This is an exercise is philosophical theology. Using concepts from logic including the logical concepts of moral language arguments are constructed to show, at a very abstract level, that there must be some kind of being of religious interest that some being of religious interest must have certain features. The most well-know, or notorious, is the so-called ontological argument of St. Anselm. This is apriori conceptual play. However, if the order thought is the order of reality, this conceptual play uncovers fundamental features of religiously reality apart from thought.
I present the argument in a brief syllogism and then argue in support of only the second premise since I think apriori considerations about God’s goodness would easily support premise (1)
1. God cannot do what God ought not do.
2.God ought not destroy Satan
(3) God cannot destroy Satan
Why accept premise (2)?
Suppose God created an intelligence with a will free to choose as God wills it to act and to be or choose not to act and to be as God wills. Suppose this being is almost equal to God in intelligence and creative power. Suppose further that this being chooses not to act and be as God wills. Such a being could plausibly be described as Satan.
Even if Satan is not as he ought to be there is still a way he ought to be out there to be realized if Satan so chooses. If God were to destroy Satan, God would bring it about that Satan ceases to be. However, if Satan ceases to be, he cannot be as he ought to be. No being ought to stop the possibility of what ought to be from coming about. So, not even God ought to stop the possibility of Satan becoming as he ought to be.
Some corollaries which I think can be established are as follows.
A. God cannot bring it about that there is no time. For Satan is a moral being and a moral being needs a temporal framework to choose. Destruction of time would bring it about that Satan does not exist.
B. God cannot allow Satan to bring it about that he, Satan, does not exist. (Satanic suicide ). If Satan were to choose not to be, without revoking his choice contrary to God’s will, he would be irrevocably ruling out the possibility of being as he ought to be. An all good being cannot allow a being to irrevocably block the possibility of being as it ought to be.
I have written a book in which defending traditional sexual morality using as a crucial premise that we have a moral obligation to be morally correct people. Of course, the case for traditional sexual morality cannot be at the highly abstract level of the above conceptual play. However, I find that there is a phase of any serious philosophical argument where we confront the challenge starkly facing these apriori arguments. The challenge is what justifies us in assuming that the order of our thinking uncovers the order of reality apart from our thinking. I confront that high level challenge in my ” down to earth” book on sexual morality.
My book arguing that sexual neutrality leads to nihilism is Confronting Sexual Nihilism: Traditional Sexual Morality as an Antidote to Nihilism was released by Tate Publishing on March 11, 2014. See Book Web Page for information about the book. The publisher’s listed price is $26.99. Printed copies can be purchased here by credit card for $12.99, plus $3.71 for shipping and handling.
To purchase the printed book by check, send check of $16.70 per copy. Send to:
Charles F. Kielkopf
45 W. Kenworth Rd.
Columbus, Ohio 43214
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