Retribution versus the Will to Power

Moral philosophy, Nihilism, Retributive punishment

Use of moral language presupposes human dignity. See Human Dignity Requires Retribution. Any person has the status to challenge anyone who asserts “I will do it” with “You ought not do it.” With moral language the will to power can always be challenged from a higher standpoint by the will for what ought to be done. Unfortunately, the will to power frequently, if not almost always, overcomes the will for righteousness – the will for what is right. The will to power inflicts pain. The will for righteousness is left with the claim that there ought to be pain in reaction – retribution- to the actual unjustified pain.

What if all that the will for righteousness had was the claim that there ought to be pain? (Revenge is not production of the pain that ought to be. revenge is only a contrary exercise of a will to power.) If the pains that ought to be never occurred, moral language would be only language – a way of trying to persuade people. The will to power is not only expressed in language. It is follwed up with oppression. If moral language is only a form of rhetoric, then morality is only a weak way of expressing a will to power. If moral language is only a way of expressing a will to power, there is no morality, If there is no morality, then all is permitted. Everything is permitted is an expression of nihilism. In the long run, nothing matters. The presupposition of human dignity is gone.

So, if morality is to be more than words, then all of the pain that there ought to be must occur. Why all? Pain that ought to be arises upon violation of a moral law. There is no reason for distinguish between moral laws. To be sure, morality by itself does not require pain that ought to be; only the potentiality for requiring pain as a sanction for its laws. Pain that ought to be depends upon an actual violation of a moral law. Morality as we know it, presupposes a Fall. But given violations, there is a pain that ought to be.

So, in actuality morality is fatally flawed. It categorically forbids infliction of harm; backed up with threats of inflicting harm. Harm is inflicted contrary to its laws and so harm is categorically required. Those norms requiring need to be removed to bring morality back to what it ought to be. This hope for redemption is not concern about some abstraction called morality. If morality does no have these harm requiring norms satisfied, then morality is only words and the will to power prevails. So, the required harm -retribution- needs to be actual to have human dignity, for us to have more than nihilism as our fate and for the will to power not to prevail.

How much harm needs to be suffered for morality to overcome the will to power? An unlimited amount of suffering is required for there is no limit to the defiance of moral laws. Someone suffering unlimited harm for the sake of satisfying every moral norm requiring pain or suffering, would redeem morality and thereby redeem us by making morality the prevaling force over the will to power.

I now face the task for my next post on retribution and a redeemer.

Retribution and Some Moral Intuitions

Moral harm, Moral philosophy, Retributive punishment

Some discussions in moral philosophy revolve around asking what the discussants’ intuitions tell how the questions should be answered. For instance, in a discussion about whether it is wrong to directly take the life of a terminally ill patient in pain as opposed to letting the patient die, some report that their intuitions are that the direct killing is wrong while others report their intuitions are contrary. The interminable “trolley cases” fall into this pattern. What’s the pattern? A case is invented wherein there is a forced choice between violating a standing moral rule such as: Don’t kill! Don’t lie, and bringing about an outcome with less suffering by violating the rule.

These discussions go on-and-on because many of us have intuitions supporting both sides. What are these intuitions? These inuitions are based on our innate knowledge of how to use moral language – how to think morally. I call this knowledge “semantics of moral language.” In the semantics of moral language the direct violation of a moral law is to proclaim that some harm ought to be brought about. This is the thought of retribution. So thinking of violation a moral law is to think that there ought to be some harm. Thinking that some harm ought to be brought about is prima facie not a proper way to think.. On the other hand, in the semantics of moral language thinking that some preventable suffering need not be prevennted is prima facie not a proper way to think. The invented examples do not allow for going beyond prima facie thought. The semantics of moral language will not settle the case. So these discussions continue throughout the ages.

Here my goal is not to provide a recipe for how to settle these cases. My purpose is to diagnose these continuing discussions as based on the semantics of moral language and most importantly:the notion of retribution is in the semantics of moral language.

Human Dignity Requires Retribution

Moral harm, Moral philosophy

There is a widespread sentiment that violations of the moral law ought to be followed by some suffering. I believe that this retributive sentiment is more widespread than agreement on moral rules. This sentiment may be mocked as a superstition that there are gods of justice or furies who bring about such suffering. Or the sentiment may be despised as some hypocritical cloak of an inclination for revenge. My goal in all my posts on moral harm and retribution is to show that a belief that violations of the moral law ought to be followed by suffering can be expressed in the language of morality without reference to any non-human agents or sentiments for revenge. See Review of My Moral Harm Concept. This representation in the language of morality shows that the belief is rational. Rational does not imply correctness. But it shows that it must be countered with considerations from reason; not from mockery.

