It’s a Fact: The Purpose of Sexuality is New Life

Uncategorized

The goal of this post is bipartite. First: Show that it is intelligible to talk of new life as the purpose of human sexuality without believing that there is any entity which intended that human sexuality brings about new life. Second,: Show that judging new life to be the purpose of human sexuality is based upon natural facts just as much as is judging that human sexuality actually brings about new life.

Why argue for the obvious? What could be more obvious than new life being the purpose of sexuality? I am laboring the point that it makes sense to talk about some parts of nature being for another part of nature because I lived for over forty years in a philosophical culture in which, as I understood it, an underlying assumption was that if we thought clearly, we would not think, or talk, of there being purposes in nature other than those which of intention forming animals such as humans. Indeed, the materialists among us held that when we understood nature properly, we would realize that there are not even human intentions. This philosophical environment was that of the philosophy departments of the major secular universities. I experienced it primarily at the University of Minnesota and The Ohio State University. The assumption was not unmotivated although some motivations presupposed metaphysical theses which needed defense. The best motivation was that assumption of final causes in physics detracted from mathematical representation of physical laws. But that rationale for rejecting natural purposiveness, presupposed a metaphysical assumption that ultimately the only proper science of nature is physics. As noted, another motivation was that talk of purposiveness suggests that the reality of the mental, or at least, something capable of having intentions. That rationale for rejecting natural goals is based on the belief that somehow in someway it can be shown that there is only the physical. Another rationale is based on the fear that theistic arguments based on design in nature are tempting once it is conceded that there are purposes and, then, desgns in nature. Of, course, that rationale assumes atheism. Another rationale is based on a fear that moral arguments, especially arguments in sexual morality, will be based on showing that natural purposes are not to be frustrated. Here, I agree that recognition of natural purposes by itself does not support any moral conclusion. So, concern that recognition of moral purposes might lead some to commit a naturalistic fallacy is legitimate. I agree that only beings such as us who recognize basic goods and also recognize these goods as natural goals can draw conclusions about right and wrong from information about natural purposes.

The intercourse theory of conception provides a helpful starting point. The what? I recall from my teen years, wondering about the understanding of sexuality as expressed by many of my male acquaintances and many novelists. These stupid conversations occurred in last two years of high school and while in the army. I married shortly after release from active duty. I soon became well aware of the purpose of sexuality.

We talked and they wrote as if persuading a girl to engage in full coitus was an accomplishment and no more morally significant than holding hands. The implicit rules for these kinds of conversation forbade raising the prospect of untoward consequences. Many of those, along with me, participating in this self-imposed ignorance, were Catholics. We were well aware of Catholic teaching on sexuality which is not very difficult to understand. But the Catholicism and standard sexual morality in the 1940s and 50s was bracketed-off – pushed to the “back of our minds.” To myself, perhaps in an attempt to excuse myself, I would think “These people talk like they don’t believe in the Intercourse Theory of Conception.” There is an irrational pattern of excusing which runs “I know this is wrong or stupid so my doing it is not seriously wrong.”

I have never heard anyone ever use the term “intercourse theory of conception.” The intercourse theory of conception, if it be a theory, is so well confirmed that we call it “a fact of life.” However, for our primitive ancestors, there was a gap of some months between coitus and clear signs of conception. Also infertility made the correlation only statistical. How, did our primitive ancestors connect the two: coitus with pregnancy and birth?

I think an hypothesis of innate knowledge better explains its universal acceptance. It is hard to imagine, as I do below, how homomids like us, would be ignorant of the “facts of life.” I could engage in socio-biological speculation about innate knowledge. But I find speculating about it as learned knowledge, brings out how moral knowledge is grounded in factual knowledge. Many of us have to learn the intercourse theory of conception as we grow up. It also aids in making the polemical point that the contemporary view of the Moral Neutrality of Sexuality is an implicit theoretical return to a primitive ignorance.

By sexuality I refer to that whole range of courting, mating and bonding activities connected with human reproduction. I could not define sexuality without assuming the intercourse theory of conception

How might early homo sapiens have dealt with sexuality before they knew what sexuality brought about? There would be these strange, delightful but dangerously disruptive urges and activities which suddenly errupted in children as they reached teenage. Strange if for no other reasons than that they seemed to lead to a activities which made the participants vulnerable to attacks from man and beasts. Delightful, of course, but dangerous and disruptive . There would be what we now call rapes and perversions such as genital manipulation of the very young. Males seeking orgasms. especially in coitus, would be recognized as a central paractice within this cluster of practices.

If they had any sapiens, sexuality would be regulated. Trying to imagine a species of homo without social mechanisms for behavior control is to think of an animal too different from us to shed light on our sexuality. There would be rules for repressing all sorts of urges and activities. There would be punishments. Of course, they could not have surpressed all expressions of sexuality, for , then, in addition to missing considerable joy they would have disappeared. Utilitarian, i.e., practical considerations lead to the regulation, so it is not implausible to assume that the regulation of sexual expression would be based on utilitarian or consequential considerations.

In passing, note that I am assuming something like the collective consciousness of a group and, indeed of all humanity. This is not the place to examne that assumption. See Human Thought as a Fundamental Reality .

We need not assume that they made accurate assesments of what brought about a tolerable amount of satisfaction; let alone the greatest possible mount of satisfaction. Nobody has ever figured that out. There most likely would have been a diversity of regulations amongst different communities. It is also plausible to assume that some who thought about why things are as they are, early natural philosophers, would conclude that sexuality is for the special physical and emotional pleasures that it can bring about. We will evaluate this judgment that sexuality is for pleasure shortly.

