Supporting Sexual Morality vs. Speculating about Satan

I am thinking about dropping my project of writing a booklet rationalizing belief in Satan? and turning to revising my book book on sexual morality. Would any conceptual scheme I develop in which there is a place for a Satan-like being convince anyone? Indeed, it would not be the conceptual scheme which convinced me of the reality of Satan if I am so convinced. Is it not more important to convince people of the reality of sexual evil? That means convincing people of the incorrectness of the Moral Neutrality of Sexuality.

Why is sexual morality so important? I cite two reasons which I did not present in the first edition of my book. In the October 2024 issue of First Things, we can read in Ryan T. Anderson’s, The Way Forward After Dobbs, “Nonmarital sex is the main cause of abortion. Marriage is the best protector of unborn human life.” Another is the vast increase in viewing pornography as examined in Grant H. Brenner MD’s Pychology Today article “4 Ways Porn Use Causes Problems.”

In my book, I advocated the traditional , which has been taught by the Catholic Church, sexual morality as an antidote for nihilism. I am still certain that traditional sexual morality is an antidote for nihilism. Unfortunately, it is being undercut by some leading Catholics. See for instance: Cardinal McElroy: Sex and sin need a new framework in the church | America Magazine . Even the current Pope is less than supportive of traditional Catholic sexual morality. See, for instance, Pope Francis on sexual morality

Basic Human Goods Constitute The Common Good

The common good is defined in Pope John XXIII’s encyclical Mater et Magistra (On Christianity and Social Progress) as “the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfillment more fully and more easily.” I propose that the Basic Human Goods specify what ought to be pursued to attain the common good and what ought not be done because it detracts from the common good. If the no one ever acted in a way to impede a basic human good and would always so act as to promote some basic good, all that humans could do for the sake of the common good has been done. Unfortunately, factors beyond human control might always occur so that human life is wretched beyond any human effort.

So, I propose interpreting “basic human good” as “a constituent of the common good” or as “a common good.” So, the first law of morality “Do good, avoid evil!” can be read as ” Always promote a common good; never directly inhibit development of a common good.” Recreation or play is a basic good. So, one can be promoting a common good and hence the common good by “taking it easy” once and a while.

I offer an example of a common good brought about by human sexuality. Human sexuality, sexual practices, frequently brings about babies and somewhat less frequently a male bonded to the female who bore the child to help her and the child. Let us call this complex result “new life.” It is the new life of the infant, new life in the nuclear family, renewal of the life of the bonded mother and father and new life for continuance of the life of the community. Some but, but not all, and many, if only dimly, will recognize new life as a good in the common good. Hence, the gist of sexual morality is: Use sexuality to promote new life and never directly inhibit sexuality from leading to new life.

Much can be written about how we discover the common good. Here are a few observations on recognizing the common good. A common good is good for us; not necessarily good for me. It is communal. Nonetheless, since individuals are in communities common goods have to be good for individuals for the most part. There can be misperception of a common good if “us” refers to less than the whole human community. However, people understanding their community as less than the whole of humanity may very well recognize a common good in what is good for a narrower comunity to which they belong. Ethno-centricism accounts for misperception of a common good. However, ethno-centrism does not prevent correction perception of a common good. Perception of a common good does not require some impossible deracination program of thinking as a person who is simply human’ only in the community of humanity. Careful use of imagination and analogies suffice fairly well, I submit, for recognizing what people the world over care about. For instance, on the whole they don’t want their babies to die.

Why Confront Secularism?

Why have I changed the theme of my blog posts from confronting Nihilism to confronting Secularism?

From September 2024 through February 2025, I am dedicating a page of my blog site as the instructions and information page for The Priestly Vocation Essay contest of the Serra Club of Columbus. I manage the contest. Parents, teachers and students might be confused by a title about a Catholic philosopher confronting nihilism when they are looking for information about writing essays on a vocation to the Catholic priesthood.

The Columbus Serra Club challenges eighth grade boys to write an essay of five hundred words or less answering  a question about whether God might be calling them to the priesthood.  Writers of the ten best essays are awarded a $1,000 tuition assistance grant to a diocesan Catholic high school for the 2025/2026 academic year. The Serra Club encourages  participation from all schools in the diocese. The mere fact of writing the essays helps form a culture of vocations. The 2024 essays, even those written as an extra credit assignment,  were very well written while showing serious thought about what God might have in mind for them. Most of the essays were analyses of why they did not think God was calling them to be a priest. Nonetheless: A boy   who settles down to write out what he thinks about his future in light of God’s will, forms in himself an antidote against secularism.