Here my goal is to sketch out how the notion of human dignity includes the notion of retribution.

A feature of moral thinking is that anyone can make a moral judgment. No social standing or power is needed to say “You are not entitled to do that to us.” If I may use the cliche “Speaking truth to power,” moral language is the language for speaking truth to power.” Whatever else is involved in human dignity, it includes this status, almost to speak as a god, of saying to everyone, everywhere and always “Thou shalt not !” “Thou shalt !” But such proclamations are empty complaints, whinning of the weak, if there are no consequences for defying them. Of course, cynics think that is all there is to moral protests from the weak. But cynics think there is no morality and the weak have no status, no dignity.

What have the weak to maintain there dignity? What force do their moral judgments have? The weak do not have the social and physical power to resist the stronger. Resistance involves at least the pain of thwarting the will of the aggressor. But the weak cannot inflict the pain of resistance in the physical world. They need to move to the moral order to maintain their dignity. The moral order contains what ought to be. In the moral order a violation of a moral rule creates a second moral rule that there ought to be pain for a violation of the first moral rule. This is the fundamental notion of retribution.

Retribution and Catholic Philosophizing

Moral philosophy, Retributive punishment

Some time ago I asked myself: What is Catholic Philosophy? My answer was:

Catholic philosophy, then, is use of philosophical methods to understand a mystery of Catholicism with the intent of at least getting partial truth about it. In Catholic philosophy scripture may be cited; but only as a motivation for dealing with the topic. It is unlikely that a non-Catholic would engage in Catholic philosophy. A non-Catholic might read through Aquinas’ arguments about the existence of angels merely to appreciate how Aquinas reasoned. You cannot read the philosophy of a Catholic philosopher without thinking philosophcally. But the philosophical thinking required to read Catholic philosophy is not by itself Catholic philosophy A Catholic philosopher is a faithful Catholic who engages in Catholic philosophy.

In several posts, I have been trying to articulate a rationale for retributive punishment. See, for instance, Retributive Punishment is Consistent with the Logic of Moral Thinking. Roughly, the notion of retributive punishment is that harm ought to be brought about simply because a moral law was broken. Trying to show that accepting retributive punishment is consistent with our current moral thinking is simply a philosophic task: not a Cathlic philosophic task. Similarly, arguing that the notion of retributive punishment is justifiable or not justifiable is philosophy: not Catholic philosophy.

I am trying to show that retributive punishment is consistent with moral thinking and that it is justifiable to retain it. So far, I am working as a philosopher. However, my motivation transforms my philosophy into Catholic philosophy. I hope to gain a better partial understanding of the Catholic doctrine that God became man so that He could suffer and die to save humanity from death. I studied the famous Cur Deus Homo? of St. Anselm. I could never be persuaded by his line of thought. Finally, I realized that to appreciate Anselm, I had to accept the intelligibility and even morality of retributive punishment. So, now I switched to Catholic philosophizing about retributive punishment. But I could have done the same kind of thinking about retribution without any Catholic motivation. Once I rationalized retributive punishment, other questions about retribution and Catholic belief arose. For instance, Is retribution required by God? and, if so, would not we have to think of God as somehow being satisfied by human suffering? These are troubling religious questions for they certainly suggest God might be some type of tyrant. So, I try to show that morality itself, in so far as it is a human construction, requires the suffering of retribution. It is we ourselves, as a moral community, who receive satisfaction from the suffering of retributive punishment. However, even these questions about who receives satisfaction from the suffering of retributive punishment could be undertaken without a religious motivation

Punishment = Retribution

Moral harm, Moral philosophy, Retributive punishment

The purpose of this post is to provide background for fighting sins with suffering and the review of the moral harm concept.

Punishment is infliction of some mental or physical harm on someone who has broken a law legal or moral. The harm inflicted is activity that without the violation of the law, ought not be done. Infliction of harm requires justification. What is the justification? The justification is ” The violator ought to suffer harm because he violated the law.” Retribution is fullfillment of this obligation to inflict harm for the violation of the law. Retribution is punishment.