I set aside a hypothesis that sexuality in our primitive ancestors did not contain any dangerous and disruptive practices prior to being repressed by regulations. If the sexuality of our primitive ancestors did not contain a great deal of the weirdness, “kinkiness” for lack of a better term, existing in our contemporary sexuality, it is diffcult to explain why it would have become regulated. Cartoons used to portray a caveman dragging a woman by her hair off to his cave.

Now, suppose they discovered the natural fact that sexuality brought about babies and frequently a male bonded to the female who bore the child to help her and the child. If this is how it happened, a woman was most likely to have discovered this scientific breakthrough, since women are closer to more of the relevant data.

Let us call this complex result “new life.” It is the new life of the infant, new life in the nuclear family, renewal of the life of the bonded mother and father and new life for continuance of the life of the community. Some but, but not all, and many, if only dimly, will recognize new life as a good in the The Common Good. In my moral theory, new life is the basic human good, i.e., common good, which is the obligatory good grounding sexual morality. See Basic Human Goods & Human Morality

How might the thoughtful people, now regard the well confirmed theory that sexuality centered on coitus brings about new life? Would they find it of interest primarily because it showed similarities between their breeding practices and those of many other types of animals or suggested techniques for preventing new life? If they had a value for human life, would they be mistaken in concluding that sexuality is for this value- this good? If they recognized new life as a common good, would it be a mistake to think that sexuality was for this common good? They would not need to be primitive animists who believe that they have discovered spirits who designed sexuality. They need not be clever philosophers who think they have explained this natural function as the plans of some superhuman rationality or the cunning of evolution. To discover a purpose, to introduce for, they need only think “now we understand what all that “stuff,” viz., sexuality, is about. Now we understand why we were doing all that crazy courting, mating and bonding.

There are two issues about use of for in this context. First, is it some fundamental misuse of intelligence, to think about something , call it X, being for something else, Y, without thinking about about some intelligent being, , intending X to bring about Y? Second, granted that it is intellectually legitimate to talk of the purpose of human sexuality, is the purpose discovered or invented?

I have already introduced my position on the first issue. We introduce for when we explain a human practice, frequently a socially regulated practice, to make sense of our so behaving. But judging that nature displays purposiveness extends beyond human affairs. Primitives would not be restricted by some philosophic strictures that nature shows only sequences of events; some of which are repeatable. For instance, their thinking that the seasonal change of fur coloring on deer is a provision of nature for the protection of the deer from predators.

One role of evolutionary theory, or the evolution paradigm, is to help us understand natural purposiveness. Perhaps, some philosophers hope evolution will show us how to eliminate any thought of natural ends or goals. But the goal of such philosophers is in nature and will not be eliminated if attained.

Consider that I have talked of natural purposes only in the most bland sense of being what some processes are for. Theism and evolutionary theory are examples of explaining the occurrence of natural purposes. Recognition of the legitimacy of FOR claims is foundational for these explanations.

Also bring out that claims that sexuality brings about new life are empirically distinguishable from claims that sexuality is for new life. There could be two societies. Both recognize that sexuality brings about new life. But only one believes that sexuality is for new life. Sociological predictions could be made about moods and attitudes of the respective cultures.

If a process or practice naturally brings about, for the most part, something which is good, it is perfectly intelligible to say that practice is for this good. For instance, regulating behavior by rules and sanctions brings about order, which is presumably good. So, we can say the practice of regulating is for order. Humans may have practices which are pointless – are for nothing. Warfare may be such a practice Perhaps, warfare doesn’t promote human welfare; but it is not yet so destructive as to eliminate humanity. If so, we could say that warfare is not for anything. In this use of for, judgments about what a practice or process is for are supported or rejected by natural facts. Of course, amongst these facts are facts about what human judge to be good. And, I submit that it is a fact that humans hold as good the common goods.

So it is intellectually respectable to talk about purposes in nature. In particular, it is not obscurantism to claim that new life is the purpose of human existence sexuality. I do not know how or whether our primitive ancestors discovered the regular result of sexuality and its purpose. I do know that for many individuals, myself for sure, learned the purpose of sexuality

f people think that sexuality is for pleasure or on the contrary think that sexuality is for new life are both parties thinking unintelligently about what sexuality brings about? Are they somehow imposing upon the facts a belief, unsupported by any evidence, that something intentionally created, or at least arranged, sexuality to bring about pleasure or new life for us?

What is the difference between claiming that sexuality brings about new life and claiming that sexuality is for new life? Use of “for” expresses taking new life as a purpose of sexuality instead of merely a result of sexuality. What, though, is the difference between a result and a purpose? It is the difference between thinking factual about sexuality and thinking morally about sexuality. It is not an assumption of some entity having the intention of sexuality producing new life. The “for” comes from asking “What is that for us?” Thinking of what the facts are is no more rational than thinking of what the facts are for us. To be sure we cannot ask what the facts are for us prior to getting the facts, however asking both questions are equal as parts of rationality. We ask what are facts for us only if we have values. Hence, having values is no less a part of being rational than thinking of what the facts are.