An antidote against secularism is an antidote to nihilism. For in a secular outlook a boy thinks about his life as if God is irrelevant to what he should become. There is heavy pressure to think as a secularist in our culture. If he continues to think as a secularist and becomes aware of his secularist outlook, he will either become an explicit nihilist, continue as a secularist while suppressing thoughts about the meaning of his life or return to thinking of God having a purpose for his life. Rememberance of having written, way back in the eighth grade, how it was not all about him but God and him, might protect him from the nihilism of “It’s all about me.”

Freewill of Love, Freewil of Duty & Freewill of Inclination Satisfaction

In other posts I have written of the freewill of love. See: Agency, Ordinary Free Will, & Free Will of Love. Here I frequently call that level of freewill “freedom to love.” I hope to show that the freedom to love is no more mysterious than the fact that humans, and perhaps all animals, inject agent causation into the events which occur in nature. Of course, agent causation remains mysterious from an explicit, or even implicit, outlook that when reality is properly understood reality will be recognized as nothing more than matter in motion. But more importantly, I hope to show that the freewill of love is necessary for the freedom of morality. The freewill of love is the capability of choosing the good of the other for the sake of the other. The freewill of morality is the capability of choosing what is morally obligatory because it is morally obligatory. Hereafter, I will call the freewill of morality, the freewill of duty.

I conjecture that agent causation extends far down in the animal kingdom. Suppose I lift a rock and bugs scurry off in various directions To an external observer, this is a stochastic process. However, internally to the bugs the paths taken are selected by the individual bugs. The individual bugs are not mere conduits through which a stream of causal action and reaction, be it deterministic or pr0bablistic, flows. An agent caused event has no sufficient conditions prior to what an agent does and the agent’s selection provides the sufficient conditions. Most likely there are neural processes in the bugs which give them the power of selection to initiate new causal pathways. Still agent causes are self-accelerators.

If agent causation goes fairly far down in the animal kingdom, so-called libertarian or contra-causal freewill goes fairly far down in the animal kingdom. Once agent causation emerged in evolutionary history, the evolutionary process may have selected for organisms capable of agent causation as opposed to those whose reactions are always strictly determined or totally random. I do not think that the bugs do anything like conscious deliberation. But conscious deliberation is not necessary for libertarian or contracausal free will. I also conjecture that once organisms with libertartian free will have evolved, there is evolutionary selection for agent causation modified, but not totally determined, by sensations, inclinations and thoughts. There is always remains a need for the selection or act of will by the agent. This is the common core of freewill for bugs, humans and angels.

Put it this way. Basic agent causation is freedom from deterministic causation. Levels of this basic freedom from are freedoms to execute choices of various types. Perhaps the freedom from deterministic causation only gives my bugs the freedom to select a flight path at random. However, their possesion of photo sensors might be giving them the freedom to seek a darker spot after my lifting the rock exposed them to bright sunshine.

The first law of freedom is to restrict it. An organism develops freedom to do specifIc things by developing ways of restricting its freedom from non-agent causality.

In the remainder of this post, the concern is with the levels of freewill at which humans act. Humans frequently deliberate before making a selection. In delibertion the agent consciously considers alternative before making a selection. I must emphasize that the deliberation of an agent before making a selection is not the cause of the selection. The agent is the the cause of selecting action its deliberation proposed.

Consider three types of human feewill typically preceded by deliberation. . There is the freewill of inclination, the freewill of duty, and the freewill of love.

In freewill of inclination the agent chooses amongst ends toward which he recgonizes no end as that to which he has an overwhelming inclination. The goal is to satisfy inclinations. This frequently takes the form of trying to avoid leaving inclinations unsatisfied. Choosing a desert in a cafeteria provides a typical example. Should I choose apple pie, cherry pie or chocolate cake? I enjoy them separately but realize I would feel sick and waste money if I chose more than one. I think and think; but the other people in line cause me, perhaps deterministically to make up my mind. I select cherry pie, enjoy it while satisfying my desert inclinations for awhile. My inclination for cherry pie was not an efficient cause of my selecting it. I selected the cherry pie to satisfy my inclination.

If humans had only the freewill of inclination satisfaction, it might seem that freewill is restricted to selfish choices. However, people have inclinations for the health and well-being of others. Choosing to help others be happy is certainly not selfish.

With freewill of dutyy an agent deliberates between satisfying an inclination for a good in conflict with a basic human good and following the moral command not to act contrary to a basic human good.