But what good is accomplished by taking retribution, viz., by punishing? Retribution (punishment) fulfils the obligation to inflict harm for violation of the law. We have here a condition in which two wrongs make a right. The wrong of inflicting harm in reaction to the wrong of violating the law sets things right. However, Doing what is right does not imply making things better. Morality or legality is satisfied by punishment even if no person is satisfied by improving their lives. So, punishment may not accomplish any good.

There is , however, a reluctance to recognize obligations whose fulfilment produces no improvement in human life. Merely satisfying morality or legality is easily regarded as too abstract to be relevant to improving human life. So various goals are proposed as something good for human affairs accomplished by punishment Indeed punishment frequently attains these goals. What are some?

Deterrence: Being aware of actual punishments may frighten people into obeying the law. In general, obeying laws is good for human flourishing.

Restraint: Some types of punishment such as imprisonment may prevent people from having any oportunity to violate the law.

Reform: Some type of punishment may train offenders to be obedient to the law. The re-education is infliction of a pain in so far as it is involuntary. Here is should be noted if the reform program is enjoyed by the law breaker, there is a sense that his punishment did not fit his crime. Think of a case in which an offender truly enjoys learning a trade in rison and after release becomes a good citizen practicing his trade. Punishment should not be a so-called win-win situation. In such a case, we might say “He wasn’t really punished, even if reformed”

Restitution: Some types of punishment may improve the lives of victions of violation of the law by requiring the offender to repair damage done by his violation.

It is to the credit of human intelligence that we have worked out ways to have obligations to do harm be fulfilled in ways which also produce good. But these ways of getting good from what is done in the punishing are not punishment itself.

Review of My Moral Harm Concept

Divine Command Morality, Moral Harm and Moral Worth, Moral philosophy, Retributive punishment

I develped a notion of moral harm to provide a rationale for retributive punishment. See my Moral Harm, Retributive Punishment, Punitive Harm and Contrition and Punishment = Retribution. For an essay along the lines of this post, see my Suicide is a Choice that People Ought to be Killed .

In this post, though, I emphasize the notion of defiance of The gist of this notion is that a free choice to disobey a moral law places within morality a specific, an ad hoc, rule that some frustration of human flourishing ought to be brought about. This frustration of human flourishing is infliction of physical or mental pain. This infliction is retributive punishment. The retributive punishment satisfies the ad hoc rule and thereby removes it from morality. Retributive punishment is a partial cleansing of morality: Partial because there are so many of these ad hoc harm requiring rules in the morality of our fallen species.

How does a choice to commit an act contrary to a moral law created a new specific moral rule requiring some harm be done? Consider Tyler Robinson’s choice to assassinate Charlie Kirk. This consideration is “done at a distance.” I take no account of his mental or emotional condition. For I am assuming that Tyler acted of his own freewill. Judgment of his freedom is my decision that what he did can be judged as morally right or morally wrong. The empirical facts for my judgment are the media reports on the assassination in Utah. Empirical facts that he suffered mental illness compelling his action could justify setting aside a judgment that he acted on his own freewill.

The significance of pointing out that recourse to actual facts about Tyler Robinson’s mental and emotional states is that a judgment about his acting freely attributes a rather complex thought pattern to him which most likely he did not actually think. Attribution of this thought pattern is the answer to a question: “What do I mean by saying that Tyler’s action was morally wrong?”

To interpet Tyler’s decision as worth moral evaluation, we have to interpret Tyler’s decision as bipartite. He was not only deciding how to carry out his inclincation to kill someone he hated. He was also deciding to disobey the moral law against killing. He chose to defy the moral law against killing people and let his inclination lead him to killing someone, viz. Charlie Kirk.

What is it to defy a moral law? To defy the moral law “Do not kill” requires more that holding “I may kill.” For merely thinking that “I may kill” is compatible with accepting “Do not kill” but believing that this case presents an exception. Thinking there is an exception is compatible with respecting the moral law but only being mistaken about exceptions to it. Attributing a mistake about the moral law to someone is to cease to blame that person of choosing immorally; stupid maybe, but not immoral. Genuine defiance in morality recognizes that the moral law says an act ought not be done but replies “I may do it” because what I have decided is “This is what I ought to do.” There is a clash on two claims of what ought to be done; not merely a denial of the “ought” of the moral law. For instance, I attribute to Tyler the thought “I ought to kill Charlie Kirk regardless of the moral prohibition of killing.”