We first make a judgment that sexuality is for us. Then we infer, perhaps hastily, that since fact patterns can be intentionally arranged to be for something by us, then always when a fact pattern is for something, someone intentionally so arranged it. However, if we correctly recognize that a fact pattern is for us, it is not foolish to keep open a hypothesis that something so had that result as an intention.

We think evaluatively that X is good. We have the basic law: Do good, avoid evil. Evaluative thought is independent of factual thought. If fact patterns produce what we value we link fact patterns with what we value by concluding those fact patterns are for this value. This linkage grounds moralizing those fact patterns to specify activities which ought not be done, which may be done and which must be done.

When I write “They take new life as a basic good” I am using “they” in the way in which it is used in “they say girls mature sooner than boys.” The referent is a community, which is usually not well defined and the opinion is attributed to the community regardless of whether many do not hold the opinion. Acceptance of communal thought is not an assumption introduced solely for to find a place for the value judgment that new life is a basic good. Communal thought is presupposed in claiming that they found that sexuality brings about new life.

For any community it is rational to judge that for it to be is an ultimate value – new life is what it is to be. However, it is not inconceivable that a community chooses not to be. For instance, they commit suicide rather than be enslaved. Better we vanish from the face of the earth than endure servitude. However, suicide, individual or communal, is not a judgment that being is not good. It is a decision that evil prevail or at least a recognition that evil is prevailing

Granted that recognition that sexuality is for what is good is a foundation for moralizing sexuality, what, though, shows the moralizing is not only human invention? Ultimately, the judgment that morality is not only a human invention, is taking a realist stance. The realist stance is not irrational even if it is not a logical truth. Here, I want to note that a realist acceptance of factual truth also presupposes a supernatural which leads to nature being as it as regardless of whther we know it or think it. So, thinking as a realist about the intercourse theory of conception is no better founded than thinking as a realist about the value judgment that sexuality is for new life.

The value judgment that what sexuality brings about is what sexuality is for is giving sexuality a moral purpose

Sexuality is for pleasure vs. sexuality is for the good of human life, i.e new life, we want to continue after we die.

Supporting Sexual Morality vs. Speculating about Satan

Booklet on Satan, Sexual morality

I am thinking about dropping my project of writing a booklet rationalizing belief in Satan? and turning to revising my book book on sexual morality. Would any conceptual scheme I develop in which there is a place for a Satan-like being convince anyone? Indeed, it would not be the conceptual scheme which convinced me of the reality of Satan if I am so convinced. Is it not more important to convince people of the reality of sexual evil? That means convincing people of the incorrectness of the Moral Neutrality of Sexuality.

Why is sexual morality so important? I cite two reasons which I did not present in the first edition of my book. In the October 2024 issue of First Things, we can read in Ryan T. Anderson’s, The Way Forward After Dobbs, “Nonmarital sex is the main cause of abortion. Marriage is the best protector of unborn human life.” Another is the vast increase in viewing pornography as examined in Grant H. Brenner MD’s Pychology Today article “4 Ways Porn Use Causes Problems.”

In my book, I advocated the traditional , which has been taught by the Catholic Church, sexual morality as an antidote for nihilism. I am still certain that traditional sexual morality is an antidote for nihilism. Unfortunately, it is being undercut by some leading Catholics. See for instance: Cardinal McElroy: Sex and sin need a new framework in the church | America Magazine . Even the current Pope is less than supportive of traditional Catholic sexual morality. See, for instance, Pope Francis on sexual morality

Basic Human Goods Constitute The Common Good

Moral philosophy, Sexual morality

The common good is defined in Pope John XXIII’s encyclical Mater et Magistra (On Christianity and Social Progress) as “the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and more easily.” I propose that the Basic Human Goods specify what ought to be pursued to attain the common good and what ought not be done because it detracts from the common good. If the no one ever acted in a way to impede a basic human good and would always so act as to promote some basic good, all that humans could do for the sake of the common good has been done. Unfortunately, factors beyond human control might always occur so that human life is wretched beyond any human effort.

So, I propose interpreting “basic human good” as “a constituent of the common good” or as “a common good.” So, the first law of morality “Do good, avoid evil!” can be read as ” Always promote a common good; never directly inhibit development of a common good.” Recreation or play is a basic good. So, one can be promoting a common good and hence the common good by “taking it easy” once and a while.

I offer an example of a common good brought about by human sexuality. Human sexuality, sexual practices, frequently brings about babies and somewhat less frequently a male bonded to the female who bore the child to help her and the child. Let us call this complex result “new life.” It is the new life of the infant, new life in the nuclear family, renewal of the life of the bonded mother and father and new life for continuance of the life of the community. Some but, but not all, and many, if only dimly, will recognize new life as a good in the common good. Hence, the gist of sexual morality is: Use sexuality to promote new life and never directly inhibit sexuality from leading to new life.

Much can be written about how we discover the common good. Here are a few observations on recognizing the common good. A common good is good for us; not necessarily good for me. It is communal. Nonetheless, since individuals are in communities common goods have to be good for individuals for the most part. There can be misperception of a common good if “us” refers to less than the whole human community. However, people understanding their community as less than the whole of humanity may very well recognize a common good in what is good for a narrower comunity to which they belong. Ethno-centricism accounts for misperception of a common good. However, ethno-centrism does not prevent correction perception of a common good. Perception of a common good does not require some impossible deracination program of thinking as a person who is simply human’ only in the community of humanity. Careful use of imagination and analogies suffice fairly well, I submit, for recognizing what people the world over care about. For instance, on the whole they don’t want their babies to die.

