Consensual Sexual Morality & Privacy

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An ancient Greek philosopher, around 300 BC, challenged the rationality of prohibition of publicly engaging in sexual intercourse. See my Sexual Privacy Necessary for New Life . What would Consensual Sexual Morality – I the following classic case described the Hipparchia article in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy?

[…] Crates of Thebes…was so passionate about Cynic ideas that, leaving behind the wealth of his father, he moved to Athens with his wife Hipparchia, who was an equally zealous follower of his doctrine. And when he wanted to lie down with her in public, and she…pulled over her cloak as a cover, she was scolded by her husband: “obviously you are not yet wise,” he said, “since you don’t dare to do in the presence of others what you know well to be the right thing to do.”
The story of Hipparchia’s Cynic marriage quickly became the premiere example of that virtue, which is based on the Cynic belief that any actions virtuous enough to be done in private are no less virtuous when performed in public. As exemplars of anaideia, Hipparchia and Crates influenced their pupil Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism.

The judgment of Consenual Sexual Morality about this case is clear. Crates acted imorally since he was forcing Hippachia’s consent to public coitus. He was not respecting her sexual dignity. The type of shamelessness called anaideia is not a virtue recognized by Consensual Sexual Morality. It is clearly possible that some people’s authentic desire is for privacy in sexual activity.

But is anaideia a vice?

In the New York Review of Books August 20, 2026, I read the following in a review of John Lanchester’s Look What You Made Me Do by Laura Marsh. There is a couple Jack and Kate Hittlestones who have a way of speaking in code. One of their code terms is “Ho Chi Minh birthday.” This term stands for “the special occasions on which the Hittlestones hire an escort to have sex with Kate while Jack watches.” Consensual Sexual Morality can accommodate the consent of sex workers as authentic consent. Drug addicted victims of sex trafficing do not give authentic consent. But not all sex workers are victims. I suspect that some Consensual Sexual Moralist would commend the Hittlestones for discovering a way to enhance their sex lives. None could condemn it without evidence that some coercion was involved.

Consensual Sexual Morality – I

Moral Neutrality of Sexual Activity, Nihilism, Sexual morality

(This post is subject to frequent modification since I am using these posts to develop a book comparing Consensual and Conjugal Sexual Morality.)

Consensual sexual morality is a reaction to the sexual revolution beginning in the mid-twentieth century. It is progressive; not reactionary. There is no plea for restoration of traditional sexual morality or as I call it Conjugal Sexual Morality. The project is to maintain and even expand the liberation of ways of satisfying sexual desires while providing moral correction for the discontents with the amorality of liberated sexuality. What is so good about the liberation? What is wrong with the amorality? The question about the goodness of sexual liberation is the topic for Consensual Sexual Morality-II. Progression beyond sexual amorality is a topic here.

Intellectual respectability no longer requires amorality. The tyranny of logical positivism has been long defeated. A theory of amorality maintains moral judgments of right or wrong, good or evil are only expressions of preferences; never correct or incorrect. In the mid-twentieth century, there was a “moral theory” revolution. If making moral judgments and supporting these judgments with reasons for thinking them correct is a traditional view, this revolution in moral theory is reactionary. There is a complex and intellectually fascinating history of the effort to restore moral judging as rigorous as reasoning in any area. Here, it suffices, to note that philosophers and other sophisticated writers reflecting on dissatisfactions of the sexual revolution approach the issues with a mindset that they may and ought to analyze attitudes and actions with a view to judging which are right or wrong, good or evil. Popularly, those participating in the sexual revolution or even those suffering from it, may express the amorality view of “Who is to judge?” But the popular sexual amorality is naive.

However, an inconsistency in the popular amorality reveals how moral thinking can engage with liberated sexuality. The popular view is that anything sexual is permissible as long as it is consensual. This judgment about the impermissibility of non-consensual sex is, of course, inconsistent with an alleged amorality. The inconsistency of the popular outlook is uninteresting. The interesting issues are how and why consent is necessary, and perhaps sufficient, for morally permissible sexual activity from the perspective of the new sexual morality? And then, how does the consent requirement lead to a requirement to uncover and satisfy authentic desires?

The moral stance I develop is my own construction of a moral point of view from which I could make the judgments of progressive sexual morality in the articles which expressed moral judgements. The articles in the Palgrave anthology expressing moral judgements are primarily applications of the moral theories of the authors. Indeed, the Palgrave anthology is an anthology of articles on sexual ethics. They do not elaborate on their theoretical stances. We could say that in ethics we apply a moral theory to types of situations while in casusistry we apply moral theory to particular cases. Here it is worth repeating that consensual sexual moralists follow the traditional ways of thinking and speaking morally. They accept general structural rules such as “Do good, avoid evil,” “Treat similar cases the same,” “Each human being has, at some level, equal worth,” Moral judgments are to be supported with reasons. So, I develop a moral stance for consensual sexual morality which, to the best of my ability, avoids logical errors and misuses of moral language. An example of a logically inconsistent use of moral language would be “Necrophila is intrinsically wrong although permissible if she would have given consent to such use of her body before she died.”1

In sexual activity, it is tempting and extraordinarily easy to treat another person as merely a body to satisfy desires. People can feel degraded and misused after sexual activity or feel shame that they degraded and misued another. The amorality of the sexual revolution revolution promised a “garden of delight” but left us in the same old “vale of tears.” On college and university campuses there were many injustices of too much strictness and too much leniency about consent. Indeed, the Palgrave essays by faculty members are intended to give moral guidance for disputes about consent. The #MeToo reaction made clear how many women in the work-place felt degraded, misused and disrespected. Writers examined the deep dissatisfaction. See Review of Christine Emba’s Re-thinking Sex: A Provocation, The recent release of the Epstein files reveal the need of moral guidance for how rich and famous men who degraded themselves by using young girls. A theme in these lamentations is “I didn’t really consent to this.”

