authentic consent. In the second post of this triad, I finish the sketch of this moral theory by elaborating on the good which is supposed to be promoted and protected by consensual sexual morality. In the third I evaluate it as an alternative to traditional sexual morality which I now label Conjugal Sexual Morality as a verbal match for Consensusal Sexual Morality.

Confronting Sexual Nihilism: Traditional Sexual Morality as an Antidote to Nihilism,
The Palgrave handbook of sexual ethics, Editor: Boonin-Vail, David, Palgrave Macmillan, 2023

Sexual Morality & Conjugal Episodes

May 14, 2026Critique of Birth Control, Sexual moralitykielkopf1

The purpose of this post is to introduce a concept for discussing morally acceptable methods for birth control without moral attention to the various ways a married couple initiate, sustain and enjoy sexual arousal. Thereby, suspicion that the Catholic Church is unduly concerned with sexuality may be set aside.

Types of birth control are the main issue for moral evaluation of the sexual behavior of a married couple. There need be no moral consideration of the touches, kisses, positions, lights on or off etc. Concern during sexual activity about whether their intimate acts conform to the regulations of moral micromanagers detracts from the unitive purpose of marital sexuality. A married couple should not be anxiously reflecting on what a imagine moralist thinks about them. In private, they are entitled to work out how they form one flesh. It seems like an interest in pornography to ponder details of intimate behavior in moral philosophy. Of course, such details are important for clinical discussions with a physician or psychologist if there are sexual problems such as erectile dysfunction, premature ejaculation or infertility.

There are two types of birth control: Conception prevention and conception avoidance. Prevention methods such as use of condoms, diaphrams or pills are certainly abstract enough for public discussion. Similarly, avoidance methods about having sexual relations only at times when conception is highly improbable can be discussed technically by all with some basic biological knowledge.

“Conjugal episodes” is a term I propose for discussing the morality of birth control methods for a married couple. Only a married couple can have conjugal episodes. Conjugal episodes are colloquially referred to as a couples’ “making love.” “Episode” is a better term than a technical term such as “coitus” because we need consider foreplay and perhaps what happens after the man has reached a climax. Similarly, the term “marriage act” seems too narrow. I offer no precise definition of “conjugal episodes.” But a couple realizes fairly well when it starts and is finished. They are well enough defined so that they are countable. A healthy young couple could enjoy three or four during a single night. An older couple may be able to say how many episodes they enjoy in a week or month.

Married people are, as individuals, subject to the moral laws about adultery, masturbation and homosexuality. However, as a couple they are subject to a special moral law concerning their conjugal episodes. This additional law is balanced by the privilege of the moral neutrality of the activities in their conjugal episodes as long as none conflict with the moral law for conjugal episodes.

What is the moral law for conjugal episodes?

The fundamental moral law runs: Promote basic human goods and never intentionally inhibit a basic human good for the sake of a lesser good. Conjugal episodes are for the basic human good¹ of a life-long monogamous union of a man and woman. Proceation by itself is not a basic human good; nor is male/female bonding by itself a basic human good. Definitely, the good of pleasure by itself is not a basic human good. So, the fundamental moral law applied to conjugal episodes tells us that conjugal episodes should be open to conception and enhancement of bonding and never entered into with an intention to inhibit bonding or procreation.

Intentionally phantasizing another parnter is an intentional inhibition of the unitive goal of conjugal episodes. Another clear violation of this application is a husband forcing coitus on his wife. Such a violent act is clearly done with reckless disregard for enhancement of bonding. I suspect watching pornography to initiate a conjugal epidsode also threatens the unitive goal. Here, though, my topic is birthcontrol. The application of the fundamental moral law to conjugal episodes is provided in Paul VI’s 1968 Encyclical Humanae vitae – the challenging official teaching of the Catholic Church on birth control.

So, I seem not to have added anything new to the controversy about birth control methods. However, by locating the discussion about the marital sexual morality on simply the relation of conjugal episodes to unity and procreation, we can set aside attempts to evaluate morally the variety of acts a couple may perform in the course of a conjugal episode. Evaluation of methods of birth controll is not “peeking into the bedrooms” of married people.

Finnis, John. “Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good.” The Monist, vol. 91, no. 3/4, 2008, pp. 388–406.

What Makes Masturbation Wrong?

November 19, 2025Moral philosophy, Sexual moralitykielkopf1

It is morally wrong for a man to masturbate.

The goal of this post is attained by noting that in a discussion of morality there can be a subtle shift from considering what’s wrong with the action to what harm does the action bring about. The subtly of the shift conceals an assumption that the wrongness of the action is to be determined by the harm which it brings about. The concealed assumption is, of course, an assumption of a consequentialist moral theory.