Why Confront Secularism?

Character Morality, Virtue ethics

Why have I changed the theme of my blog posts from confronting Nihilism to confronting Secularism?

From September 2024 through February 2025, I am dedicating a page of my blog site as the instructions and information page for The Priestly Vocation Essay contest of the Serra Club of Columbus. I manage the contest. Parents, teachers and students might be confused by a title about a Catholic philosopher confronting nihilism when they are looking for information about writing essays on a vocation to the Catholic priesthood.

The Columbus Serra Club challenges eighth grade boys to write an essay of five hundred words or less answering  a question about whether God might be calling them to the priesthood.  Writers of the ten best essays are awarded a $1,000 tuition assistance grant to a diocesan Catholic high school for the 2025/2026 academic year. The Serra Club encourages  participation from all schools in the diocese. The mere fact of writing the essays helps form a culture of vocations. The 2024 essays, even those written as an extra credit assignment,  were very well written while showing serious thought about what God might have in mind for them. Most of the essays were analyses of why they did not think God was calling them to be a priest. Nonetheless: A boy   who settles down to write out what he thinks about his future in light of God’s will, forms in himself an antidote against secularism.

An antidote against secularism is an antidote to nihilism. For in a secular outlook a boy thinks about his life as if God is irrelevant to what he should become. There is heavy pressure to think as a secularist in our culture. If he continues to think as a secularist and becomes aware of his secularist outlook, he will either become an explicit nihilist, continue as a secularist while suppressing thoughts about the meaning of his life or return to thinking of God having a purpose for his life. Rememberance of having written, way back in the eighth grade, how it was not all about him but God and him, might protect him from the nihilism of “It’s all about me.”

Freewill of Love, Freewil of Duty & Freewill of Inclination Satisfaction

Freewill, meaning of love, Moral philosophy

In other posts I have written of the freewill of love. See: Agency, Ordinary Free Will, & Free Will of Love. Here I frequently call that level of freewill “freedom to love.” I hope to show that the freedom to love is no more mysterious than the fact that humans, and perhaps all animals, inject agent causation into the events which occur in nature. Of course, agent causation remains mysterious from an explicit, or even implicit, outlook that when reality is properly understood reality will be recognized as nothing more than matter in motion. But more importantly, I hope to show that the freewill of love is necessary for the freedom of morality. The freewill of love is the capability of choosing the good of the other for the sake of the other. The freewill of morality is the capability of choosing what is morally obligatory because it is morally obligatory. Hereafter, I will call the freewill of morality, the freewill of duty.

I conjecture that agent causation extends far down in the animal kingdom. Suppose I lift a rock and bugs scurry off in various directions To an external observer, this is a stochastic process. However, internally to the bugs the paths taken are selected by the individual bugs. The individual bugs are not mere conduits through which a stream of causal action and reaction, be it deterministic or pr0bablistic, flows. An agent caused event has no sufficient conditions prior to what an agent does and the agent’s selection provides the sufficient conditions. Most likely there are neural processes in the bugs which give them the power of selection to initiate new causal pathways. Still agent causes are self-accelerators.

If agent causation goes fairly far down in the animal kingdom, so-called libertarian or contra-causal freewill goes fairly far down in the animal kingdom. Once agent causation emerged in evolutionary history, the evolutionary process may have selected for organisms capable of agent causation as opposed to those whose reactions are always strictly determined or totally random. I do not think that the bugs do anything like conscious deliberation. But conscious deliberation is not necessary for libertarian or contracausal free will. I also conjecture that once organisms with libertartian free will have evolved, there is evolutionary selection for agent causation modified, but not totally determined, by sensations, inclinations and thoughts. There is always remains a need for the selection or act of will by the agent. This is the common core of freewill for bugs, humans and angels.

Put it this way. Basic agent causation is freedom from deterministic causation. Levels of this basic freedom from are freedoms to execute choices of various types. Perhaps the freedom from deterministic causation only gives my bugs the freedom to select a flight path at random. However, their possesion of photo sensors might be giving them the freedom to seek a darker spot after my lifting the rock exposed them to bright sunshine.

The first law of freedom is to restrict it. An organism develops freedom to do specifIc things by developing ways of restricting its freedom from non-agent causality.

In the remainder of this post, the concern is with the levels of freewill at which humans act. Humans frequently deliberate before making a selection. In delibertion the agent consciously considers alternative before making a selection. I must emphasize that the deliberation of an agent before making a selection is not the cause of the selection. The agent is the the cause of selecting action its deliberation proposed.

Consider three types of human feewill typically preceded by deliberation. . There is the freewill of inclination, the freewill of duty, and the freewill of love.

In freewill of inclination the agent chooses amongst ends toward which he recgonizes no end as that to which he has an overwhelming inclination. The goal is to satisfy inclinations. This frequently takes the form of trying to avoid leaving inclinations unsatisfied. Choosing a desert in a cafeteria provides a typical example. Should I choose apple pie, cherry pie or chocolate cake? I enjoy them separately but realize I would feel sick and waste money if I chose more than one. I think and think; but the other people in line cause me, perhaps deterministically to make up my mind. I select cherry pie, enjoy it while satisfying my desert inclinations for awhile. My inclination for cherry pie was not an efficient cause of my selecting it. I selected the cherry pie to satisfy my inclination.