This new thought that a killing ought to be is a new obligation put into morality -moral space. It is ad hoc because it was added for this occasion. In some ways it is like ad hoc moral rules put in place by promising. Promises create moral obligations which are removed from morality when the promise is kept. Similarly, ad hoc rules requiring harm are, let us hope, removed from morality when the harm is done. In the The Virtue of Taking Retribution I discuss problems of removing ad hoc rules that harm ought to be.

Why doesn’t the harm inflicted by the immoral act satisfy the ad hoc rule? For instance,, why doesn’t Tyler’s killing Charlie Kirk satisfy Tyler’s “Killing Kirk is what I ought to do?” The actual killing of Kirk is required for the rule justifying it becomes valid. Prior to the actual misdeed the rule is merely a thought of Tyler. Once the misdeed is performed, the perverted moral rule becomes valid and requires punishment to satisfy it.

What Makes Masturbation Wrong?

Moral philosophy, Sexual morality

It is morally wrong for a man to masturbate.

The goal of this post is attained by noting that in a discussion of morality there can be a subtle shift from considering what’s wrong with the action to what harm does the action bring about. The subtly of the shift conceals an assumption that the wrongness of the action is to be determined by the harm which it brings about. The concealed assumption is, of course, an assumption of a consequentialist moral theory.

My moral condemnation of masturbation is, in part, placing a heavy burden of proof on those who dissent. Defending consequentialism is a heavy burden.

Masturbation is wrong; morally wrong. I imagine many challenging me with “What’s wrong with masturbation?” I will imagine the debate going beyond pointing out the need to have rules about when, and especially where, men may masturbate. Unregulated masturbation might very well be socially disruptive. Pointing out a need for some restrictions on masturbation is compatible with an assumption that harmfulness of some sort is the standard for an action being wrong. Here we can note that many condemnations of men viewing pornography, which is part of their masturbation, go in the direction of pointing out harm produced by male masturbation.

But honesty requires admitting that millions of masturbatory actions lead to no readily recognized harm. It is easy to think of masturbatory actions which lead to no harm; no physical or emotional harm. Masturbation is, hence, not intrinsically harmful. However, without assuming some consequentialist moral theory, we cannot infer “Masturbation is not intrinsically wrong” from “Masturbation is not intrinsically harmful.”

Here again honesty sets a requirement. Those of us who continue to condemn harmless acts of masturbation, need to admit holding an assumption about what makes an act wrong apart from the harm, if any, it brings about We need to justify a clear persuasive non-consequentialist moral theory.

Here is a sketch of such a theory. Some acts, for example, attainment of a human male orgasm, are for the sake of a basic human good of marriage and children. These acts may also be chosen for the sake of non-basic human good such as pleasure. but which are incompatible with the basic human good. For instance, the choice of the pleasure of masturbation is incompatible with the basic human good of marriage and children. One cannot think of masturbation accomplishing what coitus with a spouse can accomplish. So, a masturbation orgasm is intrinsically incompatible with what male orgasms are for. This incompatibility with the good which it is for makes such an orgasm wrong..

The theory I sketched is a teleological moral theory insofar as acts are evaluated with reference to what is good. They are evaluated whether they are directed toward that good; not primarily on how they accomplish that good.

Conception is not Sexual

Abortion, Moral philosophy

In my book on sexual morality1, I divided sexuality into the triad: Courting, mating and bonding. Fifteen years later, While planning to revise my book, I find that division appropriate. Also, fifteen years later, most abortions in the United States are chemically induced miscarrigages. Classifying conception, perhaps implicitly, as an area of sexuality, can lead to a fallacious rationalization for chemically induced abortions.

Conception as a process may be sexual as a part of mating. However, conception as a product is not sexual; the product is a human being at its first stages.