My moral condemnation of masturbation is, in part, placing a heavy burden of proof on those who dissent. Defending consequentialism is a heavy burden.

Masturbation is wrong; morally wrong. I imagine many challenging me with “What’s wrong with masturbation?” I will imagine the debate going beyond pointing out the need to have rules about when, and especially where, men may masturbate. Unregulated masturbation might very well be socially disruptive. Pointing out a need for some restrictions on masturbation is compatible with an assumption that harmfulness of some sort is the standard for an action being wrong. Here we can note that many condemnations of men viewing pornography, which is part of their masturbation, go in the direction of pointing out harm produced by male masturbation.

But honesty requires admitting that millions of masturbatory actions lead to no readily recognized harm. It is easy to think of masturbatory actions which lead to no harm; no physical or emotional harm. Masturbation is, hence, not intrinsically harmful. However, without assuming some consequentialist moral theory, we cannot infer “Masturbation is not intrinsically wrong” from “Masturbation is not intrinsically harmful.”

Here again honesty sets a requirement. Those of us who continue to condemn harmless acts of masturbation, need to admit holding an assumption about what makes an act wrong apart from the harm, if any, it brings about We need to justify a clear persuasive non-consequentialist moral theory.

Here is a sketch of such a theory. Some acts, for example, attainment of a human male orgasm, are for the sake of a basic human good of marriage and children. These acts may also be chosen for the sake of non-basic human good such as pleasure. but which are incompatible with the basic human good. For instance, the choice of the pleasure of masturbation is incompatible with the basic human good of marriage and children. One cannot think of masturbation accomplishing what coitus with a spouse can accomplish. So, a masturbation orgasm is intrinsically incompatible with what male orgasms are for. This incompatibility with the good which it is for makes such an orgasm wrong..

The theory I sketched is a teleological moral theory insofar as acts are evaluated with reference to what is good. They are evaluated whether they are directed toward that good; not primarily on how they accomplish that good.

Pope Leo Reminds Us: Synodality is not Subversive

August 28, 2025Catholic doctrine, Religious morality, Sexual moralitykielkopf1

I was not alone when I cringed upon hearing of synodality and going to the peripheries. The secular media along with some Catholic sources mislead us to fear that synodality and going to the peripheries are primarily processes for subverting Catholic sexual morality. The peripheries to which we should go are the so-called LGBQT communities. While at these peripheries, synodality is accompanying representitives of LGBQT communities so that we can better understand and accept them as they are. Ultimately, such acceptance requires explicit admission that traditional Catholic prohibitions of certain sexual activities, begining with the intrinsically disordered masturbation, were in error. Such an admission would put the Catholic Church in conformity with the sexual morality of the mid-twentieth century Sexual Revolution; but a cruel betrayal of all who rely on the spiritual resources of Catholism in their struggle to be chaste.

Fortunately, in his August 15, 2025 address sent to the participants of the Peruvian Social week Pope Leo XIV has subtly calmed fears of subversion. He used “synodality” and “going to the peripheries” as normal terms for describing how the Church has been built up since Apostolic times. With special references to the missionaries and saints who built the Church in Peru he sketched out how, of course, they were at the peripheries in the New World. Of course, practiced synodality by learning the ways of those they encountered at the peripheries so they could convert them.

Jesus Would Not Have Reasoned as a Consequentialist

July 25, 2025Moral philosophy, Sexual moralitykielkopf1

This essay supplements my essay on Jesus’ sexual morality. In that essay, I argued that Jesus would never have masturbated because he was a moral genius. I elaborate on notion of moral genius and emphasize that the reasoning of a moral genius, especially in his early years when he would be a moral prodigy, is not that of a utilitarian or more broadly: a consequentialist.

His genius was possessing from a very early age perfect applied moral reasoning of a type frequently called natural law moral reasoning. Applied moral reasoning is primarily knowing how to do good and avoid evil. It is knowing, on a particular occasion how to organize the facts characterizing the situation and the values relevant to the situation into an intention to do good and avoid evil. The genius, as brought out below, invariably has the will to carry out his intention.

For instance, consider how I argue that a moral genius would resist a temptation to replicate the sensation of an unintended orgasm? He would recognize that he could aim at getting a pleasure and that since he had a desire for that pleasure it would be good. He would also recognize that he could manipulate himself to attain that pleasure. And, perhaps less clearly, he would recognize that such manipulations could be done whenever he wished. He was also at a stage of life when he knew of the role of male orgasms in reproduction. This knowledge of “the facts of life” brought with it recognition that lifelong monagamous bonding of a male and female for reproduction and mutual care was a basic human good. A basic human good is one which ought never be intenitonally set aside. Along with the recognition of the basic goodness of marriage, there would be the recognition that the pleasure of an orgasm is one of the features which make for marriage’s basic goodness. With this meagar but crucial information, the moral genius knows how to form an intention not to masturbate because an intention to masturbate would beintending what is evil – not good. The intention to masturbate would intend that the basic good of marriage could be set aside for only a portion of it. That would be intending evil since a basic good ought never be set aside for only a fragment of it.