For an example, imagine that I live in a community allowing medical assistance in dying, MAID. Suppose also that I have an extremely painful terminal illness. I can deliberate between satisfying my strong inclination for the good of being pain-free at the expense of destroying the basic human good of my life,which I am usually inclined to preserve. Basic human goods are obligatory goods. See: Basic Human Goods Convey Divine Commands Hence, basic human goods entail categorical imperatives that they never be directly destroyed. In this case, then, I am deliberating between a good, viz. no pain, towards which I am strongly inclined and obeying a moral law not to take my life. Suppose that I refuse the euthanasia option. I have then exercised my freedom of duty by selecting obedience to the moral law over satisfying an inclination involving its violation. I did not select obedience to the law because I had a stronger inclination to obey than to avoid pain. I selected to subordinate inclination satisfaction to doing what is right. I realize that at best a sense of righteousness is small comfort in great physical pain. In this case, I can choose not to have my life taken while hoping that I die immediately because all my inclinations oppose the path I select.

An agent who can use its freedom from determism to select obedience to a moral law over inclination satisfaction has the freedom to be moral.

However, the freedom to be moral requires recognition of moral laws. What capabilities does an agent need to recognize moral laws? Suppose that my adaptation of the New Natural Law theory gives a correct account of how moral laws are recognized. See: Basic Human Goods & Human Morality Under this supposition, humans must recognize certain human goods as basic human goods. This means that they are goods which are to be promoted and never intentionally frustrated. The general command never to frustrate the basic goods supports the various categorical imperatives – moral laws- such as Do not kill used in the euthanasia example above. However, to become convinced of the moral laws we need to come to appreciate that these basic goods are indeed goods in whomever they occur. This means learning to will these goods in whomever they occur. Willing what is good for the sake of the other is love. For love is to will the good of the other.

What we notice here is that the capability of loving – the capability to choose the good of the other is the foundation for the universaliization of what is often called “the moral point of view.”

It might seem that I have, at best, written of learning to love abstractions such as life, knowledge friendship etc., for basic human goods. However, humans do not learn which goods are basic human goods by thinking of abstractions. We reflex on real or imagined situations to learn good from evil. Our thoughts, which are always inseparable from affections, of good and evil are always thoughts of good or evil in particular real, or imagined, human beings. If we will the good for the humans in these scenarios our willing is an act of love – willing the good of the other.

Consider a case to show that my opposition an abortion is based on love. In so far as I oppose abortion because I hold that life is a basic human good, my opposition to abortion is only moral. However, an abortion for a particular woman because I choose for her to have the good of being a mother who preserves the life growing in her, my choice is a choice for the good of the other – a choice of love for that girl. That this choice is of love is clearest when both my inclinations and those of the woman are all in favor of solving current problems with abortion. It is the love which strenghtens my moral choice against abortion.

Unscientific speculations about agent causality:

I propose limiting agent causality to animals. Attribution of agency to angels poses problems which must be confronted elsewhere. Let’s not speculate about the crazy networks of roots sent out by plants as agent selected. Further I suggest restricting speculation about agency to organisms with at least a rudimentary central nervous system. An agent is an individual organism. Its agency – its capacity to spontaneously change- be an uncaused cause of – its state may depend upon the potential -DNA-for having a certain level of neuronal complexity. But an agent is not its conditions for it to exercise agent causality. Agency is an emergent feature of animals. Once a certain neuronal complexity evoved, or was created, agent causation came into being. But the agents are not identical with the complexity required for their existence. Two agents can have identical conditions for their agency and not be identical.

There Ought to be Something Rather than Nothing

In construction of a model of what it would be like for there to be Satan in which I represent Satan as a disobedient deputy creator, I need to answer why God creates at all; let alone creates a deputy creator capable of insubordination. So, we confront the question: Why is there something rather than nothing? But I have transformed the question into: Why ought there be something rather than nothing?

The transformation is based on a model of reality in which what ought to be the case – the Deontic- is more fundamental than what is the case- the Ontic. Values are more fundamental than facts; obedience is a more fundamental correct response to reality than knowledge of facts. I have not yet presented this model.

Consider the following argument in which moral necessity is logical necessity when the major premisses are deontic statements, viz., statements of what ought to be. or ought to br done.

If there were nothing, there would be nothing good.

What is good ought to be.

Hence, if there were nothing there would not be what ought to be.

So, by moral necessity, there ought not be nothing.

Or by moral necessity, there ought to be something.

Conceptual Models are Models of HavingTruth Conditions.

In my efforts to construct a conceptual model of what reality would be like if there were a Satan, I am concerned about the purpose of such an effort. See: The Value of Conceptual Models of Satan The purpose for the model is found in a realistic or correspondence understanding of truth, under the constraints of a presupposition that thinking of justified belief, let alone the thinking of knowing, is reflective. Here “reflexive” means “thought about thinking.”