How can we frame the problem of degradation so that moral thought can be used to address it? The concept of respect links moral thought to psychological problems of degradation. The degradation is based on failing to respect how our bodies are to be used in sexual activity. What is it to respect how our bodies are used in sexual activity? Consensual sexual moralists are not Kantians. But as I read their concerns, most hold that each human being is an end-in-itself and it is morally wrong to treat any human being only as a means to an end. Following this principle is respecting human dignity. How do we respect human dignity in sexual activity? In other words, how do we respect the sexual dignity of each and every person with whom we have sexual activity? As a sexual end-in-itself, each person is the ultimate authority on how his or her body is to be used. However, this authority is valid only if the consent truly comes from the person himself or herself. In other words, the consent is valid only if it is autonomous or as I prefer to say: only if there is full consent of the will. Another term used for authorative consent is authentic consent – that which the person genuinely wants. In regard to never using anyone as a means only, the principle tells us never to engage in sexual activity regardless of the full consent of the parties.

This categorical imperative does not require denying oneself any sexual activity; only doing it with total disregard for consent is forbidden. I coin the term “aspirational imperative” because human sexuality provides little time or incentive before sexual activity to carefully consider the character of the consent.

In a more complete presentation of Consensual Sexual Morality, there are several topics which need to be developed about this principle that a sexual activity is morally correct if and only if what is done is done with the full consent of all parties involved. The goodness of such a morally correct sexual activity is the topic of the next post: Consensual Sexual Morality-II.

First, I have stated the principle as an “if and ony if” principle. I add the “if” by assuming that the Kantian sounding principle is the only moral norm specified for sexual activity. To say that it is specified for sexual activity is not simply to say respect human dignity in sexual activity. It says respect human sexual dignity. Consensual sexual morality avoids two errors about sexual morality. One error is to think sexual activity is too trivial to be of moral concern. But if sexual morality is based on respecting human dignity, it is far from trivial. A second error is to demonize sexuality as too powerful to be constrained by moral thinking. But if sexual morality is ultimately respecting human dignity, there is hope that moral thought can guide it. For sexuality is not some external force but part of our nature.

Second, Consensual sexual morality focuses primarily on the courting dimension of sexuality. Sexual activity occurs along three dimensions: courting, mating (use of genitalia) and bonding. Consensual sexual morality focuses primarily on courting as partner selection. It seems that consensual sexual morality refards all mating (use of genitalia) as morally neutral. No Palgrave writers examine use of genitalia with an aim to uncover their proper use. Bonding as in romantic love or marriage gets some attention which gives results contrary to conjugal sexual morality. What guidelines does consensusal sexual morality have for bonding. Interesting areas are whether romantic love compromises consent, when romantic love should be suppressed and when pursuit of consent becomes “stalking” or harrassment.

Third, Consensual sexual morality is not utilitarian. Sometimes in moral theory, we are asked to look at acts with a tripartite framework. There is the object or what is to be done, the intentions and motives of the actors, and the consequences of what is to be done. According to this framework, the consensual sexual morality I am constructing regards only the motives and intentions of the actors. What is done and its likely consequences are morally irrelevant or morally neutral2.

Fourth, consensual sexual ethics is primarily a virtue or character morality. The goal is to become the kind of person who strives to engage in only morally correct sexual activities – those with full consent of all participants.There need be no claim that sexual activity will be more enjoyable for those who strive to engage in only morally correct sexual activities. They can answer that trying to be that way is the right thing to do. This how my defense of Conjugal Sexual Morality as an antidote to nihilism is undercut. Consensual sexual moralists can also give meaning to their lives by stoically adhering to the duty of being morally correct sexual partners.

Fifth, Consensual sexual morality is not hedonistic. It does hold that pleasure is the goal of sexuality. However, the pursuit of pleasure is contrained by seeking the pleasure in the proper way.

Sixth, Living in accordance with consensual sexual morality is not easy. The difficulties do not come from prohibitions of sexual activity. The difficulties come from anxiety that one’s own sexual activity and that of others are morally problematic. It is very difficult to determine that one’s own sexual consent is full, genuine or authentic; let alone that of another. Hence, there is anxiety that most sexual activity is morally problematic.3 But apart from clear cases of forcible rape there are indefinitely many circmstances which case doubt on whether or not the consent was genuine, real, authentic. One author claimed that excessively loud music at college The solace is that one can be striving to become a morally proper sexual agent while being willing to admit that no sexual activity ever reaches the level of morally correct.

Seventh, Basing sexual morality on respect for human dignity leads to rules of sexual morality being principles of human justice as well as promoting sexual activity as a matter of justice. If all genuine sexual desires are legitimate, the prohibiting exercise of some is an afront to the sexual dignity of those who have such desires. Hence, all activities hindering expressions of homosexual desires are violation of human dignity. For consensual sexual morality condemnation of homosexuality as intrinsically disordered is itself intrinsically disorder. If sexual satisfaction is regarded as a good, then there will be concern about a just distribution of this good. Polices that allow certain sorts of people few if any outlets for sexual satisfaction are disrespectful of the sexual dignity of those people.

Eighth, Is being an authentic choice, choice with full consent of the will or autonomous choice is always a choice for what is right? It is a mark of being fully responsible for the choice. so, seeking to work with others on projects with which you seek their autonomous choice is only showing them respect. It is not seeking for an affirmation that what is to be done is in accordance with morality. However, what if we are asking for genuine consent or authentic consent?

Ninth, What are the sanctions forrules of consensual sexual morality? What happens when there is reckless disregard for consent? I think it would be difficult to make a factual case that people would be happier if they mst followed the guidelines of consensual sexual morality. I think that any moral theory is ultimately going to need a metaphysical theory to point out that there are sanctions for violating moral rules. Challenges to any such metaphysical theory about providers of sanctions is what really threatens being a realist about morality.

Tenth, What constraints does authenticity place on the sexuality one can choose? This is closely connected to the eighth point above

Can one have an authentic desire for sexual activity with another regardless of the authentic desires of the other? I think a plausible case can be made for holding that a person who desires to use another solely as an object for satisfaction of his desires does not care about authenticity. One can’t authetically not care about authenticity.