More elaboration my be needed to persuaded everyone that the unarticulated reasoning of the alleged genius is correct. Here I want to give a reminder of the limited about of factual information – knowledge that – required. If the reasoning of the moral prodigy were to be based on an evaluation of the consequences of masturbating, an immense amount of factual information about the future would have to be innate to the child. Assuming an ability to organize a small amount of facts and values is more probable.

But making a correct moral decision requires more than forming a correct intention

A perfect applied practical reason is a reason for which to know the good is to do the good. Here I put myself on the side of those, such as St. Paul in Rm 7:19, who recognize weakness of the will. A weak will may not choose the good it intends. A perfect applied practical reason is a reason for which to intend the good is to choose the good. A moral genius is one with a perfect applied moral reason.

For a moral genius to intend the good is to choose the good. However, this choice may not be easy. A moral genius can be tempted and overcoming the temptation may be painful. However, the moral genius always has the will to endure the pain of setting aside the lesser good for the more fundamental good.

Might Jesus Have Masturbated?

June 25, 2025Catholic doctrine, Sexual moralitykielkopf1

Catholic Christology Corroborates Traditional Catholic Sexual Morality

The purpose of this essay is to make a case that a fundamental Christian doctrine requires traditional Catholic Sexual morality.. What is traditional Catholic sexual morality? Since I focus on the sexuality of a man, viz., Jesus of Nazareth, I state a principle of traditional Catholic morality for males. I call this the Paternal Principle

A man may not seek an orgasm except in consensual coitus open to conception with a woman to whom he has made a pledge of life-long fidelity with an intent to support and to protect her and any children resulting from their sexual intercourse.¹

This principle is only a frgment of traditional sexual morality. The multiple facts, theories and customs which are used to justify and motivate such a rule comprise sexual morality. However, such a principle implies directly the behaviors which those who advocate revising Catholic sexual morality seem open to admiting as morally permissible². However, such revisions cannot be made without revising, if not rejecting, doctrines about the nature of Jesus Christ³. For the Paternal Principle implies the immorality of the traditional sexual sins: masturbation, homosexual acts, fornication, adultery and forms of contraception which are physical or chemical interventions in coitus.

In this essay, I consider only masturbation. Masturbation is the foundational sexual immorality for men. Masturbation ,or the core intention of masturbation, is involved in all the other genital sexual immoralities. That core intention is seeking the estactic pleasure of an orgasm at the expense of the basic human good for whose promotion that pleasure is both a means and a constituent, viz., procreation and life-long male/female bonding.

What is the Christological doctrine requiring traditional sexual morality? It is the doctrine that Jesus was a man like us in all things except sin. (Heb 4:15, CCC467)

Why write of corroborating rather than use logical terms such as “implying” or “entailing?” I want to avoid any suggestion that traditional sexual morality came from Christian doctrine. To corroborate means to strengthen and confirm. I hope to show that elaboration of what it means for Jesus to be a man without sin provides considerations which strengthen belief that masturbation is truely immoral; not merely immoral according to my moral outlook which I call traditional morality.

My Christological corroboration of traditional sexual morality as the genuine, real, or objective morality requires a bipartite strategy. First, show that masturbation is traditionally immoral. That has been done by drawing implications from the Paternal Principle in conjunction with descriptions of the various sexual acts. Second, show that it is inconsistent to think that the perfectly sinless Jesus masturbated. An act which is physically possible but morally impossible for a sinless man to do is morally forbidden. Hence, the immorality of Jesus masturbating strengthens and confirms belief the traditional immorality of masturbation is a genuine immorality; not merely immoral by tradition.

Showing that the sexual morality of Jesus is that of traditional sexual morality would require showing for each of the sexual immoralities derivable from the Paternal Principle are acts we cannot consistenly think of a sinless man doing. Such a series of arguments would be strong confirmation for traditional sexual morality. For it would be the sexual morality of the sinless Jesus. However, the argument that masturbation is immoral in Jesus’ sexual morality provides a model argument for the others, eg., homosexual acts, are immoral in Jesus’ sexual morality.