Ignoring the process/product ambiguity of “conception” together with an assumption of the moral neutrality of sexuality can have deadly consequences. At least the consequences are deadly for many humans at their earliest stages. The moral neutrality of sexuality is an assumption that no sexual actvity is immoral apart from considerations of its consequences. Hence, using birth control pills to prevent the process of conception occurring is immoral only if it has very bad consequences whicy is usually not the case. So, those who follow the dominant strand of our culture about sexuality hold that use of contraceptive pills are morally permissible. In other words, they hold “It is morally permissible to use pills to stop conception.” However, it should be read as “It is morally permissible to use pills to stop conception as a process.” If people are not aware of, or ignore, the process/product of “conception, ” it is very easy to accept use of pills to stop, abort, the product of conception,

  1. Confronting Sexual Nihilism: Traditional Sexual Morality as an Antidote to Nihilism, Mustang OK, 2014, p.44

Pope Leo Reminds Us: Synodality is not Subversive

Catholic doctrine, Religious morality, Sexual morality

I was not alone when I cringed upon hearing of synodality and going to the peripheries. The secular media along with some Catholic sources mislead us to fear that synodality and going to the peripheries are primarily processes for subverting Catholic sexual morality. The peripheries to which we should go are the so-called LGBQT communities. While at these peripheries, synodality is accompanying representitives of LGBQT communities so that we can better understand and accept them as they are. Ultimately, such acceptance requires explicit admission that traditional Catholic prohibitions of certain sexual activities, begining with the intrinsically disordered masturbation, were in error. Such an admission would put the Catholic Church in conformity with the sexual morality of the mid-twentieth century Sexual Revolution; but a cruel betrayal of all who rely on the spiritual resources of Catholism in their struggle to be chaste.

Fortunately, in his August 15, 2025 address sent to the participants of the Peruvian Social week Pope Leo XIV has subtly calmed fears of subversion. He used “synodality” and “going to the peripheries” as normal terms for describing how the Church has been built up since Apostolic times. With special references to the missionaries and saints who built the Church in Peru he sketched out how, of course, they were at the peripheries in the New World. Of course, practiced synodality by learning the ways of those they encountered at the peripheries so they could convert them.

Jesus Would Not Have Reasoned as a Consequentialist

Moral philosophy, Sexual morality

This essay supplements my essay on Jesus’ sexual morality. In that essay, I argued that Jesus would never have masturbated because he was a moral genius. I elaborate on notion of moral genius and emphasize that the reasoning of a moral genius, especially in his early years when he would be a moral prodigy, is not that of a utilitarian or more broadly: a consequentialist.

His genius was possessing from a very early age perfect applied moral reasoning of a type frequently called natural law moral reasoning. Applied moral reasoning is primarily knowing how to do good and avoid evil. It is knowing, on a particular occasion how to organize the facts characterizing the situation and the values relevant to the situation into an intention to do good and avoid evil. The genius, as brought out below, invariably has the will to carry out his intention.

For instance, consider how I argue that a moral genius would resist a temptation to replicate the sensation of an unintended orgasm? He would recognize that he could aim at getting a pleasure and that since he had a desire for that pleasure it would be good. He would also recognize that he could manipulate himself to attain that pleasure. And, perhaps less clearly, he would recognize that such manipulations could be done whenever he wished. He was also at a stage of life when he knew of the role of male orgasms in reproduction. This knowledge of “the facts of life” brought with it recognition that lifelong monagamous bonding of a male and female for reproduction and mutual care was a basic human good. A basic human good is one which ought never be intenitonally set aside. Along with the recognition of the basic goodness of marriage, there would be the recognition that the pleasure of an orgasm is one of the features which make for marriage’s basic goodness. With this meagar but crucial information, the moral genius knows how to form an intention not to masturbate because an intention to masturbate would beintending what is evil – not good. The intention to masturbate would intend that the basic good of marriage could be set aside for only a portion of it. That would be intending evil since a basic good ought never be set aside for only a fragment of it.

More elaboration my be needed to persuaded everyone that the unarticulated reasoning of the alleged genius is correct. Here I want to give a reminder of the limited about of factual information – knowledge that – required. If the reasoning of the moral prodigy were to be based on an evaluation of the consequences of masturbating, an immense amount of factual information about the future would have to be innate to the child. Assuming an ability to organize a small amount of facts and values is more probable.

But making a correct moral decision requires more than forming a correct intention

A perfect applied practical reason is a reason for which to know the good is to do the good. Here I put myself on the side of those, such as St. Paul in Rm 7:19, who recognize weakness of the will. A weak will may not choose the good it intends. A perfect applied practical reason is a reason for which to intend the good is to choose the good. A moral genius is one with a perfect applied moral reason.

For a moral genius to intend the good is to choose the good. However, this choice may not be easy. A moral genius can be tempted and overcoming the temptation may be painful. However, the moral genius always has the will to endure the pain of setting aside the lesser good for the more fundamental good.