If I desire to use another regardless of their desires I desire to ignore human dignity. If I desire to ignore human dignity, then I ignore human dignity in myself. If I ignore human dignity in myself, then I ignore my authority to determine my authentic desires. If I ignore my authority to determine my authentic desires, then I do not determine my authentic desires. So, if I desire to use another regardless of their desires, I do not determine my authentic desires.

Can a person authentically desire that he be used only as an object for satisfying another’s desires?

If I desire to be used by another regardless of my desires, then I ignore human dignity in myself. If I ignore human dignity in myself, then I ignore my authority to determine my authentic desires. If I ignore my authority to determine my authentic desires, then I do not determine my authentic desires. So, if I desire to be used by another regardless of my desires, I do not determine my authentic desires.

To repeat, consider a brief argument that an authentic sexual desire is never for a sexual act which disregards the authentic consent of all concerned. An agent searching himself or herself for an authentic desire is searching for a desire which respects his or her sexual dignity. So, he or she has a concern for respecting human dignity. Hence, this agent will act as is or her sexual desire only acts respecting sexual dignity of all involve.

Here is another way to for trying to characterize the sexual morality of the progressive writers in this Handbook. One framework for organizing a sexual morality for humans is to regard it as for human reproductive. In this framework, we can divide sexuality into three main types of activity: courting, mating (genital activity) and bonding. In this framework, the purpose of sexuality is the pairing of a man and a woman to provide mutual support of each other in the bringing forth and caring for their children. The morality of acts in courting Mate selection, mating and bonding is weighed by considering how well they promote supportive monagous unity and children. A new sexual morality can be developed by changing the purpose of sexuality. How can the purpose of sexuality be changed? The theory that it is the means of reproducing the human species is well-established. Also, in theory, there is the prospect of reproduction without sexuality. So, the features of sexuality: courting, mating and bonding are not essentially linked with reproduction. so, their purpose could be for some other good. What might this other good be? Is it to be discovered or invented? Despite frustrations, there is a battery of physical, interpersonal and emotional delights in the courting, mating and bonding that have evolved in the human species to maintain our species. That battery of delights is desired. Being universally (almost) desired makes this battery of delights a candidate for being a basic human good. A revolution in sexual morality is to assume -better: to suddenly recognize- the battery of sexual delights is a basic human good. Taking the battery of sexual delights as a basic human good is compatible with a variety of other moral theories. You would expect that the greatest differences in morals would be between those who take sexual delights as the purpose of sexuality and those who take reproduction as the purpose of sexuality. However, since sexuality does function for reproduction there will still be courting, mating and bonding in the battery of sexual delights – only differently for the new telos of sexuality. Since sexuality is a basic good we are obliged to promote it in ourselves and in others, especially those with whom we have sexual relations. Hence, carrying out the command to promote what people desire sexually, we are morally obliged to find out what we and our partners really desire sexually.. Thus the imperative for authenticity. If we seek sexual delights with another person regardless of what they really desire, we use them as a means for our own delights. If we use them as a means only for our own delights, we are not acting on the imperative to promote sexual delights since we ignore attainment of delights in the other person.

Conjugal outlook: Sexuality is for reproduction. . Reproduction is the good for determining sexual morality. Here facts give the standard for sexual morality.

Relativistic outlook: There is no purpose for sexuality. Good order in the community is standard for its regulation. This is amorality of sexuality

Consensual outlook: Sexuality is for satisfaction of sexual desires. this requires that each individual uncover his own desires and seek to satisfy them with someone else who has uncovered his true desires.

The desire satisfaction has been chosen by people autonomously but not arbitraryrily afer all there are the desires.

Each person has their own sexuality. This is not to say that each person has a unique sexuality. Two or more people may have the same sexuality. The claim is that each person has a sexuality which is their own It is a pattern of desires that if they knew the truth about themselves and could express that truth, they would say that is what they are sexually. A type of sexuality is a component of personal identity. But sexuality is necessary for a personal identity. An asexual person can have an inauthentic sexual identity if he simply lives without sexual desires while never bring it to consciousness to accept asexuality as his way of being sexual. However, ethnicity can be a component of personal identity but it need not be. For instance, I choose to ignore ethnicity as characterizing myself.s But I know men whose being Irish is a component of their identity.

People have privileged access to what they believe, hope for and desire. This means that the ultimate authority on what a person believes and desires is the person. When a person authoritatively(autonomously) judges what he believes, hopes for and desires, what he so judges is his authentic beliefs, hopes and desires.

Social forces can lead people to have a sexuality which is not their real or authentic sexuality. There is no claim that an authentic sexuality has to be the individual’s invention. The basic sexualities are given to a person although variants can be invented. The authenticity or autonomy comes from accepting a sexuality as one’s own. There is a “That’s for me” accepting of a sexuality.

The sexuality of a person can change and the new sexuality is authentic as long as it is autonomously accepted.

There is no normal sexuality. Sexualities are morally neutral. No sexuality is intrinsically disordered.

Sex-positivity extends the moral neutrality of the physical dimension of sexual acts. Not only sexual acts morally neutral they are part of a natural good viz. sexual pleasure. Attainment of sexual pleasure is to be promoted and its attainment is not to be directly frustrated.

Sexual autonomy is to recognize and accept one’s authentic sexuality.

Dignity is measured by what a person is is free to do.

All people are free to choose their identity. So, there is a basic sense of dignity in which all people have equal dignity. This is the freedom to choose their authentic identity as their identity. This is human dignity. When we focus on sexuality we can talk of human sexual dignity or simply sexual dignity. Sexual dignity is each person’s freedom to choose their authentic sexuality as their identifying sexuality.

. Respect for human sexual dignity requires accepting any authentic sexuality as legitimate for no person is illegitimate. No person is born bad.

The basic moral principle for sexuality runs: Promote the expression of the authentic sexuality of yourself and others and never directly hinder the expression of authentic sexuality of yourself or others.

This sexual morality is feasible only if there are reliable methods of contraception and abortion is readily available.

This sexuality is feasible only if divorce is readily available. For a couple should not be bound to one another if their authentic sexuality indicates they be in other types of relation.