Thinking about Jesus engaging in any sexual activity is offensive. Nevertheless, Christians who fly rainbow flags from their houses, schools and churches should think about it. Unfortunately, the offensiveness of the thought can lead to question-begging. With religious images in mind, we may immediately decide “Jesus would never do anything like that!” We would thereby “beg off” from answering the question “Why would Jesus never do anthing like that?” I recomend adopting a philosophic attitude of trying to ignore any sense of offence. To avoid being offended try not to imagine anything about the historical man consideration under descriptions such as “Jesus of Nazareth” or “Jesus as portrayed in Luke’s Gospel.” We can imagine Jesus under those descriptions sinning in all sorts of ways. My argument is that we cannot think or conceive of Jesus masturbating under the description of “a man like us in all things except sin” regardless of how our imaginations can embelish what we know of a historical figure.

However, we must take as our starting point the son of Mary and Joseph the carpenter around the time of the Finding in the Temple. The Christological doctrine refers to him. This specificity saves us from philosophical digressions such as analyzing the supposed sinlessness of man of an IQ around 50. Luke tells us “Jesus advanced in wisdom and age in favor before God and man.” We, then, are considering primarily what this intelligent and well behaved Jewish youth might have done during the hidden years in Nazareth. But how should we consider this historical figure’s moral thinking and acting?

We should not attempt a historical reconstruction of the consciousness of the young Jesus. For instance, how did Jewish culture guide his moral thinking? That would be historical speculation without any evidence. We can use some bland factual assumptions such as he became aware of “the facts of life. But we cannot even assume that before his first temptation to masturbate he knew the role of ejaculation and accompanying sensations in reproduction.

I make a significant assumption. The assumption that he was like us in all things except sin allows another assumption that he was a moral genius throughout his life. Jesus would, then, have been a child prodigy of morality. There are different ways to characterize a moral genius. A moral genius is someone who always wills what is for the good because it is for what is good.⁴ Such is the will of God. So, a moral genius always wills what God wills because God wills it. God wills what is good for whatever God wills. That is loving. So, a moral genius loves what God loves because God loves it. However, since we can better articulate the object of God’s willing and loving, it is better to talk of what is good. The italicized qualifications beginning with because are important. In a positive way they bring out the negative point that a moral genius wills what is good, etc., regardless of any inclination to choose otherwise. It is also important to note that genius is exhibited primarily in knowing how rather than in having theoretical knowledge. A mathematical genius may know how to get a result without being able to articulate a proof of how he reached the result. Little Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart knew how to compose without musical theory. So, a moral genius knows how to put together the elements of morality: representations of goods as both ends and means, inclinations, plans of action, forming and acting on intentions to act and to be in accordance with what ought to be done and how we ought to be. The mind of a moral genius is not filled with all of the factual knowledge about how the consequences of acts actually effect human happiness. A moral genius does not think as a consequentialist or utilitarian. It must be emphasized that the works of genius are not expressions of the genius’ individuality. The genius, working as a genius, expresses what is right, what is correct and what is beautiful for everyone. The works of genius present what is universal: what anyone who tries to get it right hopes to discover and become,

So, our question is runs: Would a boy who always knows how to will what is for the good because it is for the good will to masturbate?

For completeness, start with consideration of the temptation of a boy who does not yet know “the facts of life.” Such a boy can have a temptation to masturbate. To be tempted he has to know to what he is being tempted. So, he has experience an orgasm. Perhaps, he touched his genitalia enough scatching a rash in a way sufficient for an orgasm. Perhaps, he experienced it while riding in a cart on a bumpy road. It could have been in a dream.

The temptation comes as a strong inclination to repeat that experience of an orgasm. Our moral prodigy has the knack of always willing what is good regardless of any inclination to do otherwise. Without being able to articulate his knowledge, he has the practical knowledge that acting on strong inclinations whose satisfaction is not necessary for survival is morally risky. The strength of the inclination for mere pleasure would be a “red flag” to a genius at navigating through the moral life.

So, the sexually naive moral genius would not masturbate regardless of an inclination to do so. However, he may not find resisting the tempatation easy.

What about Jesus after he learned that the inclination for an orgasm plays an important role in starting and maintaining a man bonding to a woman to develop a family? He would recognize that monagamous marriage and family is a basic human good. Taking monogamous marriage and family as a basic human good is not a wild assumption. (See note 4.) It could be called a default view on sexuality. It is honored with an apology: ” If everyone could or would behave properly, that is how human sexuality would operate. But you know how human nature is, so. . . ” With this awareness of the basic human good of which an orgasm is both a means and constituent, one who is a genius at thinking morally would use the, perhaps implicit, knowledge that a fundamental way of not being in accordance with what ought to be done and ought to be is to choose a means to a basic good as a basic good. It puts disorder in the order of what is good. If we use “love” broadly to label that for which we have inclinations and that which we recognize as basic human goods, we can say a moral genius properly orders his loves. Hence, a perfect composer of intentions in accordance with what is good would not form or act on an intention to masturbate. He, however, may need to make an effort to resist temptations.

