Monthly Archives: September 2026

Transition from Consensual Sexual Morality to Conjugal Sexual Morality

Conjugal Sexual Morality, Consensual Sexual Morality

No sex outside of a lifelong monogamous marriage of a man and a woman. That’s the gist of conjugal sexual morality which many love, many hate and most violate. The “sexual revolution” was a revolt against this type of morality. There are many variants of conjugal sexual morality since sexuality includes courting, bonding and genital activity in Erotic Episodes. Adherents of conjugal sexual morality may different on permissible acts and degrees of severity in these three dimensions. For instance, with respect to bonding some may find marriage at thirteen impermissible, with respect to courting some may impose severe constraints are women’s’ style of dress and with respect to genital activity some may regard contraception permissible. So, I will not try to characterize conjugal sexual morality in detail. I am an adherent of the conjugal sexual morality taught by the Roman Catholic church. My examples will reflect that variant of conjugal sexual morality

This admission of variants in a morality is not acceptance of some sort of theory of moral relativity. Consensual sexual morality also has variants. The various circumstances in which a morality is to be applied often require different decisions of what ought to be done. There is good sense supporting a degree of moral relativity. However, any consistent moral theory has to have some core teachings which they hold applicable always and everywhere. For moral thought is universal in the sense of searching for fundamental action guides for all people everywhere at any time. In my comparison of consensual and conjugal sexual moralities, I hope to isolate these fundamental teachings. My strategy for isolating these fundamental teachings come from their stances on the fundamental law of morality: Do good, avoid evil. This fundamental teaching requires a moral outlook to take a stand on what is evil and what is good. Avoiding evil gives rise to what are frequently called definite or perfect duties. Definite duties are frequently expressed as negative categorical imperatives as “Thou shall never do such and such!” Doing good gives rise to what are frequently called indefinite or impertect duties. However, as seen in exposition of consensual sexual morality the perfect duties can be expressed positively as protections against evil. Athough we ought to promote what is good, there is no precision about when, where and how. Thus they are labelled “indefinite” or “imperfect duties”

The practice of calling a moral outlooks basic perfect duties its theory of right and its basic imperfect duties its theory of of good produces an ambiguity.

There is ambiguity with the term “right” when I call specifying what a moral outlook regrads as the basis of obligation – definite obligations as its theory of right but also call consensual sexual morality a rights theory of sexual morality. The ambiguity is using “right” to stand for what ought to be done – the right thing to do – and using “right” to stand for a condition of a person which it is never right to inhibit or remove. To avoid circularity in the definition it is necessary to change the meaning of “right” when it is used in the defineins from that in the defineindum. Sexual pleasure is the sexual good. Personally, I do not find this switching the sense of “right” confusing.

Before moving on to the theory of right for conjugal sexual morality it is helpful to review consensual sexual morality in accordance with this strategy for recognizing the fundamental principles of a moral outlook. Consensual sexual morality holds the following about good and evil on sexual matters. Disregard for sexual autonomy is evil. The evil is manifested in the degradation felt in non-consensual sex. Evil is lack of sexual autonomy. But sexual autonomy is not a good in the sense of being desired. For sexual satisfaction may be enjoyed in both dominating and being dominated. People may find sexual satisfaction in both degrading and being degraded. For consensual sexual morality the sexual good is satisfaction of sexual desire.

We now turn to answering. What is the basic evil for conjugal sexual morality? What is the basic good for conjugal sexual morality?

Erotic Episodes and Erotic Actions

Uncategorized

The purpose of this post is to have a post to which I can link for definitions of erotic episode” and “erotic actions.”