The emphasis on authenticity prioritizes parents pursuing their authentic selves over their children.

A basic moral principle is: Respect human dignity. Accept all people as good when they are accepting in accordance with what they really are.

If a person truly desires to perform a sexual act that sexual act is prima facie permissible

If human sexuality does not require that it ought to be used in certain ways, then no sexual act is intrinsically disordered.

If no sexual act is intrinsically disordered, then all sexual acts are prima facie permissible.

If all sexual acts are prima facie permissible, then if some sexual acts are impermissible they are wrong because of the mentality of actors, the circumstances in which the act is performed or the consequences of the act.

But respect for the dignity of each and every human forbids treating another person only as material to be used.person is an end in itself. This means that there is never a need to justify willing what is good in itself for another. You may need to justify that what you do is in fact a good for the other. But the fact that you intend it for the good of the other needs no justification.

But it is most helpful to set aside doing it for the good of the other to consider doing it regardless of the good of the other.



In other words, if love is willing the good of the other, loving needs no justification. . How can consent overcome using another as merely a means to satisfy desires? I write from the perspective of a heterosexual male.The consent must be perfect and mutual. Her consent is her willingness to give me her body to use for my good, which is satisfaction of my sexual desire. My consent is my willingness to give her my body to use for her good, which is satisfaction of her sexual desire. In this perfect situation neither of us are treated as a means only. Although I am a means in so far as my body is used, I am treated as an end in itself because she gives her body to me as an end itself. Similarly, she is a means in so far as her body is used by me, she is treated as an end in itself because I give my body to her as an end in itself. In this union which is created each is treated as an end-in-itself. The intention to form this union in which the dignity of each is maintained because each is treated as an end-in-itself, need not be conscious. What is in the thoughts and emotions are many and various. With their bodies they accomplish what is intended.

NOTE Can we say: Their bodies express the intention? Not always. The body in sexual activity is always saying we come together to form a unit for procreation to form one for life. On traditional sexual morality, in the best sexual activity the intention expressed by the body is that of the best sexuality, viz. uniting to form life. In progressive sexual morality the intention of the participants is out of sync with what their bodies express. They intend the joint pleasure; not a union open to life for life-long.



It is a human creation. It is autonomous in the sense that humans make it independently of anything else. Autonomy requires recognizing that all consent. Each person has the dignity of consenting.

Note: Since human sexuality requires consent, traditional sexual morality posits unifying as a goal of sexuality. the unity goal of human sexuality cannot be attained without consent.

moral sexual activity?

parties cast doubt on whether or not there can be authentic consent.

Focusing on consent leads us to consider the courtship dimension of sexual morality. They focus on the morality of partner selection but there are discussion of bonding under the headings of cohabitation and gay marriage which seems to be unquestionably accepted. What about mating – the physical contacts or lack thereof? As far as I can tell, there is no moral evaluation of sex acts. It is assumed that all of them are morally neutral

Here is another way to for trying to characterize the sexual morality of the progressive writers in this Handbook. One framework for organizing a sexual morality for humans is to regard it as for human reproductive. In this framework, we can divide sexuality into three main types of activity: courting, mating (genital activity) and bonding. In this framework, the purpose of sexuality is the pairing of a man and a woman to provide mutual support of each other in the bringing forth and caring for their children. The morality of acts in courting Mate selection, mating and bonding is weighed by considering how well they promote supportive monagous unity and children. A new sexual morality can be developed by changing the purpose of sexuality. How can the purpose of sexuality be changed? The theory that it is the means of reproducing the human species is well-established. Also, in theory, there is the prospect of reproduction without sexuality. So, the features of sexuality: courting, mating and bonding are not essentially linked with reproduction. so, their purpose could be for some other good. What might this other good be? Is it to be discovered or invented? Despite frustrations, there is a battery of physical, interpersonal and emotional delights in the courting, mating and bonding that have evolved in the human species to maintain our species. That battery of delights is desired. Being universally (almost) desired makes this battery of delights a candidate for being a basic human good. A revolution in sexual morality is to assume -better: to suddenly recognize- the battery of sexual delights is a basic human good. Taking the battery of sexual delights as a basic human good is compatible with a variety of other moral theories. You would expect that the greatest differences in morals would be between those who take sexual delights as the purpose of sexuality and those who take reproduction as the purpose of sexuality. However, since sexuality does function for reproduction there will still be courting, mating and bonding in the battery of sexual delights – only differently for the new telos of sexuality. Since sexuality is a basic good we are obliged to promote it in ourselves and in others, especially those with whom we have sexual relations. Hence, carrying out the command to promote what people desire sexually, we are morally obliged to find out what we and our partners really desire sexually.. Thus the imperative for authenticity. If we seek sexual delights with another person regardless of what they really desire, we use them as a means for our own delights. If we use them as a means only for our own delights, we are not acting on the imperative to promote sexual delights since we ignore attainment of delights in the other person.

Traditional outlook: Sexuality is for reproduction. . Reproduction is the good for determining sexual morality. Here facts give the standard for sexual morality.

Relativistic outlook: There is no purpose for sexuality. Good order in the community is standard for its regulation. This is amorality of sexuality

Authenticity outlook: Sexuality is for satisfaction of sexual desires. this requires that each individual uncover his own desires and seek to satisfy them with someone else who has uncovered his true desires.

The desire satisfaction has been chosen by people autonomously but not arbitraryrily afer all there are the desires.

to make this moral – not egotistical there needs to be consent. the consent requirement is respecting human dignity.

Each person has their own sexuality. This is not to say that each person has a unique sexuality. Two or more people may have the same sexuality. The claim is that each person has a sexuality which is their own It is a pattern of desires that if they knew the truth about themselves and could express that truth, they would say that is what they are sexually. A type of sexuality is a component of personal identity. But sexuality is necessary for a personal identity. An asexual person can have an inauthentic sexual identity if he simply lives without sexual desires while never bring it to consciousness to accept asexuality as his way of being sexual. However, ethnicity can be a component of personal identity but it need not be. For instance, I choose to ignore ethnicity as characterizing myself.s But I know men whose being Irish is a component of their identity.