We, who are not moral geniuses, can validate the refusal of the moral genius to form or act on an intention to masturbate. Human sexuality functions well enough to cary on the human species. We cannot label human sexuality as dysfunctional. However, we humans make it troublesome, to say the least. The intention or maxim of a masturbator expresses the basic source of human sexuality’s problematic character. The maxim runs: I may enjoy the satisfaction of an inclination of a means for sexuality’s purpose regardless of attaining the purpose of sexuality. The maxim highlights the intrinsic disorder of masturbation. This is not to say that men who masturbate are intrinsically disordered; their masturbation is intrinsically disordered. With such a maxim, a masturbator joins that vast, almost universal, crowd of men who have disordered sexuality. Jesus, as a man like us in all things except sin would not join the crowd.

NOTES

1. From purely secular assumptions, I argue for this principle in my book: Confronting Sexual Nihilism: Traditional Sexual Morality as an antidote to nihilism, Oklahoma City, OK. 2014.

2. Cardinal Claude-Hollerich of Luxembourg advocates significant revisions to accommodate homosexuality Hollerich on homosexuality: the Cardinal’s many errors – Daily Compass. American Cardinal McElroy advocates revisions Cardinal McElroy’s Attack on Church Teachings on Sexuality Is a Pastoral Disaster| National Catholic Register Fr. James Martin SJ welcomes people with same sex attraction so enthusiastically, it seems to me that he condons homosexual acts Fr. James Martin on Marriage, Sexual Morality, and the Church’s Teachings: A Solution to the Puzzle – Public Discourse. Even some papal views suggest indefference towards traditional sexual morality. See Pope Francis’s Candid Views on Sexual Morality – CatholicCitizens.org

3. Previously, I thought revision of moral doctrines would not conflict directly with non-moral doctrines Sexual Revolution Undercuts Christianity

4. My notion of moral genius is an adaptation of Kant’s notion of a good will. Kant begins the first Section of his 1785 Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals with: “There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will.” But I anchor the good will to willing basic human goods. Here I adapt the moral theory of the New Natural Law theory. Sexual Ethics, Human Nature, and New Natural Law Theory – Public Discourse. However, I am not providing any interpretations of Kant. Nor do I claim to present New Natural Law theory as its proponents would. This is not a scholarly essay. Note, though, that John Finnis’ excellent characterization of marriage and family as a basic human good can be found in the link to the New Natural Law theory. I suspect that any moral theory which condemns masturbation, Traditional (Thomistic) Natural Law theory or theology of the Body Relections, would conclude that a “natural born whizz” in apply those theories would refrain from masturbation as immoral. The crucial concept in this essay is “moral genius.”

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It’s a Fact: The Purpose of Sexuality is New Life

April 24, 2025Sexual moralitykielkopf1

The goal of this post is bipartite. First: Show that it is intelligible to talk of new life as the purpose of human sexuality without believing that there is any entity which intended that human sexuality brings about new life. Second,: Show that judging new life to be the purpose of human sexuality is based upon natural facts just as much as is judging that human sexuality actually brings about new life.

Why argue for the obvious? What could be more obvious than new life being the purpose of sexuality? I am laboring the point that it makes sense to talk about some parts of nature being for another part of nature because I lived for over forty years in a philosophical culture in which, as I understood it, an underlying assumption was that if we thought clearly, we would not think, or talk, of there being purposes in nature other than those of intention forming animals such as humans. Indeed, the materialists among us held that when we understood nature properly, we would realize that there are not even human intentions. This philosophical environment was that of the philosophy departments of the major secular universities. I experienced it primarily at the University of Minnesota and The Ohio State University. The assumption was not unmotivated although some motivations presupposed metaphysical theses which needed defense. The best motivation was that assumption of final causes in physics detracted from mathematical representation of physical laws. But that rationale for rejecting natural purposiveness, presupposed a metaphysical assumption that ultimately the only proper science of nature is physics. As noted, another motivation was that talk of purposiveness suggests that the reality of the mental, or at least, something capable of having intentions. That rationale for rejecting natural goals is based on the belief that somehow in someway it can be shown that there is only the physical. Another rationale is based on the fear that theistic arguments based on design in nature are tempting once it is conceded that there are purposes and, then, desgns in nature. Of, course, that rationale assumes atheism. Another rationale is based on a fear that moral arguments, especially arguments in sexual morality, will be based on showing that natural purposes are not to be frustrated. Here, I agree that recognition of natural purposes by itself does not support any moral conclusion. So, concern that recognition of moral purposes might lead some to commit a naturalistic fallacy is legitimate. I agree that only beings such as us who recognize basic goods and also recognize these goods as natural goals can draw conclusions about right and wrong from information about natural purposes.