The reflective interpretation of thinking assumes that what we are aware of in thinking is something produced by thinking and not things in-themselves apart from thought. There might be some thinking which is directly about things-in-themselves But whenever we have the least concern about the correctness of our thinking we think about our thinking. The support for the representational understanding of thinking is that whenever we try to think carefully we reflect on our thinking. We cannot think of ourselves not thinking of our thinking. For any attempt to think of ourselves not thinking about our thinking leads to our thinking about our thinking.

What we think and say can be true or false depending upon whether we say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not. This realist interpretation presupposes that our thoughts and words are a type of dependent reality – dependent upon humans- and real – independent reality- to which our thoughts and words refer, viz. things in themselves apart from out thinking.

The fundamental challenge to realism based on a correspondence theory of truth points out that we have no concept of things in themselves. For whenever we try to think of things apart from out thinking, we think of them whereby we fail to guarantee their existing apart from thinking of them. This challenge leads me to hold a mitigated skepticism about truth. See Confession of a Truth Skeptic .

We must acept the result that a conceptual model of reality independent of our thought is not a model of reality independent of our thought.

The mere possibility of thinking of reality apart from our thought seems illusory.

However, the possibility of the way we think corresponding to conditions apart from our thinking can be shown by distinguishing two types of our thought. Let us call them empirical and abstract. The distinguishing feature of empirical thought is that we can imagine what we think about. The distinguishing feature of abstract thought is that any imagery of what is thought about is dismissed as misleading. Now we cannot really think without imagery. So, completely abstract thought is an idealized type of thought that we cannot attain. Abstract thinking requires keeping always in the background an intellectual conscience to criticize any recourse to imagery. So, idealized abstract thought can be used as a substitute for a reality beyond our thinking which can be compared with our normal ways of thinking. Of course, constructing the abstract model requires showing the abstract way of thinking more or less accurately represents the empirical way of thinking. Hence for the case of Satan, I need to display how my ways of talking about Satan with abstract moral and theological concepts is in accord with religious talk of Satan with all of its imagery.

Some realists, let us call them “classical realists,” assume our thought can match reality apart from thought. This assumption holds that the structure of empirical thoughts can be the same as the structure of things-in-themselves. We have truth when the structure of empirical thoughts we obtain by abstraction from our images corresponds to the structures outside human thinking. I do not accept this type of direct realism. For when we try to think of abstract structures outside our minds we are thinking of our thought in constructing that abstract structure.

The important message of this post is the conceptual models show the possibility of truth by correspondence with a reality apart from truth claims. But this all takes place within our thinking.

I found the following passage from Ch 3 of BI of Augustine’s De Trinitatae encouraging when I felt like discontinuing work on this Satan book. I realize that few, if any people, will be interested in my efforts to show the major thelogical claims about Satan could be true. My effort may be of use to some. A book does not have to be suitable for everyone.

This is not well said, because I do not understand it; such an one finds fault with my language, not with my faith: and it might perhaps in very truth have been put more clearly; yet no man ever so spoke as to be understood in all things by all men. Let him, therefore, who finds this fault with my discourse, see whether he can understand other men who have handled similar subjects and questions, when he does not understand me: and if he can, let him put down my book, or even, if he pleases, throw it away; and let him spend labor and time rather on those whom he understands. Yet let him not think on that account that I ought to have been silent, because I have not been able to express myself so smoothly and clearly to him as those do whom he understands. For neither do all things, which all men have written, come into the hands of all. And possibly some, who are capable of understanding even these our writings, may not find those more lucid works, and may meet with ours only. And therefore it is useful that many persons should write many books, differing in style but not in faith, concerning even the same questions, that the matter itself may reach the greatest number— some in one way, some in another.

Basing the Reality of Satan on the Problem of evil

This post begins the actual construction of a Conceptual Model of what it would be like for Satan to be a reality. We begin with a variation of the familiar problem of evil.

If God is all-good and all-powerful and the sole creator of reality as we experience reality and we do not deserve reality as we experience reality to have sin and suffering, then reality as we experience it would not have sin and suffering.

But: God is all good and all powerful.

And: Reality as we experience it has sin and suffering.

Hence, God is not the sole creator of reality as we experience it or we deserve reality as we experience it to have sin and suffering.

The disjunctive conclusion is an inclusive disjunction, viz., both disjuncts can be true. Here, it is plausible, as we shall see, that if both are true they are connected. First, though, we should note that a creator other than God is not equal to God. For, a creator equal to God would be God. So, the creator other than God is only a deputy creator created by God with the capability of acting against what God would have in reality as we experience it. In other words it has the greatest possible Free Will .