People have privileged access to what they believe, hope for and desire. This means that the ultimate authority on what a person believes and desires is the person. When a person authoritatively(autonomously) judges what he believes, hopes for and desires, what he so judges is his authentic beliefs, hopes and desires.

Social forces can lead people to have a sexuality which is not their real or authentic sexuality. There is no claim that an authentic sexuality has to be the individual’s invention. The basic sexualities are given to a person although variants can be invented. The authenticity or autonomy comes from accepting a sexuality as one’s own. There is a “That’s for me” accepting of a sexuality.

The sexuality of a person can change and the new sexuality is authentic as long as it is autonomously accepted.

There is no normal sexuality. Sexualities are morally neutral. No sexuality is intrinsically disordered.

Sex-positivity extends the moral neutrality of the physical dimension of sexual acts. Not only sexual acts morally neutral they are part of a natural good viz. sexual pleasure. Attainment of sexual pleasure is to be promoted and its attainment is not to be directly frustrated.

I will not claim that those who hold this theory of sexual authenticity do not hold moral principles. I will only posit that no principle can consistently contradict justifying an act in pursuit of sexual authenticity

Sexual autonomy is to recognize and accept one’s authentic sexuality.

Dignity is measured by what a person is is free to do.

All people are free to choose their identity. So, there is a basic sense of dignity in which all people have equal dignity. This is the freedom to choose their authentic identity as their identity. This is human dignity. When we focus on sexuality we can talk of human sexual dignity or simply sexual dignity. Sexual dignity is each person’s freedom to choose their authentic sexuality as their identifying sexuality.

. Respect for human sexual dignity requires accepting any authentic sexuality as legitimate for no person is illegitimate. No person is born bad.

The basic moral principle for sexuality runs: Promote the expression of the authentic sexuality of yourself and others and never directly hinder the expression of authentic sexuality of yourself or others.

This sexual morality is feasible only if there are reliable methods of contraception and abortion is readily available.

This sexuality is feasible only if divorce is readily available. For a couple should not be bound to one another if their authentic sexuality indicates they be in other types of relation.

The emphasis on authenticity prioritizes parents pursuing their authentic selves over their children.

This sexual morality is a virtue ethic. The goal is to be authentic. Sexual imorality is falling short of sexual activity in accoradance with sexual authenticity.

The sexual morality of authenticity is primarily a morality for courting, The other dimensions for sexual morality are mating and bonding. Since all physical acts are morally neutral, authenticity morality has no morality for mating,

PROBLEM TO BE WORKED OUT. What constraints does authenticity place on the sexuality one can choose?

Can one have an authentic desire for sexual activity with another regardless of the authentic desires of the other? I think a plausible case can be made for holding that a person who desires to use another solely as an object for satisfaction of his desires does not care about authenticity. One can’t authetically not care about authenticity.

If I desire to use another regardless of their desires I desire to ignore human dignity. If I desire to ignore human dignity, then I ignore human dignity in myself. If I ignore human dignity in myself, then I ignore my authority to determine my authentic desires. If I ignore my authority to determine my authentic desires, then I do not determine my authentic desires. So, if I desire to use another regardless of their desires, I do not determine my authentic desires.

Can a person authentically desire that he be used only as an object for satisfying another’s desires?



If I desire to be used by another regardless of my desires, then I ignore human dignity in myself. If I ignore human dignity in myself, then I ignore my authority to determine my authentic desires. If I ignore my authority to determine my authentic desires, then I do not determine my authentic desires. So, if I desire to be used by another regardless of my desires, I do not determine my authentic desires.

A basic moral principle is: Respect human dignity. Accept all people as good when they are accepting in accordance with what they really are.

If a person truly desires to perform a sexual act that sexual act is prima facie permissible

If human sexuality does not require that it ought to be used in certain ways, then no sexual act is intrinsically disordered.

If no sexual act is intrinsically disordered, then all sexual acts are prima facie permissible.

If all sexual acts are prima facie permissible, then if some sexual acts are impermissible they are wrong because of the mentality of actors, the circumstances in which the act is performed or the consequences of the act.

  1. I use this bizzare example because one writer considers necrophilia and wrote “it canot be argued that advanced consent is insufficient to render later sex with the corpse impermissible” (David Bentar,Homosexuality, Beastiality and Necrophilia, Ch13 Because to me necrophilia is intrinsically wrong besides being abbhorent to imagine, I thought he made the inconsistent statement. However, he does not hold that necrophilia is intrinsically wrong. This single quotation shows the importance of consent in consensual sexual morality.
  2. One writer is explicitly a untilitarian; not what I call a consensual sexual moralist.. He argues that the sexual practices of those participating in the sexual revolution are immoral on the utilitarian grounds that they lead to the bad consequence of sexu
  1. I use this bizzare example because one writer considers necrophilia and wrote “it canot be argued that advanced consent is insufficient to render later sex with the corpse impermissible” (David Bentar,Homosexuality, Beastiality and Necrophilia, Ch13 Because to me necrophilia is intrinsically wrong besides being abbhorent to imagine, I thought he made the inconsistent statement. However, he does not hold that necrophilia is intrinsically wrong. This single quotation shows the importance of consent in consensual sexual morality.
  2. One writer is explicitly a untilitarian; not what I call a consensual sexual moralist.. He argues that the sexual practices of those participating in the sexual revolution are immoral on the utilitarian grounds that they lead to the bad consequence of sexually trasmitted disease and unwanted pregnancies. Coitus should be used only when the intention is conception. Otherwise, everyone should masturbate as much as possible and , if desired, use of sex-toys and pornography. See

Re-thinking Sexual Nihilism

Book promotion, Nihilism, Sexual morality

Is the title of my Blog Site outdated? In 2014 I published a book defending traditional sexual morality.1 I contended that there was a widely accepted view that no sexual act by itself was morally impermissible. I called this moral neutrality of sexual acts “sexual nihilism.” The commonly used term is “sexual amorality”. I went on to make a case that sexual amorality (sexual nihilism) led to total amorality (nihilism) that nothing matter because in principle nothing was right or wrong. Traditional sexual morality was proposed as an antidote for drifting into nihilism.