If humans had only the freewill of inclination satisfaction, it might seem that freewill is restricted to selfish choices. However, people have inclinations for the health and well-being of others. Choosing to help others be happy is certainly not selfish.

With freewill of dutyy an agent deliberates between satisfying an inclination for a good in conflict with a basic human good and following the moral command not to act contrary to a basic human good.

For an example, imagine that I live in a community allowing medical assistance in dying, MAID. Suppose also that I have an extremely painful terminal illness. I can deliberate between satisfying my strong inclination for the good of being pain-free at the expense of destroying the basic human good of my life,which I am usually inclined to preserve. Basic human goods are obligatory goods. See: Basic Human Goods Convey Divine Commands Hence, basic human goods entail categorical imperatives that they never be directly destroyed. In this case, then, I am deliberating between a good, viz. no pain, towards which I am strongly inclined and obeying a moral law not to take my life. Suppose that I refuse the euthanasia option. I have then exercised my freedom of duty by selecting obedience to the moral law over satisfying an inclination involving its violation. I did not select obedience to the law because I had a stronger inclination to obey than to avoid pain. I selected to subordinate inclination satisfaction to doing what is right. I realize that at best a sense of righteousness is small comfort in great physical pain. In this case, I can choose not to have my life taken while hoping that I die immediately because all my inclinations oppose the path I select.

An agent who can use its freedom from determism to select obedience to a moral law over inclination satisfaction has the freedom to be moral.

However, the freedom to be moral requires recognition of moral laws. What capabilities does an agent need to recognize moral laws? Suppose that my adaptation of the New Natural Law theory gives a correct account of how moral laws are recognized. See: Basic Human Goods & Human Morality Under this supposition, humans must recognize certain human goods as basic human goods. This means that they are goods which are to be promoted and never intentionally frustrated. The general command never to frustrate the basic goods supports the various categorical imperatives – moral laws- such as Do not kill used in the euthanasia example above. However, to become convinced of the moral laws we need to come to appreciate that these basic goods are indeed goods in whomever they occur. This means learning to will these goods in whomever they occur. Willing what is good for the sake of the other is love. For love is to will the good of the other.

What we notice here is that the capability of loving – the capability to choose the good of the other is the foundation for the universaliization of what is often called “the moral point of view.”

It might seem that I have, at best, written of learning to love abstractions such as life, knowledge friendship etc., for basic human goods. However, humans do not learn which goods are basic human goods by thinking of abstractions. We reflex on real or imagined situations to learn good from evil. Our thoughts, which are always inseparable from affections, of good and evil are always thoughts of good or evil in particular real, or imagined, human beings. If we will the good for the humans in these scenarios our willing is an act of love – willing the good of the other.

Consider a case to show that my opposition an abortion is based on love. In so far as I oppose abortion because I hold that life is a basic human good, my opposition to abortion is only moral. However, an abortion for a particular woman because I choose for her to have the good of being a mother who preserves the life growing in her, my choice is a choice for the good of the other – a choice of love for that girl. That this choice is of love is clearest when both my inclinations and those of the woman are all in favor of solving current problems with abortion. It is the love which strenghtens my moral choice against abortion.

Unscientific speculations about agent causality:

I propose limiting agent causality to animals. Attribution of agency to angels poses problems which must be confronted elsewhere. Let’s not speculate about the crazy networks of roots sent out by plants as agent selected. Further I suggest restricting speculation about agency to organisms with at least a rudimentary central nervous system. An agent is an individual organism. Its agency – its capacity to spontaneously change- be an uncaused cause of – its state may depend upon the potential -DNA-for having a certain level of neuronal complexity. But an agent is not its conditions for it to exercise agent causality. Agency is an emergent feature of animals. Once a certain neuronal complexity evoved, or was created, agent causation came into being. But the agents are not identical with the complexity required for their existence. Two agents can have identical conditions for their agency and not be identical.

There Ought to be Something Rather than Nothing

Authoritarian Morality, Deontic logic, Moral philosophy

In construction of a model of what it would be like for there to be Satan in which I represent Satan as a disobedient deputy creator, I need to answer why God creates at all; let alone creates a deputy creator capable of insubordination. So, we confront the question: Why is there something rather than nothing? But I have transformed the question into: Why ought there be something rather than nothing?

The transformation is based on a model of reality in which what ought to be the case – the Deontic- is more fundamental than what is the case- the Ontic. Values are more fundamental than facts; obedience is a more fundamental correct response to reality than knowledge of facts. I have not yet presented this model.

Consider the following argument in which moral necessity is logical necessity when the major premisses are deontic statements, viz., statements of what ought to be. or ought to br done.

If there were nothing, there would be nothing good.

What is good ought to be.

Hence, if there were nothing there would not be what ought to be.

So, by moral necessity, there ought not be nothing.

Or by moral necessity, there ought to be something.

Conceptual Models are Models of HavingTruth Conditions.

Core philosophy, On the Nature of Satan

In my efforts to construct a conceptual model of what reality would be like if there were a Satan, I am concerned about the purpose of such an effort. See: The Value of Conceptual Models of Satan The purpose for the model is found in a realistic or correspondence understanding of truth, under the constraints of a presupposition that thinking of justified belief, let alone the thinking of knowing, is reflective. Here “reflexive” means “thought about thinking.”