The intercourse theory of conception provides a helpful starting point. The what? I recall from my teen years, wondering about the understanding of sexuality as expressed by many of my male acquaintances and many novelists. These stupid conversations occurred in last two years of high school and while in the army. I married shortly after release from active duty. I soon became well aware of the purpose of sexuality.

We talked and they wrote as if persuading a girl to engage in full coitus was an accomplishment and no more morally significant than holding hands. The implicit rules for these kinds of conversation forbade raising the prospect of untoward consequences. Many of those, along with me, participating in this self-imposed ignorance, were Catholics. We were well aware of Catholic teaching on sexuality which is not very difficult to understand. But the Catholicism and standard sexual morality in the 1940s and 50s was bracketed-off – pushed to the “back of our minds.” To myself, perhaps in an attempt to excuse myself, I would think “These people talk like they don’t believe in the Intercourse Theory of Conception.” I fell into an irrational pattern of excusing which runs “I know this is wrong or stupid so my doing it is not seriously wrong.”

I have never heard anyone ever use the term “intercourse theory of conception.” The intercourse theory of conception, if it be a theory, is so well confirmed that we call it “a fact of life.” However, for our primitive ancestors, there was a gap of some months between coitus and clear signs of conception. Also infertility made the correlation only statistical. How, did our primitive ancestors connect the two: coitus with pregnancy and birth?

I think an hypothesis of innate knowledge better explains its universal acceptance. It is hard to imagine, as I do below, how homomids like us, would be ignorant of the “facts of life.” I could engage in socio-biological speculation about innate knowledge. But I find speculating about it as learned knowledge, brings out how moral knowledge is grounded in factual knowledge. Many of us have to learn the intercourse theory of conception as we grow up. It also aids in making the polemical point that the contemporary view of the Moral Neutrality of Sexuality is an implicit theoretical return to a primitive ignorance.

By sexuality I refer to that whole range of courting, mating and bonding activities connected with human reproduction. I could not define sexuality without assuming the intercourse theory of conception

How might early homo sapiens have dealt with sexuality before they knew what sexuality brought about? There would be these strange, delightful but dangerously disruptive urges and activities which suddenly errupted in children as they reached teenage. Strange if for no other reasons than that they seemed to lead to a activities which made the participants vulnerable to attacks from man and beasts. Delightful, of course, but dangerous and disruptive . There would be what we now call rapes and perversions such as genital manipulation of the very young. Males seeking orgasms. especially in coitus, would be recognized as a central paractice within this cluster of practices.

If they had any sapiens, sexuality would be regulated. Trying to imagine a species of homo without social mechanisms for behavior control is to think of an animal too different from us to shed light on our sexuality. There would be rules for repressing all sorts of urges and activities. There would be punishments. Of course, they could not have surpressed all expressions of sexuality, for , then, in addition to missing considerable joy they would have disappeared. Utilitarian, i.e., practical considerations lead to the regulation, so it is not implausible to assume that the regulation of sexual expression would be based on utilitarian or consequential considerations.

In passing, note that I am assuming something like the collective consciousness of a group and, indeed of all humanity. This is not the place to examne that assumption. See Human Thought as a Fundamental Reality .

We need not assume that they made accurate assesments of what brought about a tolerable amount of satisfaction; let alone the greatest possible mount of satisfaction. Nobody has ever figured that out. There most likely would have been a diversity of regulations amongst different communities. It is also plausible to assume that some who thought about why things are as they are, early natural philosophers, would conclude that sexuality is for the special physical and emotional pleasures that it can bring about. We will evaluate this judgment that sexuality is for pleasure shortly.

I set aside a hypothesis that sexuality in our primitive ancestors did not contain any dangerous and disruptive practices prior to being repressed by regulations. If the sexuality of our primitive ancestors did not contain a great deal of the weirdness, “kinkiness” for lack of a better term, existing in our contemporary sexuality, it is diffcult to explain why it would have become regulated. Cartoons used to portray a caveman dragging a woman by her hair off to his cave.

Now, suppose they discovered the natural fact that sexuality brought about babies and frequently a male bonded to the female who bore the child to help her and the child. If this is how it happened, a woman was most likely to have discovered this scientific breakthrough, since women are closer to more of the relevant data.

Let us call this complex result “new life.” It is the new life of the infant, new life in the nuclear family, renewal of the life of the bonded mother and father and new life for continuance of the life of the community. Some but, but not all, and many, if only dimly, will recognize new life as a good in the The Common Good. In my moral theory, new life is the basic human good, i.e., common good, which is the obligatory good grounding sexual morality. See Basic Human Goods & Human Morality

How might the thoughtful people, now regard the well confirmed theory that sexuality centered on coitus brings about new life? Would they find it of interest primarily because it showed similarities between their breeding practices and those of many other types of animals or suggested techniques for preventing new life? If they had a value for human life, would they be mistaken in concluding that sexuality is for this value- this good? If they recognized new life as a common good, would it be a mistake to think that sexuality was for this common good? They would not need to be primitive animists who believe that they have discovered spirits who designed sexuality. They need not be clever philosophers who think they have explained this natural function as the plans of some superhuman rationality or the cunning of evolution. To discover a purpose, to introduce for, they need only think “now we understand what all that “stuff,” viz., sexuality, is about. Now we understand why we were doing all that crazy courting, mating and bonding.