When writing of consensual sexual morality, accuracy requires a more comprehensive term for the genitalia manipulation phase of sexuality than “mating episode.” The term “mating” suggests an activity whose function is reproduction. Consensual sexual moralists find good in the pleasure of masturbation and same-sex genital manipulation. So, I offer “erotic episode” as a more comprehensive term. Colloquially, “making love” and “having sex” are terms for what I here call erotic episodes. When writing of erotic episodes, accuracy also requires a moral general term than “genitalia manipulation” since while people have sex, more body parts than genitalia may be manipulated. Indeed, material objects such as sex toys and pornography may be involved in the episode. I am writing about sexual morality; not about sex itself. So, I do not want to describe details. I label all those actions used for arousal and pleasure in an erotic episode “erotic actions”. Many, if not most, erotic actions are clearly identified as sexual. However, there are many other actions, not readily identifiable as having anything to do with sexuality, which for various reasons some people use in erotic episodes for sexual arousal and pleasure such as whipping, choking and even killing. These non-sexual actions are morally forbiden even if not forbidden by sexual morality. Consensual sexual moralists have more morality than sexual morality. So, even if an erotic episode in which all parties consented to all erotic actions, there could be moral condemnation of strangling a woman even if she consented. The strangling would not be condemned as a sexual wrong but as the wrong of strangling someone.

Consensual Sexual Morality is a Respect Morality

Consensual Sexual Morality, Moral philosophy

What is meant by “respect morality?” A respect morality has a basic imperative that some condition C ought to be promoted and protected regardless of any desire for C. Some examples of C are autonomy, duty and the good of the other. Corresponding imperatives might be expressed as: Protect autonomy for the sake of autonomy, Do your duty for the sake of doing your duty and promote the good of the other for the sake of the good of the other. Respect moralities are also virtue or character moralities because correlative to imperatives to do C for the sake of C there are imperatives to make yourself the kind of person who does C for the sake of C regardless of any desire to be such a person. For consensusal sexual morality in which protecting sexual autonomy is identified with receiving consent, the imperative may, for the purpose of emphasizing the difference between respect and desire, be expressed as protect receiving consent to the sexual act regardless of any desire to wait for consent.

The significance of recognizing some moralities as respect moralities is to point out that these kinds of moral theories need to include in their moral psycholgies another factor besides belief and desire to account for moral motivation. Perhaps belief and desire can account for why people choose what is believed to be good. However, if autonomy is specified what is to be respected, desire cannot account for choosing autonomy because autonomy is the condition for specifying what is good or truly desirable.

In this connection, I close this note by an attempt to reduce respecting sexual autonomy to desiring a certain type of sexual experience. See On Ohio State’s “Consent is Sexy” Posters.

Consensual Sexual Morality & a Rationalization for Abortion

Abortion, Moral philosophy

Can Consensual Sexual Morality be used to defend abortion? If conception is regarded as a part of an erotic episode, a plausible rationalization for abortion can be made. For terminology, I repeat the last paragraph of Consensual Sexual Morality – II . I have never heard or read of any defense of abortion along the lines sketched out below. If the rationalization is explicitly stated, the “stretching the meaning of terms” makes it implausible. I present it as a challenge to holders of consensual sexual morality who also support abortion rights. They are challenged to consider if they implicitly rationalize abortions in this way. Abortions stop a pregnancy. They are not killing an unborn human. Pregnancies are processes in sexual activity and such consent for such processes may always be withdrawn.

A summary of the relations of right, good and erotic actions in erotic episodes is helpful. Here I use “coerced” rather than “non-consensual” although some non-cconsensual acts are not strictly speaking coerced. I use “coerced” to emphasize the negativity of the types of non-consensual actions to which I allude. An erotic action is right (morally permissible by sexual morality ) if and only if no participant is coerced to perform or allow it. An erotic episode is right (morally permissible by sexual morality) if and only if the none of the erotic actions are coerced.

