It is morally wrong for a man to masturbate.

The goal of this post is attained by noting that in a discussion of morality there can be a subtle shift from considering what’s wrong with the action to what harm does the action bring about. The subtly of the shift conceals an assumption that the wrongness of the action is to be determined by the harm which it brings about. The concealed assumption is, of course, an assumption of a consequentialist moral theory.

My moral condemnation of masturbation is, in part, placing a heavy burden of proof on those who dissent. Defending consequentialism is a heavy burden.

Masturbation is wrong; morally wrong. I imagine many challenging me with “What’s wrong with masturbation?” I will imagine the debate going beyond pointing out the need to have rules about when, and especially where, men may masturbate. Unregulated masturbation might very well be socially disruptive. Pointing out a need for some restrictions on masturbation is compatible with an assumption that harmfulness of some sort is the standard for an action being wrong. Here we can note that many condemnations of men viewing pornography, which is part of their masturbation, go in the direction of pointing out harm produced by male masturbation.

But honesty requires admitting that millions of masturbatory actions lead to no readily recognized harm. It is easy to think of masturbatory actions which lead to no harm; no physical or emotional harm. Masturbation is, hence, not intrinsically harmful. However, without assuming some consequentialist moral theory, we cannot infer “Masturbation is not intrinsically wrong” from “Masturbation is not intrinsically harmful.”

Here again honesty sets a requirement. Those of us who continue to condemn harmless acts of masturbation, need to admit holding an assumption about what makes an act wrong apart from the harm, if any, it brings about We need to justify a clear persuasive non-consequentialist moral theory.

Here is a sketch of such a theory. Some acts, for example, attainment of a human male orgasm, are for the sake of a basic human good of marriage and children. These acts may also be chosen for the sake of non-basic human good such as pleasure. but which are incompatible with the basic human good. For instance, the choice of the pleasure of masturbation is incompatible with the basic human good of marriage and children. One cannot think of masturbation accomplishing what coitus with a spouse can accomplish. So, a masturbation orgasm is intrinsically incompatible with what male orgasms are for. This incompatibility with the good which it is for makes such an orgasm wrong..

The theory I sketched is a teleological moral theory insofar as acts are evaluated with reference to what is good. They are evaluated whether they are directed toward that good; not primarily on how they accomplish that good.