There are two issues about use of for in this context. First, is it some fundamental misuse of intelligence, to think about something , call it X, being for something else, Y, without thinking about about some intelligent being, , intending X to bring about Y? Second, granted that it is intellectually legitimate to talk of the purpose of human sexuality, is the purpose discovered or invented?

I have already introduced my position on the first issue. We introduce for when we explain a human practice, frequently a socially regulated practice, to make sense of our so behaving. But judging that nature displays purposiveness extends beyond human affairs. Primitives would not be restricted by some philosophic strictures that nature shows only sequences of events; some of which are repeatable. For instance, their thinking that the seasonal change of fur coloring on deer is a provision of nature for the protection of the deer from predators.

One role of evolutionary theory, or the evolution paradigm, is to help us understand natural purposiveness. Perhaps, some philosophers hope evolution will show us how to eliminate any thought of natural ends or goals. But the goal of such philosophers is in nature and will not be eliminated if attained.

Consider that I have talked of natural purposes only in the most bland sense of being what some processes are for. Theism and evolutionary theory are examples of explaining the occurrence of natural purposes. Recognition of the legitimacy of FOR claims is foundational for these explanations.

Note in passing that claims that sexuality brings about new life are empirically distinguishable from claims that sexuality is for new life. There could be two societies. Both recognize that sexuality brings about new life. But only one believes that sexuality is for new life. Sociological predictions could be made about moods and attitudes of the respective cultures.

If a process or practice naturally brings about, for the most part, something which is good, it is perfectly intelligible to say that practice is for this good. For instance, regulating behavior by rules and sanctions brings about order, which is presumably good. So, we can say the practice of regulating is for order. Humans may have practices which are pointless – are for nothing. Warfare may be such a practice Perhaps, warfare doesn’t promote human welfare; but it is not yet so destructive as to eliminate humanity. If so, we could say that warfare is not for anything. In this use of for, judgments about what a practice or process is for are supported or rejected by natural facts. Of course, amongst these facts are facts about what human judge to be good. And, I submit that it is a fact that humans hold as good the common goods.

So it is intellectually respectable to talk about purposes in nature. In particular, it is not obscurantism to claim that new life is the purpose of human sexuality. I do not know how or whether our primitive ancestors discovered the regular result of sexuality and its purpose. I do know that for many individuals, myself for sure, learned the purpose of sexuality

If a reader has patience, I list several more justifications for thinking there are purposes in nature.

If people think that sexuality is for pleasure or on the contrary think that sexuality is for new life are both parties thinking unintelligently about what sexuality brings about? Are they somehow imposing upon the facts a belief, unsupported by any evidence, that something intentionally created, or at least arranged, sexuality to bring about pleasure or new life for us?

What is the difference between claiming that sexuality brings about new life and claiming that sexuality is for new life? Use of “for” expresses taking new life as a purpose of sexuality instead of merely a result of sexuality. What, though, is the difference between a result and a purpose? It is the difference between thinking factual about sexuality and thinking morally about sexuality. It is not an assumption of some entity having the intention of sexuality producing new life. The “for” comes from asking “What is that for us?” Thinking of what the facts are is no more rational than thinking of what the facts are for us. To be sure we cannot ask what the facts are for us prior to getting the facts, however asking both questions are equal as parts of rationality. We ask what are facts for us only if we have values. Hence, having values is no less a part of being rational than thinking of what the facts are.

We first make a judgment that sexuality is for us. Then we infer, perhaps hastily, that since fact patterns can be intentionally arranged to be for something by us, then always when a fact pattern is for something, someone intentionally so arranged it. However, if we correctly recognize that a fact pattern is for us, it is not foolish to keep open a hypothesis that something so had that result as an intention.

We think evaluatively that X is good. We have the basic law: Do good, avoid evil. Evaluative thought is independent of factual thought. If fact patterns produce what we value we link fact patterns with what we value by concluding those fact patterns are for this value. This linkage grounds moralizing those fact patterns to specify activities which ought not be done, which may be done and which must be done.