I started this Blog Site to continue this line of thought. Recently I read an anthology which requires serious reconsideration of my defense of traditional sexual morality.2 Most of the writers for this anthology made moral judgments about sexual behavior. The moral judgments were contrary to those of traditional sexual morality. For instance, all assume that masturbation and homosexuality are morally permissible. Their sincerely held moral judgments undercuts a major line of thought in my book. I assumed too uncritically that those who dismissed traditional sexual morality would ultimately make no moral judgments about sexuality.

To respond, I plan a triad of posts. The goal of this triad is to characterize and evaluate a moral theory supporting the moral judgments of these writers. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this is a moral outlook. It is not moral relativism. For these writers, since it is wrong to suppress homosexuality in the USA, Ugandans are morally wrong in trying to suppress homosexuality. I will label this progressive sexual morality Consensual Sexual Morality. In the first post of the triad, I speculate about the origin of this new sexual morality in relation to traditional sexual morality, the crucial role of consent and a search for authentic consent. In the second post of this triad, I finish the sketch of this moral theory by elaborating on the good which is supposed to be promoted and protected by consensual sexual morality. In the third I evaluate it as an alternative to traditional sexual morality which I now label Conjugal Sexual Morality as a verbal match for Consensusal Sexual Morality.

  1. Confronting Sexual Nihilism: Traditional Sexual Morality as an Antidote to Nihilism,
  2. The Palgrave handbook of sexual ethics, Editor:  Boonin-Vail, David,   Palgrave Macmillan, 2023

Sexual Morality & Conjugal Episodes

Critique of Birth Control, Sexual morality

The purpose of this post is to introduce a concept for discussing morally acceptable methods for birth control without moral attention to the various ways a married couple initiate, sustain and enjoy sexual arousal. Thereby, suspicion that the Catholic Church is unduly concerned with sexuality may be set aside.

Types of birth control are the main issue for moral evaluation of the sexual behavior of a married couple. There need be no moral consideration of the touches, kisses, positions, lights on or off etc. Concern during sexual activity about whether their intimate acts conform to the regulations of moral micromanagers detracts from the unitive purpose of marital sexuality. A married couple should not be anxiously reflecting on what a imagine moralist thinks about them. In private, they are entitled to work out how they form one flesh. It seems like an interest in pornography to ponder details of intimate behavior in moral philosophy. Of course, such details are important for clinical discussions with a physician or psychologist if there are sexual problems such as erectile dysfunction, premature ejaculation or infertility.

There are two types of birth control: Conception prevention and conception avoidance. Prevention methods such as use of condoms, diaphrams or pills are certainly abstract enough for public discussion. Similarly, avoidance methods about having sexual relations only at times when conception is highly improbable can be discussed technically by all with some basic biological knowledge.

“Conjugal episodes” is a term I propose for discussing the morality of birth control methods for a married couple. Only a married couple can have conjugal episodes. Conjugal episodes are colloquially referred to as a couples’ “making love.” “Episode” is a better term than a technical term such as “coitus” because we need consider foreplay and perhaps what happens after the man has reached a climax. Similarly, the term “marriage act” seems too narrow. I offer no precise definition of “conjugal episodes.” But a couple realizes fairly well when it starts and is finished. They are well enough defined so that they are countable. A healthy young couple could enjoy three or four during a single night. An older couple may be able to say how many episodes they enjoy in a week or month.

Married people are, as individuals, subject to the moral laws about adultery, masturbation and homosexuality. However, as a couple they are subject to a special moral law concerning their conjugal episodes. This additional law is balanced by the privilege of the moral neutrality of the activities in their conjugal episodes as long as none conflict with the moral law for conjugal episodes.

What is the moral law for conjugal episodes?

The fundamental moral law runs: Promote basic human goods and never intentionally inhibit a basic human good for the sake of a lesser good. Conjugal episodes are for the basic human good1 of a life-long monogamous union of a man and woman. Proceation by itself is not a basic human good; nor is male/female bonding by itself a basic human good. Definitely, the good of pleasure by itself is not a basic human good. So, the fundamental moral law applied to conjugal episodes tells us that conjugal episodes should be open to conception and enhancement of bonding and never entered into with an intention to inhibit bonding or procreation.

Intentionally phantasizing another parnter is an intentional inhibition of the unitive goal of conjugal episodes. Another clear violation of this application is a husband forcing coitus on his wife. Such a violent act is clearly done with reckless disregard for enhancement of bonding. I suspect watching pornography to initiate a conjugal epidsode also threatens the unitive goal. Here, though, my topic is birthcontrol. The application of the fundamental moral law to conjugal episodes is provided in Paul VI’s 1968 Encyclical Humanae vitae – the challenging official teaching of the Catholic Church on birth control.

So, I seem not to have added anything new to the controversy about birth control methods. However, by locating the discussion about the marital sexual morality on simply the relation of conjugal episodes to unity and procreation, we can set aside attempts to evaluate morally the variety of acts a couple may perform in the course of a conjugal episode. Evaluation of methods of birth controll is not “peeking into the bedrooms” of married people.

  1. Finnis, John. “Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good.” The Monist, vol. 91, no. 3/4, 2008, pp. 388–406.

Freedom to be Dependent

Core philosophy, Nihilism, Ontology

Western philosophy began with a Declarations of Independence.

In the 6th century BC the Parmenides proposed “For it is the same thing that can be thought as can be.”

In the 5th century BC Protagoras proclaimed “Man is the Measure of All Things”. 

These doctrines declare that human thinking independent of a reality external to our thought, if such there be, is the ultimate authority on what there is, what is good and what is beautiful.

In Obedience vs. Autonomy, I proposed that the purpose of our lives is that for which we are free. In that post, I argued that the freedom to pursue happiness, the freedom to pursue righteousness, and the freedom to love – to will the good of the other do not provide a purpose for human life. I could have given a similar argument that the freedom to pursue truth fails to provide a purpose for human life. I concluded that a freedom to obey something external to our reason might indicate a purpose for our lives.