For the remainder of this post, I will not us the phrase “reality as we experience it” but only the word “reality.” I mean by “sin” choosing reality to be different from the way a perfect creator would have it be. Since, in another post, I interpret moral laws as Divine Commands , I use “sin” above to refer to the evil brought about by choices of beings capable of choosing to obey or disobey God, viz. beings with Agenct Causality,

If the deputy creator acted against God’s will in creating reality choosing it to be different from God’s way, then we could say this deputy creator, and our candidate for Satan, comitted a cosmic sin. Why, though, should the sin of the deputy creator, viz. Satan, be inflicted on humanity by having reality be so full of sin and suffering? Why should any sins of humans bring about such a cosmic catastrophe unless some original human sin is linked with Satan’s cosmic sin? The plausible link is that Satan led humans to choose to commit its sin. So, humans deserve what Satan deserves for its sin. (I prefer to use”it” to refer to Satan. The evil intentions of an agent cause seem more uncanny when it is simply some being capable of choosing evil. )

This linkage of Satan and humanity in a choice for reality not to be as God would have it be entails that reality with its sin, suffering and death is as it ought to be. For choices that what is good ought not be are choices that some harm ought to be. Hence, the cosmic choice of Satan and humanity that the highest possible created good, viz reality as God would have it, is a choice that harm, destruction of what is good ought to be in reality.

Put it this way. For the construction of my model I assume that the original choice for the deputy creator was binary: Choose the greatest good, which is what the Creator would have, or choose the greatest harm which is total annihilation of the greatest good. What Satan chooses is a condition contradictory to what god would choose; not merely contrary to it. Even if the deputy creator would have reality be a little bit different than God would have it, the deputy creator would first have to make the cosmic choice to set aside, to disobey, the plan of the creator. That choice to set aside the good of the creator is the choice of the cosmic harm that the good God wills be destroyed. Our Genesis Myth puts it well. First Satan tempted Adam & Eve to set aside God’s plan. That disobedience is Adam & Eve’s original sin which brings upon them the same cosmic curse as that upon Satan. The subsequent choices of Adam and Eve – choices of humanity- have not been for total annihilation. They have been choices of how reality ought to be according to human inclinations and desires. Satan, the deputy creator, had no choices beyond the first choice: To create as God wills or will for no creation at all.

Of course, the preceding requires justification of many assumptions. A major assumption is that God created a deputy creator. Some reasons for creating a deputy creator are in Rationality of Belief in Satan. Another major assumption is correctness of a Retribution Punishment. This is an assumptionthat choice of what is wrong is a creation of an ad hoc moral norm that some harm ought to be. It is an ad hoc norm because it was created by a choice and can be removed by some suffering of the harm that ought to be. I have called these ad hoc norms that some harm ought to be Moral Harm. I will now start to call a moral harm a curse.

But elaboration of this curse is for another post. Here I conclude by noting how the structure of my model for the reality of Satan is set by a way of “solving the problem of evil. The model is built by elaborating upon, although not fully justifying the many crucial assumptions in the above “solution.”

The Supernatural is for Love & Freewill

Thesis:The human capacity to love reveals the supernatural dimension of humanity.

The argument for the thesis of this post develops the thesis: Freewill Necesaary and Sufficient for Love .

The purpose of this thesis for my project of modeling Satan is to justify creation of the supernatural, although the supernatural requires the possibility all of the evil initiated by intelligent agents. However, creation of the supernatural creates the possibility of love. The possibility of love outweighs all of the actualized possibilities of evil initiated by intelligent agents, which amongst other things are capable of love.

A case for love’s supreme goodness is made at the end of this post.

This is the gist of the argument that love is supernatural.

What is obligatory is supernatural. Love is obligatory. So, love is supernatural

Terminological clarifications will be needed as we procede. For “nature” and “natural” are used equivocally. Consider. In the phrase “human nature,” the term “nature” signifies what a human being is. Within the term “supernatural” the second part “natural” is an adjective which goes with “nature” where “nature” signifies the features of human beings which are studied by physics, chemistry, biology, psychology and sociology, viz. natural sciences. So, “supernatural” signifies features of human beings which cannot be studied by the natural sciences. However, in another sense of “nature,” clarified in: The Supernatural is not a Super Nature,, the term “supernatural” does not signify a type of nature different from that studied by the natural sciences.

I use “humanity” to signify what a human being is. Hence, I write of natural and supernatural dimensions of humanity. In light of Where is the Supernatural?, it would be better to write “The supernatural and natural dimensions of reality intersect in humanity.

Our subjection to moral imperatives points to the supernatural dimension of humanity. The scientific study of human nature explains why people naturally pursue what is good: Basic goods or lesser goods when not thinking clearly. We naturally seek what is good because we have inclinations for what is good. More generally, the natural goal for humans is happiness because an inclination for happiness is in the natural dimension of humanity. However, no facts about our pursuing what is good show that we ought to pursue what is good. David Hume’s observation that “ought” does not follow logically from “is” is not a philosopher noting a logical distinctions. It calls our attention to a profound reality about humanity. We have a supernatural dimension.