The reflective interpretation of thinking assumes that what we are aware of in thinking is something produced by thinking and not things in-themselves apart from thought. There might be some thinking which is directly about things-in-themselves But whenever we have the least concern about the correctness of our thinking we think about our thinking. The support for the representational understanding of thinking is that whenever we try to think carefully we reflect on our thinking. We cannot think of ourselves not thinking of our thinking. For any attempt to think of ourselves not thinking about our thinking leads to our thinking about our thinking.

What we think and say can be true or false depending upon whether we say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. This realist interpretation presupposes that our thoughts and words are a type of dependent reality – dependent upon humans- and real – independent reality- to which our thoughts and words refer, viz. things in themselves apart from out thinking.

The fundamental challenge to realism based on a correspondence theory of truth points out that we have no concept of things in themselves. For whenever we try to think of things apart from out thinking, we think of them whereby we fail to guarantee their existing apart from thinking of them. This challenge leads me to hold a mitigated skepticism about truth. See Confession of a Truth Skeptic .

We must acept the result that a conceptual model of reality independent of our thought is not a model of reality independent of our thought.

The mere possibility of thinking of reality apart from our thought seems illusory.

However, the possibility of the way we think corresponding to conditions apart from our thinking can be shown by distinguishing two types of our thought. Let us call them empirical and abstract. The distinguishing feature of empirical thought is that we can imagine what we think about. The distinguishing feature of abstract thought is that any imagery of what is thought about is dismissed as misleading. Now we cannot really think without imagery. So, completely abstract thought is an idealized type of thought that we cannot attain. Abstract thinking requires keeping always in the background an intellectual conscience to criticize any recourse to imagery. So, idealized abstract thought can be used as a substitute for a reality beyond our thinking which can be compared with our normal ways of thinking. Of course, constructing the abstract model requires showing the abstract way of thinking more or less accurately represents the empirical way of thinking. Hence for the case of Satan, I need to display how my ways of talking about Satan with abstract moral and theological concepts is in accord with religious talk of Satan with all of its imagery.

Some realists, let us call them “classical realists,” assume our thought can match reality apart from thought. This assumption holds that the structure of empirical thoughts can be the same as the structure of things-in-themselves. We have truth when the structure of empirical thoughts we obtain by abstraction from our images corresponds to the structures outside human thinking. I do not accept this type of direct realism. For when we try to think of abstract structures outside our minds we are thinking of our thought in constructing that abstract structure.

The important message of this post is the conceptual models show the possibility of truth by correspondence with a reality apart from truth claims. But this all takes place within our thinking.

I found the following passage from Ch 3 of BI of Augustine’s De Trinitatae encouraging when I felt like discontinuing work on this Satan book. I realize that few, if any people, will be interested in my efforts to show the major thelogical claims about Satan could be true. My effort may be of use to some. A book does not have to be suitable for everyone.

This is not well said, because I do not understand it; such an one finds fault with my language, not with my faith: and it might perhaps in very truth have been put more clearly; yet no man ever so spoke as to be understood in all things by all men. Let him, therefore, who finds this fault with my discourse, see whether he can understand other men who have handled similar subjects and questions, when he does not understand me: and if he can, let him put down my book, or even, if he pleases, throw it away; and let him spend labor and time rather on those whom he understands. Yet let him not think on that account that I ought to have been silent, because I have not been able to express myself so smoothly and clearly to him as those do whom he understands. For neither do all things, which all men have written, come into the hands of all. And possibly some, who are capable of understanding even these our writings, may not find those more lucid works, and may meet with ours only. And therefore it is useful that many persons should write many books, differing in style but not in faith, concerning even the same questions, that the matter itself may reach the greatest number— some in one way, some in another.

Basing the Reality of Satan on the Problem of evil

Booklet on Satan, Moral harm, On the Nature of Satan

This post begins the actual construction of a Conceptual Model of what it would be like for Satan to be a reality. We begin with a variation of the familiar problem of evil.

If God is all-good and all-powerful and the sole creator of reality as we experience reality and we do not deserve reality as we experience reality to have sin and suffering, then reality as we experience it would not have sin and suffering.

But: God is all good and all powerful.

And: Reality as we experience it has sin and suffering.

Hence, God is not the sole creator of reality as we experience it or we deserve reality as we experience it to have sin and suffering.

The disjunctive conclusion is an inclusive disjunction, viz., both disjuncts can be true. Here, it is plausible, as we shall see, that if both are true they are connected. First, though, we should note that a creator other than God is not equal to God. For, a creator equal to God would be God. So, the creator other than God is only a deputy creator created by God with the capability of acting against what God would have in reality as we experience it. In other words it has the greatest possible Free Will .

For the remainder of this post, I will not us the phrase “reality as we experience it” but only the word “reality.” I mean by “sin” choosing reality to be different from the way a perfect creator would have it be. Since, in another post, I interpret moral laws as Divine Commands , I use “sin” above to refer to the evil brought about by choices of beings capable of choosing to obey or disobey God, viz. beings with Agenct Causality,

If the deputy creator acted against God’s will in creating reality choosing it to be different from God’s way, then we could say this deputy creator, and our candidate for Satan, comitted a cosmic sin. Why, though, should the sin of the deputy creator, viz. Satan, be inflicted on humanity by having reality be so full of sin and suffering? Why should any sins of humans bring about such a cosmic catastrophe unless some original human sin is linked with Satan’s cosmic sin? The plausible link is that Satan led humans to choose to commit its sin. So, humans deserve what Satan deserves for its sin. (I prefer to use”it” to refer to Satan. The evil intentions of an agent cause seem more uncanny when it is simply some being capable of choosing evil. )

This linkage of Satan and humanity in a choice for reality not to be as God would have it be entails that reality with its sin, suffering and death is as it ought to be. For choices that what is good ought not be are choices that some harm ought to be. Hence, the cosmic choice of Satan and humanity that the highest possible created good, viz reality as God would have it, is a choice that harm, destruction of what is good ought to be in reality.