In this post, I want to set aside an implication that I argued that happiness, truth, righteousness, and love could not be purposes of human life. More importantly, I want to generalize the notion of obedience to dependence. Only under the assumption that reason is the ultimate authority on what is true, good or happiness, – only under the assumption of the autonomy of reason- can what we determine fail to provide a purpose for life. If we accept a reality apart from our reason upon which our reason depends for its correctness, then truth, goodness, happiness and love can be what we live for.

When Evil is Good

Freewill, Moral philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Retributive punishment

Many bibilica;l passages tell us that the suffering of Christ saved humanity from the punishment deserved for our sins. For instance, Peter 2:24

“He Himself bore our sins in His body on the tree, so that we might die to sin and live to righteousness. ‘By His stripes you are healed’”

How does the pain of Christ’s suffering reconcile God with humanity. Is God pleased with suffering? An authority no less than Aquinas III. 48 2 tells us that God was not pleased with the sufferings of Christ. Rather God is pleased with the great Charity of Chirst by his suffering the pain deserved for our sins. But what is it for Christ to show charity by suffering? Charity or love is willing the good of the other. It seems Christ willed immense suffering as the good for humanity. Now immense suffering is evil. So, it seems that Christ willed an evil as a good for humanity.

How can an evil be a good? An evil is a good if it ought to be. How can an evil be be something which ought to be? An evil ought to be when it is willed to be by violating a moral law. See Review of My Moral Harm Concept. Violations of moral laws create ad hoc specific moral prescriptions that some harm ought to be done. These ad hoc norms make human morality inconsistent and because of the immense amount of immorality place humanity under a moral burden that much suffering ought to be. Retributive punishment removes only a few of these ad hoc norms. So, our retributive punishments improve morality only marginally. Our efforts leave morality on the whole requiring that evil ought to be. Now ultimately evil is what ought not be. So, our current morality specifies that we ought not be. According to our current morality, if everything becomes as it ought to be, humanity ought not be.

Now, using certain theological assumptions, Christ’s suffering sufficed to satisfy every violation induced ad hoc norm obligating some harm; all of them past, present and future. This creates a new moral order for a reality when all is as it ought to be. That moral order will be fully compatible with “Do good, avoid evil.” There will be no violations to induce requirements for evil as retribution. However, it will still be a moral order for free choice because its subjects will have the free will of obedience. See Obedience vs. Autonomy

Obedience vs. Autonomy

Freewill, Realism vs. anti-realism

If there is no God whom we can obey, then life is meaningless. Why?

That for which we are free, is that which gives life meaning.1

However, if we determine that for which we are free, that which we determine cannot give life meaning. We cannot specify that which gives life meaning. Meaning must be set for us by something outside ourselves.

It is the autonomy of reason which sabotages the goals reason gives as goals for use of rational freewill. With rational freewill we have a reason for what we choose. Our autonomous reason answers only to itself as what is a proper use of reason. Hence, what reason determines to be correct is not something external to us.

To make my case I will consider only rational free will, at its best. There are three types of rational freewill. The freewill of desire, the freewill of righteousness and the freewil of love. For additional clarification of my terminology, see Agency, Ordinary Free Will, & Free Will of Love .

At its best the freewill of desire is for happiness. Of course, happiness is a poor candidate for the purpose of human existence. It is not clear what constitutes happiness and few if any attain happiness which then passes away with them. But here the point is that human reason is used to specify what happiness would be. Any candidate for happiness needs to be justified by reason.

The freewill of righteousness is the freedom to choose what is right because it is right. At its best what the freewill of righteousness is for is a good will – a will which chooses what is right because it is right. A good will cannot be what we live for. The philosopher Kant admitted that a person with a good will could be ineffective in accomplishing much good and be unhappy. But here the point is that we determine what a makes a will good because ultimately we determine what is right. Any claim that something is a duty must be acceptable to reason.

The freewill of love is to will the good of the other for the sake of the other. At its best the freewill of love is for the good of all. The freewill of love seems not to be self-centered. It might seem that the good of the others sets that for which we are free. However, choice of the good for others which is mistaken is not the freewill of love at its best. We need to use human reason to evaluate what is good for all the others. Now, in fact, programs for universal human good are usually miserable projects – for dystopias which would pass away. But here the point is that human reason is the arbitrator of what the freewill of love is for.

So, understanding the goals of rational freewill at its best, cannot show us the meaning of human life. What can? Obedience: Willing the will of the another simply because the other wills it.

Obedience is a type of freedom. For one can obey or not obey. However, it is not really a type of freewill because the will is given up. There is no act of the will of willing not to will. Becoming perfectly in harmony with what another will is allowing it to happen. In any event, the type of obedience I am writing about is not rational freewill. No reason is given to justify the choice, Indeed, finding a reason for willing as another wills would destroy what occurs as obedience. So, the obedience of an unwilling slave is not the obedience I am writing about. the unwilling slave has a reason for obeying; he does not want to be whipped. However, using our reason to lay out what is a good for a human life, does not preclude that which reason characterizes as a good for human life. It can be a goal for human life if we let the reality reason characterizes lead us regardless of the reason for it.

For the most part, this type of obedience is not valuable. We want our little children to grow to act on their own. So, we consider freedom to obey only at its best if we want to consider what it is for as giving a meaning to human life

At its best freedom of obedience is for what a perfectly good being wills. In other words freedom of obedience at its best willing what God wills. So, from this standpoint, the meaning of life is what God wills

  1. The claim is that the purpose of one of the ways in which we are free provides the purpose of our lives, if anything provides a purpose.