Am I proposing that good can be defined as that for which we have an inclination?

We must persuade ourselves and others that a condition is a basic human good.

For one, we can intelligibly say something is good for which I, at least temporarily, have no inclination. The point of bringing out that we have inclinations for what is good is to bring out that conditions for which few, if any is inclined for, are not candidates for being good. Being suitable objects of choice for humans is a limiting condition for what can be called good.

Also, the fact that basic goods, such as commuity can be commanded regardless of any inclination of to choose otherwise shows that good and that for which I have an inclination are not synonymous.

Why say that humans have a supernatural dimension, instead of saying that humans have a dimension which cannot be understood by natural sciences?

Hume’s logical point supports a metaphysical conclusion, which Hume himself would have considered “sophistry and illusion.” The metaphysical conclusion is that there is a type of reality different from nature wherein obligations are the fundamental realities. Hume assumed that there is no reality other than the reality of nature. Hence, obligations had to be explained as dependent upon nature. Roughly, obligations would be explained as what people construct to insure they get that for which they have natural inclinations. So, there would not be obligations to act regardless of any inclinations to do otherwise. There would be no categorical imperatives.

There are categorical imperatives. (The Satan modeling project assumes moral realism. Moral realist should accept that there is a moral reality.)

Being subject to categorical moral imperatives shows that humans have access to a reality different from that acessible by the thought processes needed for natural science. It’s a reality whose basic laws states: Do good, avoid evil. Such a reality warrants the title “super.” Moral realism entails supernatural agency. Why?Imperatives specify what ought to be done. What ought to be can be. If there were no agents obligations could not be carries out. So, the assumption of moral realism carries with it an assumtion that there are moral agents. These are agents with the Free Will of Love. The thesis that love requires us to be supernatural agents is, in effect, a corollary of the thesis that obligations entail that we are supernatural agents. For we cannot love if we are not moral agents. The two greatest commandments are commands to love. See Mt 22:36-40 If love is commanded, love is the sort of activity for moral agents. If such love came totally through nature, it would not make sense to speak of it as commanded.

For those who do not want to use scripture as the source of the command to love, can consider the first natural moral law: Do good! This law tells us to will the good for the sake of good itself. Willing good for the sake of good itself is certainly willing the good for another since no creature is good itself. So, in effect, the first moral law states: Love! In creation, love is necessary for good to be pursued as it ought to be pursued. Thus, love is only behind the good in terms of being valuable.

Supernatural Reality is Not a Super Nature

The purpose of this post is to support a negative thesis that the supernatural has not the the reality of a nature. In Deontic Structure of Supernatural Reality a postive thesis that the supernatural is the reality of morality. There it will be brought out that realm in which moral laws are realities is more than a bleak realm of “Thou shalts” and “Thou shalt nots.

The spiritual dimension of humanity is not a special field of study for those who enjoy the occult or spiritualists. The supernatural is not “spooky.” For the most part, trying to understand the supernatural is trying to understand ourselves; not trying to make contact with spirits. The supernatural is a dimension of each and every person. But the methods of natural science are not the way we become acquainted with and understand our supernatural dimension. Perhaps most become acquainted with the supernatural when “our conscience bothers us.” Our consciences bother us when we believe that we have done something really wrong. Here “really” means “real;” not something such as “seriously.” Our violation of a moral law is an existing and pernicious reality.

The so-called humanities and art are ways to experience the supernatural when our own experience is limited. The German term die Geistwissenschaften might refer to the kinds of studies I have in mind. However, if I am correct about love, the experience of willing the good for another regardless of any inclination is experiencing what is supernatural. Reflecting on that experience of love is a significant way of understanding the supernatural.

As “supernatural dimension” has been characterized, many thoughtful people, I believe, will accept the concept as marking out important areas of humanity; but with a tendentious label. Why, it might be objected, use the term “supernatural” which hints at the occult? Why not simply call it the moral dimension of humanity?

However, I do not accept reducing the supernatural to the aspects of humanity which cannot be understood by the methods of natural science. For my larger project of modeling Satan,I need to do more than make a case for using the concept of supernatural to apply to humans. Beyond the conceptual case, I need to make an ontolgical case. The ontological case is that there is a supernatural reality, albeit no supernatural nature. At some point in my Satan model building, I need to make a case that: Satan is a reality.

Grant that what I have called the supernatural is real. Why go on to assert that this reality is not a nature?

To answer we return to David Hume’s logical point about the logical gap between “is” and “ought.”