When I write “They take new life as a basic good” I am using “they” in the way in which it is used in “they say girls mature sooner than boys.” The referent is a community, which is usually not well defined and the opinion is attributed to the community regardless of whether many do not hold the opinion. Acceptance of communal thought is not an assumption introduced solely for to find a place for the value judgment that new life is a basic good. Communal thought is presupposed in claiming that they found that sexuality brings about new life.

For any community it is rational to judge that for it to be is an ultimate value – new life is what it is to be. However, it is not inconceivable that a community chooses not to be. For instance, they commit suicide rather than be enslaved. Better we vanish from the face of the earth than endure servitude. However, suicide, individual or communal, is not a judgment that being is not good. It is a decision that evil prevail or at least a recognition that evil is prevailing

Granted that recognition that sexuality is for what is good is a foundation for moralizing sexuality, what, though, shows the moralizing is not only human invention? Ultimately, the judgment that morality is not only a human invention, is taking a realist stance. The realist stance is not irrational even if it is not a logical truth. Here, I want to note that a realist acceptance of factual truth also presupposes a supernatural which leads to nature being as it as regardless of whther we know it or think it. So, thinking as a realist about the intercourse theory of conception is no better founded than thinking as a realist about the value judgment that sexuality is for new life.

I submit that I have labored my point long enough to establish what I set out to to show

Supporting Sexual Morality vs. Speculating about Satan

November 13, 2024Booklet on Satan, Sexual moralitykielkopf1

I am thinking about dropping my project of writing a booklet rationalizing belief in Satan? and turning to revising my book book on sexual morality. Would any conceptual scheme I develop in which there is a place for a Satan-like being convince anyone? Indeed, it would not be the conceptual scheme which convinced me of the reality of Satan if I am so convinced. Is it not more important to convince people of the reality of sexual evil? That means convincing people of the incorrectness of the Moral Neutrality of Sexuality.

Why is sexual morality so important? I cite two reasons which I did not present in the first edition of my book. In the October 2024 issue of First Things, we can read in Ryan T. Anderson’s, The Way Forward After Dobbs, “Nonmarital sex is the main cause of abortion. Marriage is the best protector of unborn human life.” Another is the vast increase in viewing pornography as examined in Grant H. Brenner MD’s Pychology Today article “4 Ways Porn Use Causes Problems.”

In my book, I advocated the traditional , which has been taught by the Catholic Church, sexual morality as an antidote for nihilism. I am still certain that traditional sexual morality is an antidote for nihilism. Unfortunately, it is being undercut by some leading Catholics. See for instance: Cardinal McElroy: Sex and sin need a new framework in the church | America Magazine . Even the current Pope is less than supportive of traditional Catholic sexual morality. See, for instance, Pope Francis on sexual morality

Basic Human Goods Constitute The Common Good

October 10, 2024Moral philosophy, Sexual moralitykielkopf1

The common good is defined in Pope John XXIII’s encyclical Mater et Magistra (On Christianity and Social Progress) as “the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and more easily.” I propose that the Basic Human Goods specify what ought to be pursued to attain the common good and what ought not be done because it detracts from the common good. If the no one ever acted in a way to impede a basic human good and would always so act as to promote some basic good, all that humans could do for the sake of the common good has been done. Unfortunately, factors beyond human control might always occur so that human life is wretched beyond any human effort.

So, I propose interpreting “basic human good” as “a constituent of the common good” or as “a common good.” So, the first law of morality “Do good, avoid evil!” can be read as ” Always promote a common good; never directly inhibit development of a common good.” Recreation or play is a basic good. So, one can be promoting a common good and hence the common good by “taking it easy” once and a while.

I offer an example of a common good brought about by human sexuality. Human sexuality, sexual practices, frequently brings about babies and somewhat less frequently a male bonded to the female who bore the child to help her and the child. Let us call this complex result “new life.” It is the new life of the infant, new life in the nuclear family, renewal of the life of the bonded mother and father and new life for continuance of the life of the community. Some but, but not all, and many, if only dimly, will recognize new life as a good in the common good. Hence, the gist of sexual morality is: Use sexuality to promote new life and never directly inhibit sexuality from leading to new life.

Much can be written about how we discover the common good. Here are a few observations on recognizing the common good. A common good is good for us; not necessarily good for me. It is communal. Nonetheless, since individuals are in communities common goods have to be good for individuals for the most part. There can be misperception of a common good if “us” refers to less than the whole human community. However, people understanding their community as less than the whole of humanity may very well recognize a common good in what is good for a narrower comunity to which they belong. Ethno-centricism accounts for misperception of a common good. However, ethno-centrism does not prevent correction perception of a common good. Perception of a common good does not require some impossible deracination program of thinking as a person who is simply human’ only in the community of humanity. Careful use of imagination and analogies suffice fairly well, I submit, for recognizing what people the world over care about. For instance, on the whole they don’t want their babies to die.