Erotic actions are the many and various things people do in an erotic episode to arouse and give pleasure. But not all of the actions in an erotic episode are intentional. Much is done naturally. They are just what people do while having sex. So, we might extend the notion of erotic action to erotic occurrence or better sexual occurrence. Then conception can be regarded as a sexual occurrence – a phase in an erotic episode. Indeed, the conception as a process of a spermatazoa contacting an ovum does most frequently occur as a phase of an erotic episode. But “conception” denotes a product as well as a process. As soon as there is the process, there is the product. So, the product -the conceptus- is also part of the erotic episode. This product is a growing entity in the body of the woman for typically nine months. By staying within the body, it extends the erotic episode for nine months. “Pregnancy” is the term for such extended erotic episodes. With a slight modification of the above quoted conditions for a morally permissible erotic episode, we have: An erotic episode is morally permissible if and only if each phase of it is consensual. This gives: A pregnancy is morally permissible if and only if each phase of it is consensual. So, if a woman refuses consent to the conception at any phase of the pregnancy, the pregnancy is not morally permissible. What is not morally permissible may be stopped. So, if a woman refuses consent to the pregnancy, the pregnancy may be terminated.

I critique this line of argument inConception is not Sexual.

Consensual Sexual Morality – II

Moral philosophy, Progressive Morality

A moral outlook has two parts: A theory of right, and and a theory of good. The bipartite division is based on the first principal of natural morality: Do good, avoid evil! The theory of right specifies what we have a right to do. These rights are what we may do without doing evil. So, in effect, the theory of right tells us what ought not be and how to avoid it. So, a theory of right could be considered a moral outlook’s theory of evil. These “Thou shalt not” are protective. For instance, in consensual sexual morality, sexual dignity is to be protected. Consensual Sexual Morality – I presents the theory of right for consensual sexual morality. The first principle of natural morality is not only protective, it is also calls for promotion of what is good. Specification of the good to be promoted and guidelines for promoting it are theory of good for a moral outlook.

It is worth noting that the first principle of natural law can be read in two ways depending upon whether the protection part is taken as more important than the promotion part. If a condition, such as dignity, which is not by itself a good, as needing protection at all costs, then promotion of positive goods are constrained by prohibitions against infringing upon that protected condition. These are rights moral outlooks. On the contrary if the only, or primary, protection needed is hinderance of the good, then we have a beneficent or teleological moral outlook for acts are judged by how well they promote that for which they are good. The consensual sexual morality theory I am constructing is a rights theory.

Why does the moral outlook of consensual sex have a theory of rights as more fundamental than its theory of good? Sexual practice is obviously in pursuit of some good in the sense of something highly desired for its own sake. People avidly engage in courting, bonding and mating. Unfortunately, sexual practices provide many affronts to human dignity; especially using others as merely bodies for some satisfaction. The affronts to human dignity require moral thought to protect human dignity. So, when we come to moralize sexual practice we must first protect human dignity. Once the constraints on pursuit of the good are in place, attention can refocus on the good to consider how it may be promoted.

What is the good of sexual activity from the perspective of consensual sexual morality? The sexual activity of the human animal, as for other animals, consists of the reproductive activities of courting, mating and bonding. I use “mating” to refer to the various uses of the genitalia for arousal and pleasure; not only to coitus. Mating is an episode beginning with some arousal actions, a climax and some post climatic states. Why do we do these things? No doubt a function of our sexual activity is reproduction of our species. Instincts are a foundation for sexual practices. Most likely we have evolved, or been created, to find the activities desirable for their own sake. However, in humans sexual activities are also intentional. A crucial assumption I put at the foundations of consensual sexual morality holds: It is in what people intend where we find what is the good of a practice in the sense of what is the purpose of a practice. If we study the human species as zoologists, human sexuality is for reproduction and bonding – has the function of reproduction and forming a foundational element of social grouping. When we examine the human condition with a view to discovering or inventing, our place in reality and purpose of our lives, we, from the perspective of consensual sexual moralists, hold that the pleasure of mating episodes is the purpose of human sexuality. For only self-conscious rational beings set purposes.