In my answer “nature” is understood as what can be correctly described by saying what is the case. A nature is what Wittgenstein called a world when he wrote: The world is all that is the case. To tell the whole truth about a nature or a world is to tell all of the facts. Statements of what ought to be done, what ought to be and for what purpose something ought to be done are not statements of fact. To be sure, some factual statements about nature studied in the natural sciences, especially psychology and sociology, report what is the case with obligations and goals humans have created. But these facts about human constructions do not give us moral laws or ultimate goals. For instance, Hume’s logical point reminds us that “Thou ought not kill” does not follow from “It is the case that people have a rule that we ought not kill.” In the nature studied in the natural sciences, man is the measure of all things, viz., measure of all norms and goals, as Protagoras taught long ago.

Suppose the supernatural signified a nature; perhaps a realm of spirits and their activities. How could there be norms and rules binding these spirits? The spirits could invent them. But inventions are not categorical moral rules: rules binding us regardless of whether or not we choose to be bound by them. Even if the spirits heard the voice of God command “Thou shalt not kill,” they know only the fact about the spirit realm expressed in “It is the case that God commanded thou shalt not kill.” Hume’s logical point about “ought” not logically implied by “is” holds for this supposed spiritual nature as well as for the familiar nature studied by the natural sciences. The spirits are not entitled to infer “Thou ought not kill” from”It is the case that God said thou ought not kill.”

In the early twentieth century, philosophers diagnosed a naturalistic fallacy. The gist of the accusation of a fallacy was as follows. Regardless of the nature of a nature, the nature only offers facts and not values. Or: the objective truth about a nature is expressed with statements of facts. In a world of facts, expressions of value are subjective; expressions of sentiments by humans.

We have reached a point where we need to make a decision about ontology. We can dismiss norms and goals as having objective reality and thereby dismiss morality as fundamental. Or we can accept them as having objective reality and try to understand a reality which is non-factual: a reality whose fundamental features are not properly reported with statements of the form “It is the case that______”

For the project of modelling Satan as a reality, I need to make the decision about ontology to model a non-factual reality in Deontic Structure of Supernatural Reality.

Agency, Ordinary Free Will, & Free Will of Love

This post elaborates on Example of Agency At Work. One main contention of that post is that we as agents, as agent causes, are a crucial factor in both making a decision about how to act and then initiating the action. For all that we know, agents are basic entities in reality. Even if agency emerged after living systems reached a certain level of complexity, the point of recognizing them as emergent is to recognize a new type of entity in reality. What emerges is not reducible to that from which it emerged. The basic property of agents is to form intentions, i.e., to will, to seek goals. At a first level the agent is not conscious of it’s agency. Conscious agency emerges from at a greater degree of complexity than elementary forms of agency. The type of agency capable of love as spelled out in Freewill Necessary and Sufficient for Love emerges at some high level of complexity.

A second crucial contention of Example of Agency At Work is that consciousness of choosing is not always the operation of agency. Rather it is the consciousness of the working of agency after the working of agency. At the end of this post, it is brought out that consciousness of the choosing in the highest type of choosing, the choosing in love or choosing the good of the other for the other, is inseparable from choosing to satisfy an inclination for the good of the other. It is only by an inference that we can make a probable judgement that we chose the good of the other for the sake of the good of the other.

As a Catholic philosopher untrained in physics, chemistry, biology, psychology or sociology , I have no objection to accepting so-called emergent features as directly created by God when the appropriate level of complexity has evolved. I think that direct creation of types of goal seeking is preferable to saying the new feature emerged from complexity. “Emergence” suggests that the new feature was already present potentially and, if so, something genuinely new did not come into existence. In any event, I will continue to use “emergence.”

Very importantly for my task of modeling Satan, direct creation of agency by God does not require agency to be based on physical complexity. For natural organisms God chooses to link agency with physical complexity. However, God need not choose to link all agency with something physical. Hence, the concept of agency is logically consistent with the concept of disembodied agents, viz. angels.

I appreciate, though, that people working in a scientific field, should be very reluctant to accept any phenomena as emergent. I believe that if I were a scientist, apparent emergence would be a challenge to” explain away.” Bertrand Russell once quipped about postulating least upper bounds when trying to construct the real number system from a rational number system “it has the advantages of theft over honest toil” People working in a science might well say the same of accepting emergence. I acknowledge that my discussion of agency and freewill assume the scientifically controversial reality of emergence1.