Put it this way. For the construction of my model I assume that the original choice for the deputy creator was binary: Choose the greatest good, which is what the Creator would have, or choose the greatest harm which is total annihilation of the greatest good. What Satan chooses is a condition contradictory to what god would choose; not merely contrary to it. Even if the deputy creator would have reality be a little bit different than God would have it, the deputy creator would first have to make the cosmic choice to set aside, to disobey, the plan of the creator. That choice to set aside the good of the creator is the choice of the cosmic harm that the good God wills be destroyed. Our Genesis Myth puts it well. First Satan tempted Adam & Eve to set aside God’s plan. That disobedience is Adam & Eve’s original sin which brings upon them the same cosmic curse as that upon Satan. The subsequent choices of Adam and Eve – choices of humanity- have not been for total annihilation. They have been choices of how reality ought to be according to human inclinations and desires. Satan, the deputy creator, had no choices beyond the first choice: To create as God wills or will for no creation at all.

Of course, the preceding requires justification of many assumptions. A major assumption is that God created a deputy creator. Some reasons for creating a deputy creator are in Rationality of Belief in Satan. Another major assumption is correctness of a Retribution Punishment. This is an assumptionthat choice of what is wrong is a creation of an ad hoc moral norm that some harm ought to be. It is an ad hoc norm because it was created by a choice and can be removed by some suffering of the harm that ought to be. I have called these ad hoc norms that some harm ought to be Moral Harm. I will now start to call a moral harm a curse.

But elaboration of this curse is for another post. Here I conclude by noting how the structure of my model for the reality of Satan is set by a way of “solving the problem of evil. The model is built by elaborating upon, although not fully justifying the many crucial assumptions in the above “solution.”

The Supernatural is for Love & Freewill

Divine Command Morality, meaning of love, Ontology

Thesis:The human capacity to love reveals the supernatural dimension of humanity.

The argument for the thesis of this post develops the thesis: Freewill Necesaary and Sufficient for Love .

The purpose of this thesis for my project of modeling Satan is to justify creation of the supernatural, although the supernatural requires the possibility all of the evil initiated by intelligent agents. However, creation of the supernatural creates the possibility of love. The possibility of love outweighs all of the actualized possibilities of evil initiated by intelligent agents, which amongst other things are capable of love.

A case for love’s supreme goodness is made at the end of this post.

This is the gist of the argument that love is supernatural.

What is obligatory is supernatural. Love is obligatory. So, love is supernatural

Terminological clarifications will be needed as we procede. For “nature” and “natural” are used equivocally. Consider. In the phrase “human nature,” the term “nature” signifies what a human being is. Within the term “supernatural” the second part “natural” is an adjective which goes with “nature” where “nature” signifies the features of human beings which are studied by physics, chemistry, biology, psychology and sociology, viz. natural sciences. So, “supernatural” signifies features of human beings which cannot be studied by the natural sciences. However, in another sense of “nature,” clarified in: The Supernatural is not a Super Nature,, the term “supernatural” does not signify a type of nature different from that studied by the natural sciences.

I use “humanity” to signify what a human being is. Hence, I write of natural and supernatural dimensions of humanity. In light of Where is the Supernatural?, it would be better to write “The supernatural and natural dimensions of reality intersect in humanity.

Our subjection to moral imperatives points to the supernatural dimension of humanity. The scientific study of human nature explains why people naturally pursue what is good: Basic goods or lesser goods when not thinking clearly. We naturally seek what is good because we have inclinations for what is good. More generally, the natural goal for humans is happiness because an inclination for happiness is in the natural dimension of humanity. However, no facts about our pursuing what is good show that we ought to pursue what is good. David Hume’s observation that “ought” does not follow logically from “is” is not a philosopher noting a logical distinctions. It calls our attention to a profound reality about humanity. We have a supernatural dimension.

Am I proposing that good can be defined as that for which we have an inclination?

We must persuade ourselves and others that a condition is a basic human good.

For one, we can intelligibly say something is good for which I, at least temporarily, have no inclination. The point of bringing out that we have inclinations for what is good is to bring out that conditions for which few, if any is inclined for, are not candidates for being good. Being suitable objects of choice for humans is a limiting condition for what can be called good.

Also, the fact that basic goods, such as commuity can be commanded regardless of any inclination of to choose otherwise shows that good and that for which I have an inclination are not synonymous.

Why say that humans have a supernatural dimension, instead of saying that humans have a dimension which cannot be understood by natural sciences?

Hume’s logical point supports a metaphysical conclusion, which Hume himself would have considered “sophistry and illusion.” The metaphysical conclusion is that there is a type of reality different from nature wherein obligations are the fundamental realities. Hume assumed that there is no reality other than the reality of nature. Hence, obligations had to be explained as dependent upon nature. Roughly, obligations would be explained as what people construct to insure they get that for which they have natural inclinations. So, there would not be obligations to act regardless of any inclinations to do otherwise. There would be no categorical imperatives.