When writing of consensual sexual morality, accuracy requires a more comprehensive term for the genitalia manipulation phase of sexuality than “mating episode.” The term “mating” suggests an activity whose function is reproduction. Consensual sexual moralists find good in the pleasure of masturbation and same-sex genital manipulation. So, I offer “erotic episode” as a more comprehensive term. Colloquially, “making love” and “having sex” are terms for what I here call erotic episodes. When writing of erotic episodes, accuracy also requires a moral general term than “genitalia manipulation” since while people have sex, more body parts than genitalia may be manipulated. Indeed, material objects such as sex toys and pornography may be involved in the episode. I am writing about sexual morality; not about sex itself. So, I do not want to describe details. I label all those actions used for arousal and pleasure in an erotic episode “erotic actions”. Many, if not most, erotic actions are clearly identified as sexual. However, there are many other actions, not readily identifiable as having anything to do with sexuality, which for various reasons some people use in erotic episodes for sexual arousal and pleasure such as whipping, choking and even killing. These non-sexual actions are morally forbiden even if not forbidden by sexual morality. Consensual sexual moralists have more morality than sexual morality. So, even if an erotic episode in which all parties consented to all erotic actions, there could be moral condemnation of strangling a woman even if she consented. The strangling would not be condemned as a sexual wrong but as the wrong of strangling someone.

In the following I assume that if people engage in a practice for its own sake, they intend to do so.

We cannot assume that people engage in the varieties of courting, mating and bonding with the intention of reproduction. For one, humans needed to learn that the natural function of coitus is conception and birth. Secondly, at least in recent history, there are intentions to avoid conception. What in this triad of courting, mating and bonding is most likely to be desired for its own sake? Courting is for the sake of finding a mating partner. Bonding is for the sake of supporting results of the mating. This leaves the erotic episodes to be desired for their own sake.

Do people pursue erotic episodes for their own sake? The “in general answer” is: People pursue erotic episodes simply because they are highly desired. In general truths are not necessary truths. But they hold for the vast majority of situations And a special explanation has to be given to support a claim that the “in general” claim is rejected for a special case.. So, it is a fact that erotic episodes are desired for their own sake. Critical thinkers may note that being desired does not mean being good. So, consensual sexual moralists add to their rights principles about protecting sexual dignity a value principle that the pleasure of erotic episodes is a basic human good. Consensual sexual morality is sex positive! Individuals experience sexual pleasure, but the judgment that this pleasure is good is a judgment that we have an obligation to increase the experiences of it both numerically and qualitatively. But obligations to promote good are obligations to do so when we can actually accomplish something without doing more harm than good. For instance, an increase in what is good might be accomplish by providing opportunities for people with physical disabilities to enjoy erotic episodes

Erotic episodes have participants and can be evaluated on the basis of the sexual pleasure of the participants. But the evaluation does not call for specific action for it is not ordered and there is no clear way of adding pleasures. But most of all, rights protection is more important that sexual pleasure promotion. An erotic episode with a USA billionaire and an eight-year old girl in Southeast Asia may be very good because of the intense pleasure of the adult. But its goodness does nothing to remove the fact that it is categorically forbidden as a degradation of the girl’s sexual dignity, and indeed the dignity of all girls.

It may be that pornography enhances sexual pleasure for male viewers who masturbate and even for male/female couples who view it together. But promoting pornography might have undesirable consequences for society. Here is a situation where we might do more harm than good by promoting what we think we do by promoting sexual pleasure.

A summary of the relations of right, good and erotic actions in erotic episodes is helpful. Here I use “coerced” rather than “non-consensual” although some non-onsensual acts are not strictly speaking coerced. I use “coerced” to emphasize the negativity of the types of non-consensual actions to which I allude. An erotic action is right (morally permissible by sexual morality ) if and only if no participant is coerced to perform or allow it. An erotic episode is right (morally permissible by sexual morality) if and only if the none of the erotic actions are coerced. The pleasures of participants are good whether in the actions or in the whole episode; but pleasures do not justify.