If we grant genuine agent causality, we cannot hold that prior to any decision of an agent factors determined the intentions the agents would produce. That is tantamount to denying that there is agency or setting agency aside as an irrelevant epiphenomena. Now any case of agent causation is a type of freedom of action. It would be inaccurate to say “freedom of will” when there is no consciousness on the part of the agent. For instance, the various bugs which go scurrying for shelter when I pick up a flat rock in my garden are freely seeking their various goals to restablish the security they had under the rock. It is not inaccurate, though, to say that the bugs intend to get wherever they are going

The disturbed bugs just select one of several choices open to them. The selection of one of the options is the new contribution of the agent. It is unpredictable from the state of the agent and inputs into the agent. The essence of agency is selecting an option. Agent causation fills in the gap between state of the agent, its inputs and its action outputs. To accept agency is to accept these gaps and that selecting of the agent is the causal factor, the efficient cause, in filling the gap. Acceptance of agent causation is acceptance of some very significant factors in any philosopher’s metaphysics. It may not require accepting that nature as a whole has goals. But it does require accepting that some systems within nature have goals: final causes.

Individuals in a type of organism which exercises agent causality are agents. Agents are agents from their beginning: when the DNA, genes and epigenetic factors which sets their level of complexity is formed. Thus, a human is an agent from the moment of its conception. It is far simpler to assume that there is direct creation of a type of agent once a level of complexity evolves than assuming a direct creation for each organism as it grows to a level of complexity. Thus, I assume that agency is inherited.

This is not the forum to investigate all types of of agency. This is a form for characterizing two types of human agency: Ordinary human choices and the choices in love. Ordinary human choices are the vast majority of our choices. They are choices we make to satisfy our inclinations. “Inclination” should not be construed as indicating what satisfies our sensual desires. Humans are frequently inclined to choose what even the most prudish would consider noble. Most of the time, people are conscious of their choices and they are free to carry them out. So, a type of freewill is very common in human affairs. Our choices a free in a twofold sense. As simply being agent choices they are free and as not being compelled by any physical or mental force. The reality of ordinary freewill is not problematic. It is almost the type of freewill that so-called soft determinists accept. However, soft determinist do not accept the elementary freewill of simply being an agent because they are determinists who reject emergence of agency. So, the problem of freewill is not a verbal problem. There is a disagreement about what can be in reality. It is an ontological disagreement about the possibility of agent causality.

The freewill of love, freedom to love, is different from ordinary freewill because it assumes a different input into human agents. The novel input is the good of the other. The goodness of the Basic Human Goods is an input available to for ordinary choices. For instance, the goodness of life is readily recognized. People naturally desire these basic goods. In most cases, the final cause, the goal, of a choice of basic human goods is to satisfy our inclination for those basic goods. For instance, a father who chooses to promote the education and health of his children has an inclination toward having those goods in his children. With ordinary freewill he seeks satisfaction of those paternal inclinations which pursuits have the side effects of those goods existing in his children. We can imagine some ungrateful adult children dismissing the efforts of their father by saying “He didn’t really love us. Given his traditions and inclinations, he was just doing what he wanted.” We have to concede that those ingrates have a point.

The freewill of love requires a higher level of agency than that needed for ordinary freewill. For ultimately, all choices of ordinary freewill are to satisfy inclinations. A capacity to select a goal regardless of any inclination for it is required.2 We need a capacity to choose the good of an other regardless of any inclination for the good of the other. This capacity for love is a condition of these higher level agents. There is also a need for inputs for this higher level of agency. What is good for the other needs to be presented to agents as good regardless of any inclination for it. For a man to love a woman, he needs to perceive what is good for her regardless of any inclination for her having that good, the capacity to choose that good in her regardless of any inclination to do so and then to carry out a course of action with the intention bring about that good in her. This freewill of love usually occurs in a context in which he acts lovingly with ordinary freewill. He has an inclination for her to have the good and he acts with the intention of satisfying his inclination for her happiness, i.e., rejoicing in the good he provides for her.

Love’s imperceptibilty now confronts us. We cannot be conscious of any difference between willing the good of the other regardless of any inclination for it and willing to satisfy an inclination for the good of the other. The free choices of love, if any, are free choices of which we are not conscious. when we make them. It is in retrospection of fairly long periods of our past about which the best explanation is that the choice we made for the good of another would have been made regardless of any inclination. I don’t like philosophical aphorisms. But: Love is inferred; not perceived.

A subsequent post brings out that an inference to a judgment that humans can love carries with it an inference to the supernatural dimension of human nature.

  1. From reviews I have read, viz. “The Fate of Free Will,” by James Gleick in Jan. 18, 2024 New York Review of Books, the metaphysics I sketch may have resemblance to that of Kevin J. Mitchell in his book Free Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Free Will, Princeton U, Press 2023. But Mitchell’s rigorous work is not to be blamed for my speculations.
  2. I will not digress into any Kantian interpretation. But Kantian moral freedom is analogous to what I am calling freewill of love. Kantian moral freedom requires a capacity, sense of duty, to choose what is right regardless of any inclination to so choose.