How Pain Atones for Sin

Contrition, Moral harm, Moral philosophy, Religious morality

In his January 18, 2026 Sermon, Bshop Robert Barron declared: “Sin Has to be Paid For.” He commented on a conviction deep in biblical sensibility that evil has to be dealt with by somehow confronting it here on earth in our daily life. Because he was preaching about the redemptive suffering of Jesus Christ, the implication is that the confronting of the evil is actually suffering the evil. He noted that forgiving a wrong by someone in a position to forgive does not fully deal with the evil. I thought of Erika Kirk forgiving the killer of her husband Charlie Kirk. What did her forgiveness accomplish? So much remains untouched. The evil of the deed is still there, she still griefs the loss of her husband, the assassin Tyler Robinson is still guilty and will suffer the legal consequences of his act. What is accomplish by way of removing evil by suffering an evil?

I answer by developing my reflections on Retributive Punishment and Moral Harm .

When Tyler Robinson chose to shoot Charlies Kirk, his justification for his action, was “this life ought to be taken.” By so choosing and acting, he added to morality a new, an ad hoc, moral rule requiring an evil, the taking of a life. It is the intentional and actual taking of the life of Charlies Kirk which which creates the ad hoc norm. The murder was a performative act because the performance of the act created something real in the moral order. Such an ad hoc prescribing harm conflicts with morality. It is a foreign element in morality.

As a reminder: there are numerous as hoc moral rules which can be carried out. A promise to repay a loan, creates an ad hoc rule which is satisfied when the loan is repaid. The promise is a performative act creating a prescription in morality

Sin is the reality in morality of an ad hoc moral rule requiring evil. The sense of sin is the dread of satisfaction of this ad hoc rule along with dread of leaving it unsatisfied.

There is so much sin in the world. Hence, much harm is required. Suffering pain is harm. Hence, a sentiment arises that personally suffering some pain satisfies some of these ad hoc norms requiring harm and thereby removing them from morality. The sentiment is that personal pain can be used to improve the human condition by at least satisfying some of the norms requiring harm to humans. This sentiment is that our pain can be used to atone for sins – our own and others.

Retribution versus the Will to Power

Moral philosophy, Nihilism, Retributive punishment

Use of moral language presupposes human dignity. See Human Dignity Requires Retribution. Any person has the status to challenge anyone who asserts “I will do it” with “You ought not do it.” With moral language the will to power can always be challenged from a higher standpoint by the will for what ought to be done. Unfortunately, the will to power frequently, if not almost always, overcomes the will for righteousness – the will for what is right. The will to power inflicts pain. The will for righteousness is left with the claim that there ought to be pain in reaction – retribution- to the actual unjustified pain.

What if all that the will for righteousness had was the claim that there ought to be pain? (Revenge is not production of the pain that ought to be. Revenge is only a contrary exercise of a will to power.) If the pains that ought to be never occurred, moral language would be only language – a way of trying to persuade people. The will to power is not only expressed in language. It is follwed up with oppression. If moral language is only a form of rhetoric, then morality is only a weak way of expressing a will to power. If moral language is only a way of expressing a will to power, there is no morality, If there is no morality, then all is permitted. Everything is permitted is an expression of nihilism. In the long run, nothing matters. The presupposition of human dignity is gone.

So, if morality is to be more than words, then all of the pain that there ought to be must occur. Why all? Pain that ought to be arises upon violation of a moral law. There is no reason for distinguish between moral laws. To be sure, morality by itself does not require pain that ought to be; only the potentiality for requiring pain as a sanction for its laws. Pain that ought to be depends upon an actual violation of a moral law. Morality as we know it, presupposes a Fall. But given violations, there is a pain that ought to be.

So, in actuality morality is fatally flawed. It categorically forbids infliction of harm; backed up with threats of inflicting harm. Harm is inflicted contrary to its laws and so harm is categorically required. Those norms requiring need to be removed to bring morality back to what it ought to be. This hope for redemption is not a concern about some abstraction called morality. If morality does no have these harm requiring norms satisfied, then morality is only words and the will to power prevails. So, the required harm -retribution- needs to be actual to have human dignity, for us to have more than nihilism as our fate and for the will to power not to prevail.

How much harm needs to be suffered for morality to overcome the will to power? An unlimited amount of suffering is required for there is no limit to the defiance of moral laws. Someone suffering unlimited harm for the sake of satisfying every moral norm requiring pain or suffering, would redeem morality and thereby redeem us by making morality the prevaling force over the will to power.

I now face the task for my next post on retribution and a redeemer.

Retribution Shows Shallowness of “Trolley Problems”

Moral harm, Moral philosophy, Retributive punishment

Some discussions in moral philosophy revolve around asking what the discussants’ intuitions tell how the questions should be answered. For instance, in a discussion about whether it is wrong to directly take the life of a terminally ill patient in pain as opposed to letting the patient die, some report that their intuitions are that the direct killing is wrong while others report their intuitions are contrary. The interminable “trolley cases” fall into this pattern. What’s the pattern? A case is invented wherein there is a forced choice between violating a standing moral rule such as: Don’t kill! Don’t lie, and bringing about an outcome with less suffering by violating the rule.

These discussions go on-and-on because many of us have intuitions supporting both sides. What are these intuitions? These inuitions are based on our innate knowledge of how to use moral language – how to think morally. I call this knowledge “semantics of moral language.” In the semantics of moral language the direct violation of a moral law is to proclaim that some harm ought to be brought about. This is the thought of retribution. So thinking of violating a moral law is to think that there ought to be some harm. Thinking that some harm ought to be brought about is prima facie not a proper way to think.. On the other hand, in the semantics of moral language thinking that some preventable suffering need not be prevennted is prima facie not a proper way to think. The invented examples do not allow for going beyond prima facie thought. The semantics of moral language will not settle the case. So these discussions continue throughout the ages.

Here my goal is not to provide a recipe for how to settle these cases. My purpose is to diagnose these continuing discussions as based on the semantics of moral language. The examples bring out that the semantics of moral language offer two alternative for what to say about the imaginary situation: “There ought to be harm.” vs. “Let there be harm.” The only feature of the actual world that will be affected by a choice of what to say will be what people think about us. I am not confident that what someone says about an imaginary scenario is a good predictor of how they choose in an actual case. Actual situations offer more alternatives for action than the semantics of moral language offer for what to say.