There are categorical imperatives. (The Satan modeling project assumes moral realism. Moral realist should accept that there is a moral reality.)

Being subject to categorical moral imperatives shows that humans have access to a reality different from that acessible by the thought processes needed for natural science. It’s a reality whose basic laws states: Do good, avoid evil. Such a reality warrants the title “super.” Moral realism entails supernatural agency. Why?Imperatives specify what ought to be done. What ought to be can be. If there were no agents obligations could not be carries out. So, the assumption of moral realism carries with it an assumtion that there are moral agents. These are agents with the Free Will of Love. The thesis that love requires us to be supernatural agents is, in effect, a corollary of the thesis that obligations entail that we are supernatural agents. For we cannot love if we are not moral agents. The two greatest commandments are commands to love. See Mt 22:36-40 If love is commanded, love is the sort of activity for moral agents. If such love came totally through nature, it would not make sense to speak of it as commanded.

For those who do not want to use scripture as the source of the command to love, can consider the first natural moral law: Do good! This law tells us to will the good for the sake of good itself. Willing good for the sake of good itself is certainly willing the good for another since no creature is good itself. So, in effect, the first moral law states: Love! In creation, love is necessary for good to be pursued as it ought to be pursued. Thus, love is only behind the good in terms of being valuable.

Supernatural Reality is Not a Super Nature

On the Nature of Satan, Ontology

The purpose of this post is to support a negative thesis that the supernatural has not the the reality of a nature. In Deontic Structure of Supernatural Reality a postive thesis that the supernatural is the reality of morality. There it will be brought out that realm in which moral laws are realities is more than a bleak realm of “Thou shalts” and “Thou shalt nots.

The spiritual dimension of humanity is not a special field of study for those who enjoy the occult or spiritualists. The supernatural is not “spooky.” For the most part, trying to understand the supernatural is trying to understand ourselves; not trying to make contact with spirits. The supernatural is a dimension of each and every person. But the methods of natural science are not the way we become acquainted with and understand our supernatural dimension. Perhaps most become acquainted with the supernatural when “our conscience bothers us.” Our consciences bother us when we believe that we have done something really wrong. Here “really” means “real;” not something such as “seriously.” Our violation of a moral law is an existing and pernicious reality.

The so-called humanities and art are ways to experience the supernatural when our own experience is limited. The German term die Geistwissenschaften might refer to the kinds of studies I have in mind. However, if I am correct about love, the experience of willing the good for another regardless of any inclination is experiencing what is supernatural. Reflecting on that experience of love is a significant way of understanding the supernatural.

As “supernatural dimension” has been characterized, many thoughtful people, I believe, will accept the concept as marking out important areas of humanity; but with a tendentious label. Why, it might be objected, use the term “supernatural” which hints at the occult? Why not simply call it the moral dimension of humanity?

However, I do not accept reducing the supernatural to the aspects of humanity which cannot be understood by the methods of natural science. For my larger project of modeling Satan,I need to do more than make a case for using the concept of supernatural to apply to humans. Beyond the conceptual case, I need to make an ontolgical case. The ontological case is that there is a supernatural reality, albeit no supernatural nature. At some point in my Satan model building, I need to make a case that: Satan is a reality.

Grant that what I have called the supernatural is real. Why go on to assert that this reality is not a nature?

To answer we return to David Hume’s logical point about the logical gap between “is” and “ought.”

In my answer “nature” is understood as what can be correctly described by saying what is the case. A nature is what Wittgenstein called a world when he wrote: The world is all that is the case. To tell the whole truth about a nature or a world is to tell all of the facts. Statements of what ought to be done, what ought to be and for what purpose something ought to be done are not statements of fact. To be sure, some factual statements about nature studied in the natural sciences, especially psychology and sociology, report what is the case with obligations and goals humans have created. But these facts about human constructions do not give us moral laws or ultimate goals. For instance, Hume’s logical point reminds us that “Thou ought not kill” does not follow from “It is the case that people have a rule that we ought not kill.” In the nature studied in the natural sciences, man is the measure of all things, viz., measure of all norms and goals, as Protagoras taught long ago.

Suppose the supernatural signified a nature; perhaps a realm of spirits and their activities. How could there be norms and rules binding these spirits? The spirits could invent them. But inventions are not categorical moral rules: rules binding us regardless of whether or not we choose to be bound by them. Even if the spirits heard the voice of God command “Thou shalt not kill,” they know only the fact about the spirit realm expressed in “It is the case that God commanded thou shalt not kill.” Hume’s logical point about “ought” not logically implied by “is” holds for this supposed spiritual nature as well as for the familiar nature studied by the natural sciences. The spirits are not entitled to infer “Thou ought not kill” from”It is the case that God said thou ought not kill.”

In the early twentieth century, philosophers diagnosed a naturalistic fallacy. The gist of the accusation of a fallacy was as follows. Regardless of the nature of a nature, the nature only offers facts and not values. Or: the objective truth about a nature is expressed with statements of facts. In a world of facts, expressions of value are subjective; expressions of sentiments by humans.

We have reached a point where we need to make a decision about ontology. We can dismiss norms and goals as having objective reality and thereby dismiss morality as fundamental. Or we can accept them as having objective reality and try to understand a reality which is non-factual: a reality whose fundamental features are not properly reported with statements of the form “It is the case that______”

For the project of modelling Satan as a reality, I need to make the decision about ontology to model a non-factual reality in Deontic Structure of Supernatural Reality.